Brazil: What Lula’s climate ambitions mean for Brazilian domestic and foreign policy

By Claire Yubin Oh

Last August, leaders of eight nations in Latin America met in the northern Brazilian city of Belem for the two-day Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) summit – a “landmark” gathering, as dubbed by Brazilian President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva (Phillips, 2023). The summit was partly a culmination of continuing pressures for deforestation in the Amazon region, especially EU’s new regulations to ban imports of commodities driving deforestation, which was made in an effort to push countries to police their supply chains against environmental and human rights violations (Figueiredo, 2023). 

But beyond such continued externalities, the ACTO summit was arguably a debut stage for the Brazilian leader to present his blueprint for “a new Amazon dream”, an environmental protection model that accompanies social inclusion, economic growth, and technological innovation, and pledging to achieve zero deforestation by 2030. As such, combating deforestation is increasingly becoming Brazil’s new priority across foreign policy and domestic politics. However, in order to understand Lula’s future policy directions, we need to carefully consider his intentions and the possible context behind such a decision: what do Lula’s climate ambitions mean for Brazilian politics and international relations, as well as his future agendas as president?

Lula’s climate commitment in the context of Brazilian politics

Undoubtedly, Lula’s ambitions and past legacies in his first two terms in climate agendas have offered him a unique political position, especially in contrast to his predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro. Heralding his anti-environmental and anti-international agenda, Bolsonaro’s office had prioritised economic development rather than addressing deforestation in the Amazon. This approach has involved the weakening of key environmental agencies, including Ibama, and the indigenous protection agency Funai. Additionally, Bolsonaro has eased restrictions on protected lands, enabling increased activities like logging and mining. Such policies have resulted in the highest levels of deforestation in Brazil in 2021 since 2008 (Jones, 2022); over the course of his four-year tenure, satellite imagery indicates a substantial contraction of the ecosystem, estimated at around 17 percent (Birnbaum and Kaplan, 2022).

In turn, Lula’s ambitious climate agenda, in sharp contrast to Bolsonaro, has effectively worked the disappointments and divisions in Brazilian society to his favour, earning Lula the powerful following of a wide range of environmentalists and indigenous activists. Comments from Marcio Astrini, the executive secretary of the Brazilian Climate Observatory, reflect a prevalent sentiment during the 2022 elections, as “Brazilians were deciding between having an Amazon or having Bolsonaro,” but shifted their decisions since “Lula really understands the weight of these [environmental] agendas.” (Birnbaum and Kaplan, 2022)

Indeed, to appease his supporters, revoking various environmental laws and decrees that were issued during Bolsonaro’s administration was one of Lula’s first actions in office. On his inauguration day, for instance, Lula revoked a 2022 decree that had endorsed small-scale, often illicit, minings in the Amazon (Rodrigues, 2023). On the same day, Lula reinstated the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm), an organization that had previously achieved an 83% reduction in Amazon deforestation between 2004 and 2012. This body had been suspended by Bolsonaro but was revived under Lula's administration.

Lula’s “Climate Diplomacy”

Yet beyond seeking a strong political foothold in a highly polarised political climate in Brazil, Lula’s rainforest policies have offered his administration a new opportunity to further Brazil’s diplomatic efforts and further commit to the another priority of his presidency: multilateralism. From the onset of his campaign, Lula’s determination to push Brazil back onto the international stage was clear: “Brazil is back. We’re back to reconnect with the world,” declared Lula on his inauguration day (Harris, 2022), underscoring his vision for Brazil to have a seat at the decision-making table for the most important issues of today. His policies and rhetoric also constantly emphasize multilateralism and his ambitions for regional integration, both in Latin America and across the developing global south, especially with Africa. To reinforce his message conveyed on his first day in office, Lula’s first 100 days were marked by a series of trips abroad, visiting countries such as the United States, China, Russia, and neighbouring Argentina. Indeed, transitioning from the extreme policies of anti-internationalism and anti-environmentalism under Bolsonaro, Lula’s climate ambitions and actions are unequivocally receiving international acclaim. A Reuters report from last November highlighted Lula's reception at the U.N. climate change conference in Egypt, describing him as being "greeted like a rock star." This recognition follows his policies' notable success in halving deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon within a year (Boadle, 2023).

Arguably, Lula’s commitment to active diplomacy in hopes of regional leadership is a continuation of his first two terms in the early 2000s. In his early days of presidency, Lula was heralded for his “pragmatic, independent diplomacy” that allowed Brazil to simultaneously pursue its own interests as well as create a “multipolar” system at a time of American hegemony (The Economist, 2023). Particularly, his role in founding the BRICS – a group of emerging economies that includes Russia, India, China, and South Africa – has been central to the assessment of Lula's early reputation.

