Assessing Russia in Syria: The Impact of the Ukraine War
Kevin Chen
Abstract
This paper examines the overall impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Russia's military presence in Syria since its intervention in 2015. Initially deployed to support President Bashar al-Assad against rebels and ISIS, Russian forces expanded their capabilities, establishing key military bases and influencing regional dynamics. Despite significant engagements, losses in Ukraine, and major impediments, such as the dissolution of the Wagner group, Russia maintained its Syrian operations. However, Moscow's dedication to its strategic objectives also allowed foreign actors to challenge its sphere of influence in Syria and the Middle East. This paper explores the implications of Russia's sustained presence for regional stability and global power balances.
In 2015, an estimated 63,000 Russian military personnel were deployed to Syria (AFP, 2022). This deployment, which began as a campaign to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad against the Syrian rebel army and the growing ISIS forces within Syria, expanded air and ground support capabilities. To facilitate this expansion, Russia and Syria signed a 2015 treaty to establish Khmeimim Air Base, their largest airbase in Syria, and a 2017 treaty to expand the Tartus naval facility into a naval base. Today, an estimated 105 Russian bases are strategically placed across the entire country (Al Majalla, 2023).
Seeing itself as a significant regional power, Russia used its military presence for diplomatic gain. Its increased air force presence in northern Syria aimed to prevent new Turkish offensives into the region without Moscow’s approval. Established Russian bases and patrols in northeast Syria ensured Russia's role in mediating any conflict between the Syrian regime and the US-backed Kurdish forces (SDF) (Haid, 2022). The Russian military presence also deterred the escalation of conflict between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iranian proxies, and Israeli forces. Russia, for instance, has allowed the Israeli Air Force to conduct airstrikes on Hezbollah forces within Syria since 2015 while at times pressuring Israel to limit these strikes by firing S-300 anti-air missiles at Israeli jets over Syria.
The demonstration of Russian military prowess in Syria led to claims of record-breaking arms sales globally. Syria served as a battleground for Russia to test “all the last-generation military systems that could not be tested under military conditions – including high-precision weaponry, missiles, helicopters, planes, and cruise missiles,” according to Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Moscow-based Center of Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (Mirovalev, 2016). From 2015 to 2019, Russia's arms exports averaged $6.34 billion, making it the second-largest arms exporter after the US (MacDonald, 2023). However, this period also saw an increased reliance on Chinese, Indian, and Algerian interest in Russian arms sales, with these three countries constituting more than half of all Russian arms exports (Hendrix, 2023).
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia found itself in a new and costly conflict. Given the significant loss of forces in the initial assault on Kyiv in February 2022, questions arose about the new power dynamic in Syria as Russia redeployed assets and personnel to Ukraine. Russia's military and humanitarian support supported the regime’s stability. The reduction in Russian presence allowed Syria's neighbors and internal factions to influence the balance of power in the decade-long civil war. Foreign actors with vested interests in the country, such as Turkey, Iran, and Israel, seized the opportunity to expand operations that Russia previously restricted. The long-term impact of Russia's decreased presence in Syria remains uncertain, but the short-term effects have already emerged.
One of the primary Russian private military companies (PMCs) operating in Syria was the Wagner group, which first reported the Syrian civil war in 2015. Despite the Russian Defense Ministry's denial of employing the illegal Wagner forces, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) claimed they unofficially supervised the group (RBC Magazine, 2016). PMCs performed various tasks, from training the Syrian Arab Army to combat operations against ISIS and Syrian rebels, intelligence gathering, and site security. This allowed the main Russian army to maintain a low-profile force capable of undertaking risky operations. Casualties sustained by Wagner fighters were often left in anonymous graves, affording the Russian government plausible deniability, as PMC fighters were not recognized as a part of the Russian military.
The first six months of the Ukraine War further drained Russia’s resources. The Russian Air Force redeployed a squadron of Su-25 fighters from Syria shortly after the invasion began (Smagin, 2023). In August, Russia shipped a battery of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles from Syria to Crimea. Russian military withdrawals from areas in Latakia were promptly followed by occupation by Hezbollah fighters (Trevelyan, 2023). As Russian commanders and veterans in Syria represented the largest pool of experienced fighters, reports indicated their redeployment to the frontlines in Ukraine, including Syrians serving alongside Russian PMCs. Estimates ranged from 500 Wagner fighters to as many as 16,000 Syrian fighters being welcomed by the Kremlin for deployment in Ukraine (Cafarella, Yazici, & Coles, 2022).
