Afghanistan and the Future of US-China Relations

By Khushmita Dhabhai

Much of the 21st century has encompassed the competing geopolitical narratives of the United States and China. It is commonly assumed that both states share a relationship quite similar to two super-power, "Cold War" adversaries. However, compared to the nature of Soviet-American relations, the multiple avenues of 'cautious optimism' between China and the United States pave a dynamic that is very different from traditional 'Great-Power Competition'. For instance, while the United States and the Soviet Union operated as two separate spheres of economic influence, presently, the U.S. and China share a mutual interdependence that connects them economically, financially and in terms of trade . Even if they were to attempt decoupling, the reorganization of a significant chunk of its production involves massive costs that would do more harm than help to the United States. Likewise, while America, and the entire world, is dependent on China's manufacturing infrastructure, the country itself is experiencing multiple hurdles on the technological frontier- rendering it increasingly dependent on foreign trade. The fact that recent sanctions, depriving Huawei of U.S.-made chips, were received as a 'death sentence' for China's most successful tech company is revalant of the 'devastating impact' the country might sustain if the United States were to continue targeting key sectors of its economy. Moreover, it is also important to note that, unlike the scenario in the Cold War, both states are not leading opposing and economically independent alliance blocs based on fundamentally opposing ideologies. Specifically from the Chinese front, its narratives of a Chinese Dream –be it ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ or the ‘Chinese Model’– are not robust ideologies that can be exported abroad. They are instead mere nationalist imperatives, used as intermittent slogans or bumper stickers. This drastically limits the U.S.-China rivalry from translating into a global or 'proxy-war’ affair.

This streak of 'cautious optimism' has recently shone in another realm of Sino-American relations, with leaders from both sides agreeing over the necessity for cooperation in Afghanistan. Consequently, one might question the extent to which the crisis in Afghanistan could, in fact, present both countries with the opportunity to engage in cooperation and avert confrontation? Therefore, this article will seek to evaluate the possible circumstances leading to 'Great-Power Cooperation' in Afghanistan and anticipate the pathways towards Sino-American collaboration in the region.

Shared Interests in Afghanistan

The United States and China, both harbor a multitude of independent and shared interests in Afghanistan.

Although having conducted a full-scale withdrawal of troops in August 2021, American interests in Afghanistan are evergreen and yet to diminish. Alongside the notion of expanding into the continental aspect of the Indo-Pacific, engagement with Afghanistan will aid the United States in consolidating current channels of bilateral cooperation with Central-Asian countries. Being aware of an increasing wariness towards the reliability of its commitments in the region, America's involvement and investment in Afghanistan will “institutionalize and consolidate” its strategic relations with Central Asia. Additionally, the scaling back of counterterrorism structures within Afghanistan and the absence of a robust external counterterrorism network means that the United States would need to exercise vigilance over the growth of militancy and violent religious extremism in the region. Finally, American agendas of containing the exertion of Chinese influence in the region lend it an increasingly pertinent reason to maintain close stakes in Afghanistan.

While Chinese propaganda has left no stone unturned in scoffing at the American withdrawal and deeming the country as an unreliable ally and a declining power, not all is bright for Beijing, and it is masking a plethora of its own insecurities. China was quick to discern the void that America left in the region and is now seeking comprehensive strategic partnerships with the Taliban to tap into the economic gold-mine that Afghanistan is. The country's geography positions it as the hub for trade and transit in Central Asia and makes it a repository of vast natural resources. These are lucrative baits that China might seek to exploit through its 'Belt and Road Initiative'. However, at its core, China is both vary of the Taliban's promises and the security threat that an influx of drugs and radical-Islamic terrorism might create around its borders. Having learnt from the attacks on Chinese workers in provinces where the Taliban were the de-facto power, Beijing is cognizant and apprehensive of the volatility surrounding the Taliban's promises. Moreover, China's 'Peace-through-Development' model has not reaped the best results in Tibet, Xinjiang or even overseas in Myanmar, Venezuela and Sudan. Afghanistan, being the 'Graveyard of Empires', only worsens the stakes because the success of Chinese investments can be threatened "by local grievances, an assortment of jihadi groups, factional divisions, and a host of other factors that even the Taliban can not control". Moreover, China suspects a 'spill-over' effect that might incite its Uighur minorities along its western borders. Consequently, political stability is key to Chinese actions in Afghanistan. As demonstrated by its reluctance to support a full-scale development project in the Mes-Aynak mines, Beijing is far too preoccupied with its defense and security requirements to pursue its affirmative interests in Afghanistan.