From a foreign affairs perspective, Lula’s commitment to climate policies is, in part, grounded in Brazil's geographical advantage of being at the centre of global climate policy-making processes. This significance arises from the Amazon, with 60% of it situated within Brazilian territory, playing a crucial role in climate discussions. Even during Bolsonaro’s administration, Brazil was often referred to as a “Big Brother” in rainforest agendas, exerting a powerful influence over other forest nations (Birnbaum and Kaplan, 2022). Leveraging its already vital position in the global environmental agenda, climate issues have been and will likely continue to be at the forefront of Brazil's multilateral efforts under leaders like Lula. Perhaps Reubens Ricupero, a former top diplomat and Brazilian government minister, best summarises Lula’s tendency to capitalize on such a position. He describes how Lula identified a "dream subject" in the environment, as“it can give him a lot of dividends in terms of prestige and acknowledgement without any immediate cost” (Harris, 2022).

Despite ongoing criticisms of how the 77-year-old Brazilian leader navigates the drastically transformed international stage, Lula remains steadfast in steering the climate agenda to restore the “soft power” status Brazil enjoyed during his initial two terms. Specifically, through a recovered multilateral relationship with other nations, Lula appears to aspire for Brazil to assume two pivotal roles during his term – serving as a mediator in the context of US-China hegemony and positioning itself as a regional leader – both achieved through the avenue of climate diplomacy.

Lula’s visit to China earlier in April, for example, has been widely publicised and analysed in the perspective of their joint declaration on climate change, and how both countries showed an interest in bilateral and multilateral cooperation for the common goal of planetary protection (Milhorance, 2023). Fewer comments emphasize how this meeting resulted in important discussions for Brazil’s agro-industry. In discussions with one of its major export partners, Brazil effectively negotiated the removal of the Chinese embargo on Brazilian beef, the approval for four new Brazilian meatpackers to export to China, and commitments for future collaboration in joint monitoring and verification systems for animal-based products. Although such economic advancements may seem at odds with to the idealised image of Lula’s climate ambitions, it is clear that the climate agenda has been utilised to fulfill Lula’s economic and goals to a certain extent. 

Amidst the closely intertwined economic relationships with China and the recent expansion of the BRICS grouping, Lula’s diplomatic efforts in navigating between the U.S. and China have garnered considerable acclaim. Latin America Analysts Andre Pagliarini and Sarang Shidore note that Lula's approach is celebrated for indicating "that the door is not yet shut on a genuinely independent foreign policy in a moment of heightening superpower tensions." Lula’s ability to find substantive areas of mutual interests is often identified as his core strength and reason for this diplomatic balance.

Brazilian Finance Minister Fernando Hadded’s series of meetings with American activists, government officials, and investors to pitch green investments in Brazil shortly before the U.N. meeting this September is one such example. Simultaneously highlighting Brazil's crucial role in mitigating the effects of climate change and suggesting that "China is entering America through the Southern Cone" (Pagliarini and Shidore, 2023), Lula's administration has leveraged the climate agenda to not only maintain close relations with both hegemonies but also advance its own economic objectives.

In August of last year, Lula visited the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to participate in the "G3 Climate Summit" in Kinshasa, alongside DRC President Felix Tshisekedi and President Joko Widodo of Indonesia. Addressing shared challenges in protecting their respective rainforests—the Amazon rainforest, the Congo basin, and the Borneo-Mekong basin—the leaders unveiled the establishment of a trilateral partnership, referred to as "a common front" by Indonesian Maritime Minister Luhat Pandjaitan (Thomas, 2023).

Commentators have widely analysed the summit as part of Lula’s efforts to achieve a renewed regional cooperation amongst emerging economies, especially in the global south, and potentially Brazil’s leading role in liaising such a cooperation (Thomas, 2023). Again, the perspective is partially shaped by the legacy of Lula's initial two terms, during which the nation enjoyed tight Brazil-Africa relations and its consequent export successes throughout his first phase of presidency. During his term in the early 2000s, exports from Brazil to sub-Saharan Africa increased by 25%. However, after his term, these exports saw a significant decline, reaching their lowest point in 15 years in 2019 at $3.67 billion(Comminoth, 2022). Whilst the improvement in Brazilian-Congolese relations, as well as a wider Brazilian-African relations, is arguably still in its initial stages, characterized by collaboration on a shared climate goal, the symbolic importance of gatherings like the G3 Climate Summit, coupled with Lula's determination to use the climate agenda as a launching pad for broader economic and diplomatic gains, is evident. Beyond the climate facade of the event, President Tshisekedi’s hopes for a revived Brazilian-Congolese relations, especially in infrastructure, air transport, electricity, and agriculture, expressed after the summit reveals both parties’ anticipations for a consequent diplomatic and economic push under Lula. 

Ten months in: is Lula’s climate strategy a success?