Recent developments caused further complications due to the dissolution of the Wagner group following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s boss. On November 2, the chairman of the Russian parliament’s Defense Committee proclaimed Wagner had 'finally disbanded' (РосБизнесКонсалтинг, 2023). Subsequently, control of Wagner’s operations was transferred to Rosgvardiya, the Russian National Guard, and the GRU-controlled PMC Redut, according to sources from the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel (Mardasov, 2023). This agency, however, lacked experience in foreign operations and further government oversight limited the PMC’s capabilities. Most of Wagner’s mercenaries had already left Syria, with the remaining few handing over weapons and processing documents. Facilities controlled by Wagner, such as the Hayan gas field and the Hayan Petroleum Company plant, were transferred to PMCs affiliated with the Russian Defense Ministry (Mardasov, 2023). Amidst this chaos, there was a possibility that disgruntled Wagner mercenaries transferred Russian weaponry and equipment to Iranian proxies like Hezbollah rather than returning it to the Russian military, further undermining Russia’s position.
Despite the sudden decrease in Russian military presence, its objectives have not diminished. The redeployment of Russian troops to the Ukrainian front was never intended to replace Syria’s armed forces but provided support with supplies and combined arms capabilities. Despite representing the largest Russian foreign presence outside of Ukraine, the estimated 5,000 active combat troops that served in Syria were an insignificant number compared to the scale of the Ukraine conflict (Smagin, 2023). The Russian air force persistently combats the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army and ISIS, while Assad forces and Iranian proxies became the main boots on the ground. The presence of Russian bases in Latakia and Tartus still afforded access across the Middle East, containing US and allied forces in Syria and supporting foreign actors such as the Axis of Resistance operating mostly out of Syria.
Although Russia’s losses in Ukraine may not have impacted its tactical capabilities, the immediate military landscape altered diplomatic dynamics, potentially giving Syria’s neighbors a larger role in shaping its future and the Middle East. Weeks after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian peacekeeping efforts slowed to a halt in Nagorno-Karabakh, which Azerbaijan took advantage of to retake territories they lost to Armenia and caused an unprecedented exodus of Armenian refugees. The withdrawal of crucial Russian equipment, such as the S-300 anti-air missiles, emboldened Turkey to expand its buffer zone into SDF territory and launch a week-long offensive in November 2022 (Mroue & Bilginsoy, 2022). With the expansion of the Turkish buffer zone in 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to further extend multiple security corridors to places like Tel Rifat, Manbij, and Ain al-Arab (Devranoglu & Kucukgocmen, 2022).
Similarly, Israeli airstrikes in Syria continued with little to no regard for Russia’s presence as Israel sought to eliminate the transfer of Russian and Iranian equipment to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria. The deteriorating relationship between Russia and Israel, exacerbated by Russia’s vocal support of Hamas, led Israel to equate Russia with its existential foes, Iran and Hezbollah (Czerny, 2023). In response to Hamas’ visit to Moscow, Israel ceased providing advance warnings to Russia ahead of its airstrikes in Syria (The Times of Israel, 2023). Despite Russia’s long-standing goal of appearing as a great power by acting as a mediator in the Middle East, Israel’s frequent attacks in Syria testified to the weakening of Russian influence in the region (Czerny, 2023).
Russia's military maneuvers in Syria, influenced by its broader geopolitical strategies and recent engagements in Ukraine, signal a complex balancing act. Currently, it is unlikely that Russian forces will withdraw from Syria, even as the Ukraine war approaches the two-year mark. Compared to the height of combat operations from 2015 to 2019, combatant forces have become less important for Russia to achieve its objectives in Syria. Airstrikes still continue on Syrian soil, as do joint Russian-Syrian military exercises. However, the dynamic geopolitical tensions between Syria’s neighbors have weakened Russia’s military prowess, a result of both Russia’s losses in Ukraine and its first redirection away from Syria since its intervention. As Russia loses or redirects equipment from Syria due to the ongoing Ukraine war, as in the case of the disbandment of Wagner fighters, foreign and internal actors like Turkey, Israel, and Iranian proxies could exploit the temporary weaknesses resulting from Russia’s absence. The evolution of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s subsequent cost of military assets against the political power of maintaining forces in Syria will be crucial in the coming months.
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