Beijing and Washington, therefore, are faced with a similar set of challenges in the region: rampant terrorism and an unfavourable Central-Asian environment. Despite this alignment of interests, the United States and China's mutual distrust towards the other has, to a great extent, hindered the translation of possible cooperation into a demonstrable joint-action plan. To ensure the elimination of their shared challenges, such a scenario can not continue. Counterterrorism strategies tend to reap better results within frameworks of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Therefore, in light of their capacities to influence additional nations, it is integral that the United States and China collaborate over the security threats emanating from Afghanistan. Moreover, as two strategic competitors, both countries specifically need to transparently cooperate with the other to secure their interests in Afghanistan. This is because even the mere “perception of state support for an armed adversary may be divisive and trigger escalatory spirals of political and material support to geopolitical rivals’ jihadi adversaries”. The current dynamics of suspicion between both countries —with China courting the very countries that the U.S. was seeking to establish bases in and the former suspecting the latter to be backing Uighyur Jihadis— would only stall the efficacy of counterterrorism measures in subsiding the region's instability. 

Realms for Cooperation

A structure of transparent cooperation is, therefore, critical to safeguarding both countries' interests. While a military-based collaborative framework in the Afghan neighborhood seems highly unlikely in the near future, both China and the United States could seek to explore alternative routes for cooperation.

Engaging Pakistan for Counterterrorism-centric Activities

Cooperation with Pakistan to establish intelligence networks is fundamental to counterterrorism strategies in the Afghan neighborhood. While Washington's waning relationships with Islamabad and increasing tilt towards India have considerably diminished America's capacity to cajole Pakistan into an agreement, China could step into this role and seek to successfully influence its "all-weather friend". 

With billions of dollars pledged in investment under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative and its increasing trade and financial assistance to Pakistan, the extent of China's economic and diplomatic ties with the country has far exceeded that of the United States. Consequently, leveraging the Beijing-Islamabad partnership emerges crucial to Washington's counterterrorism strategy in the Indo-Pacific. China, however, has consistently exercised reluctance in pressuring Pakistan: a regional ally key to China's geostrategic aims. By serving as a “friendly geographic buffer state”, Islamabad aids Beijing in sustaining a more convenient balance of power vis-à-vis India, the Central Asian republics, and U.S. regional involvement. 

Close U.S.-China talks, therefore, are central to persuading Beijing into pursuing a series of serious steps concerning Pakistan. Additionally, in such a situation, Washington must concede a certain extent of its strategic partnerships/military exercises that directly threaten China in exchange for the country’s reciprocity. This would be fundamental in nudging Beijing towards prioritizing Central Asian security and stability over the staunch maintenance of strategic ties with Pakistan- an ally that has fewer options but to heed China itself. 

Pursuing Joint Humanitarian Assistance

As the foundation for immediate, short-term assistance, the United States and China should cooperate to ensure Afghanistan receives a sufficient amount of basic necessities- allowing the country to subside its current crisis. Due to the time and labor-intensive logistics of aid distribution, it is crucial that American aid agencies establish anchorage in Afghanistan's neighbors to facilitate an easy and efficient movement of supplies. While the United States does not particularly harbor the best strategic relationships with Afghanistan's Central Asian neighborhood, the Chinese could seek to intervene in this situation, leverage their influence and cajole the neighborhood into cooperation.

Long term humanitarian assistance is dependent on whether and how both countries arrive at a consensus on recognizing the Taliban. Additionally, it would also require them to signal their shared commitments towards increasing Afghanistan's self-sufficiency; particularly, through “agreements on providing equal levels of on-budget civilian assistance based on transparent, agreed mechanisms”. While for China, this would entail increasing its current levels of assistance, the United States might need to decrease its levels of aid due to Afghanistan's poor absorptive capacity. China and the United States might also seek to direct humanitarian assistance on a condition-based approach with the Taliban. This would encompass a trade-off whereby assistance to Afghanistan is reciprocated by the Taliban allowing the operation of private supply chains, maintaining the security of private sector trade and investment, and creating a politically stable and representative form of governance.

Conclusion

While shared Sino-American interests in Afghanistan might present a streak of 'cautious optimism' in strategic relations, achieving 'Great-Power Cooperation' is subject to a range of harsh concessions. It would mean that China might have to fully leverage its partnership with Pakistan, and that the United States might have to accept the outcome of an increased Chinese presence in Afghanistan's extractive industries. Consequently, the task for both countries lies in forging beyond the past complexities of their relations and shaping a secure and sustainable Afghanistan.

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