Despite Lula’s international successes, his climate ambitions are struggling to gain traction in the nearby Latin American region, mainly due to his other political and economic alignments. Lula’s determination to become the regional leader for Latin America, if not to be heavily engaged in the bloc has been made clear over the past ten months, as suggested by his push for a greater Mercosur (South American Trade Bloc) and the revival of the Unasur (Union of South American Nations) group. The ACTO summit is also one example of Lula’s initiative for further regional action, specifically through the lens of climate considerations. 

Lula’s long-standing political sympathy towards leftist governments in Nicaragua and Venezuela, for instance, is negatively influencing Brazil’s self-proclaimed image as a “defender of human rights” (Boadle, 2023) as the nation returns to the international stage. This is particularly noteworthy among progressive leaders in Latin America. Lula's choice to invite Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro to a regional summit in Brasilia last May, for instance, faced widespread criticism from President Gabriel Boric of Chile. A commentary from Rubens Barbosa, a former Brazilian ambassador to London and Washington, reveals that such an ideological bias is often pushing Lula against his own Foreign Ministry (Boadle, 2023). Disregarding Lula's political alignments, his vision of regional integration faces challenges due to the disparities and conflicts between progressives like Boric and social conservatives like Maduro and Ortega. And without coordinated support from Brazil's own neighbors, Lula’s climate model in the global debate about how to combat climate change will struggle to advance, as much of his rhetoric bases itself on having the Amazon as part of its territory.

Domestic economics and politics in Brazil are increasingly becoming more fragile and polarised. Lula's economic performance during his first year is frequently characterized as "lackluster" (Stuenkel, 2023). Economic growth projections for 2023 are meager, ranging from 0.2% to 1.2%, and the IMF currently predicts a dismal 1.5% growth in the coming year. This situation has manifested in Lula's impatient decision to criticize, and arguably scapegoat (Stuenkel, 2023), Central Bank Governor Roberto Campos Neto for maintaining interest rates excessively high. And in the context of extreme political instability across Latin America – the 2019 protest in Chile, as well as the current political crisis in Peru arguably both happened in economic conditions relatively better than Brazil’s projected economic performance – the risk of domestic instability is real and imminent for Lula’s administration. 

Brazil will be hosting the COP30 in 2025. Whilst Brazil’s anticipation for its leading role in such a high-stake global climate meeting will only grow, the conference and Lula’s domestic and international performance leading up until then will also be an important testing ground for Lula’s climate strategy. 

References

Birnbaum, M., & Kaplan, S. (2022, November 16). “Brazil is back”: At COP27, Lula vows to be a global climate leader. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2022/11/16/brazil-lula-climate-amazon-cop27/ 

Boadle, A. (2023, September 18). Analysis: Lula struggles to revive Brazil’s “soft power” amid US-China tensions. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/lula-struggles-revive-brazils-soft-power-amid-us-china-tensions-2023-09-18/ 

Brazil-china joint statement on combating climate change. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. (2023). https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/brazil-china-joint-statement-on-combating-climate-change 

The Economist. (2023). Brazil’s foreign policy is hyperactive, ambitious and naive. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/04/10/brazils-foreign-policy-is-hyperactive-ambitious-and-naive 

Figueiredo, P. (2023). In Brazil, the EU’s deforestation law has many skeptics. euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/08/31/the-eus-deforestation-law-was-cheered-here-brazilian-experts-and-farmers-are-skeptical 

Jones, B. (2022, September 29). Earth’s future depends on the Amazon. This month, it’s up for a vote. Vox. https://www.vox.com/down-to-earth/2022/9/29/23373427/amazon-rainforest-brazil-jair-bolsonaro-lula-deforestation 

Komminoth, L. (2022, October 31). What does Lula’s Brazilian victory mean for Africa? African Business. https://african.business/2022/10/trade-investment/what-does-lula-victory-mean-for-africa 

Milhorance, F. (2023, May 19). Lula visits China: Four outcomes for the environment. Dialogo Chino. https://dialogochino.net/en/climate-energy/367582-lula-visits-china-four-outcomes-for-the-environment/ 

Pagliarini, A., & Shidore, S. (2023, September 29). Brazil is showing us how to avoid a new Cold War. Responsible Statecraft. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/lula-brazil/ 

Phillips, T. (2023, August 8). Brazilian president Lula Pledges “new Amazon Dream” at Rainforest Summit. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/aug/08/brazilian-president-lula-pledges-new-amazon-dream-at-rainforest-summit 

Rodrigues, M. (2023, March 24). Will Lula be Brazil’s environmental saviour? China Dialogue. https://chinadialogue.net/en/nature/will-lula-be-brazils-environmental-saviour/ 

Thomas, D. (2023, August 10). Brazil’s Lula to visit DRC for trilateral rainforest summit. African Business. https://african.business/2023/08/resources/brazils-lula-to-visit-drc-for-trilateral-rainforest-summit