Assessing ASEAN Passivity in 2023

By Thanapat Sakulpattanacharoen

Abstract

Passivity has long been a trait of ASEAN’s diplomatic history. It has brought peace, security and promoted economic growth for the region by balancing the power internally and externally. This op-ed examines how passivity affects the current ASEAN's global role. It showcases some examples of ASEAN's limitations in crisis resolution due to its reactive nature. ASEAN's passivity, while promoting economic growth, may well hinder conflict resolution and pose challenges to regional stability. To benefit the most from ASEAN centrality, structural reforms and a proactive approach are necessary to ensure ASEAN’s essential regional and global role.

In 2023, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), under Indonesia's chairmanship, was centered around the theme “ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth.” This theme highlights ASEAN’s effort to uphold regional peace, from internal stability to becoming the centre force of the Indo-Pacific region. Since its establishment, ASEAN has been able to preserve its integrity through balancing power within the region and thus has been promoting its centrality and carrying out a “balanced diplomacy” strategy in the post-war period (Wen & Runlin, 2023). Together with the “ASEAN way,” these enable regional stability to thrive. However, at the same time, they expose ASEAN’s biggest shortcomings: a divided stance on most major issues and its reactive tendency.

Until now, ASEAN has made Southeast Asia a neutralised region where no actors have a real high ground over others to avoid the emergence of hegemonic states (Wen & Runlin, 2023). Consequently, ASEAN benefits from its structure, successfully minimises regional conflicts, and promotes dialogues of peace throughout the year (Thompson & Chong, 2020). Therefore, the organization benefits from all external actors while presenting itself as a major player exerting its influence over the Indo-Pacific region, mainly through regional forums such as the East Asia Summit.

That being said, with the current world situation ranging from US-China hegemonic rivalry to food instability following the Russo-Ukrainian war to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, more countries, including those in Southeast Asia, are contributing to the changing global dynamic. The rise of middle powers has blurred the boundary of the bipolar world we currently live in. The complexity of global politics, in which there exist bipolar dynamic but multipolar elements, enhances the importance of both emerging countries and regional integration as ASEAN.

ASEAN has to be more flexible than before to balance its regional architecture with external powers since it has always been promoting its centrality as the main driving force for regional cooperation (Kementerian Kominfo, 2023). Contrarily, its relevance may be jeopardised if it only commits to its centrality without looking at the changing global landscape and refuses to change accordingly. Exploring how passivity affects ASEAN’s role in current global dynamics is fundamental to elevating its position.

According to Natalegawa (2018), the reactive tendency and “transformative” trait of ASEAN facilitate their ability to respond to sudden events and are what contribute the most to ASEAN’s past. However, this trait does not guarantee its relevance in the global system, or it may, even worse, have overbearing effects, since that means ASEAN’s interests will pivot on other major actors, not on itself. Some of the biggest failures in ASEAN crisis resolution can be seen through two cases: the South China Sea and Myanmar's coup.

The South China Sea (SCS) dispute is one of the most prolonged ongoing disputes not only with China but also within ASEAN itself. Since the Code of Conduct in the SCS began, 12 years have passed and China still claims the disputed territory without any major changes. While the Philippines, Taiwan, and Malaysia all rejected the latest Chinese map in 2023 (AP News, 2023), there also has not been any intra-ASEAN resolution or agreement regarding the SCS disputes. We can acknowledge China as a common threat in this dispute; however, it reflects passivity in ASEAN decision-making that only reacts to “abnormal” circumstances after it has happened.

Similarly, Myanmar’s coup reflected once again the inability to reach a solution, mainly due to the non-interference policy. As the Chairman’s Statement of the 43rd ASEAN summit was published, condemning attacks on civilians and reiterating the Five-Point Consensus (ASEAN, 2023), there have been some critics on the topic regarding its inability to solve the regional problem (The Japan Times, 2023; Tong, 2023). This pushes back ASEAN’s international impression while also deteriorating security and cooperation within Southeast Asia (Harding & Tower, 2021), but for ASEAN member states, this is the most they can do since principle and diplomatic tradition prevent them from being any more proactive.

The US is seen as a competing power against China in East Asia as a whole. Due to the aforementioned “shared leadership system” in Southeast Asia in which there is no hegemonic power, ASEAN has gained the trust of major powers. However, in early September 2023, Joe Biden did not attend both the ASEAN Summit and the East Asian Summit, both spearheaded by ASEAN, by himself despite being in the region. Instead, he went to India for the G20 summit, then visited Vietnam to “upgrade ties” (Bose, 2023). Two directions of opinion were created. Some observers suggest Indonesia, and to a larger extent ASEAN, is not being prioritised as a prominent actor for the US. Suffice it to say that, in this way, ASEAN may be perceived as “not agile in resolving or at least managing various challenges” because of their apparent lack of cooperation, adding more fuel to ASEAN’s relevance crisis (Karmini & Tarigan, 2023; Mada, 2023). On the other hand, scheduling matters were brought up as the main reason and nothing else, reaffirming its support for ASEAN centrality (Brunnstrom et al., 2023; Lu, 2023).

Whether or not Biden’s absence is justified, on one hand, it underlines the consequence of ASEAN's passivity and its principles. But more importantly, it signifies the fragility of ASEAN regional stability supported by its reactive traits, as the ASEAN Way boosts the regional economy but gets in the way when it comes to conflict resolution (Cheok & Chen, 2019). The current structure of ASEAN prevents it from getting involved in disputes between states. It is great for balancing power, but not solving problems (Thompson & Chong, 2020; Wen & Runlin, 2023). Once the balance is threatened, fear and disappointment will build up. Ultimately, this limitation will harm ASEAN centrality, or at least obstruct progress and hence regional peace and stability in the upcoming era will be put in jeopardy.

For ASEAN member states to achieve its 2025 Political Security Community goal, especially in “ASEAN Centrality in a Dynamic and Outward-Looking Region” characteristics, they have to ensure ASEAN is proactive enough on its own to conduct and lead movements for change. Reformation of structure and principles may be important in some cases. ASEAN has always been constant in upholding its centrality, but centrality and regional economic prosperity cannot truly be achieved without proper conflict management. As Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore Prime Minister (Mahmud, 2023) stated, "The solution is not to remain passive and avoid taking positions on all issues. Otherwise, ASEAN will lose its relevance."

The path of reformation is still open to be discussed; however, it is in the interest of the ASEAN community that reforming its structure while respecting its crucial principles is made possible. Regionally, its member states will benefit from having an effective regional organisation to safeguard peace and stability and to prepare for future challenges. From an international perspective, a more proactive approach will establish ASEAN’s relevance in the following decades. If ASEAN is still willing to be a mediator of the region, it has to at least produce a tangible outcome to ensure that ASEAN is capable and ready to be an essential player in broader regional integrity.

References

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