This study analyzes Turkey’s democratic backsliding (2002–2025) through institutional, elite, and media lenses. Early AKP reforms implied EU-oriented democratization, but elite conflicts, coalition reshuffling, and purges converted the bureaucracy into a loyalist apparatus. Concurrently, media capture and civil society intimidation weakened diagonal safeguards, reinforcing discourses equating regime stability with national unity. Elections stayed formally competitive but structurally biased through clientelism and state resources. Comparing Turkey with Middle Eastern and post-communist cases, the study shows that democratic erosion follows similar coalition-driven trajectories, revealing how institutional decay, elite realignment, and media control jointly sustain authoritarian consolidation beyond Turkey, within hybrid regimes.

Introduction

1. Scholarly Frameworks and Key Concepts

Mechkova et al. (2017) provide a comparative backdrop for understanding Turkey’s trajectory, showing how institutional erosion can proceed subtly without full regime collapse. Wunsch and Blanchard’s (2022) safeguard framework illuminates the mechanisms through which judicial, bureaucratic, and media institutions can be captured or weakened. (Wunsch & Blanchard, 2022). Akser’s analysis of media control complements this by demonstrating how partisan narratives are reinforced through economic and regulatory pressure (Akser, 2025). Coban & Yesilkagit further underscore the role of elite coalitions in structuring state institutions, showing that backsliding is as much a product of coordinated political action as of institutional fragility (Coban & Yesilkagit, 2025). O’Donohue’s framework of judicial audience costs demonstrates the conditional nature of judicial independence, while Bölükbaşı’s analysis of party system fragmentation illustrates how competitive authoritarianism is sustained through electoral engineering and strategic alliances. (O'Donohue, 2023) (Bölükbaşı, A Reassessment of the Turkish Party System, 2021). Building on this, Gümüşcü emphasizes the centrality of elections in Turkey, showing how the AKP instrumentalized parliamentary victories and constitutional referenda to secure political and consolidate executive authority. Çalışkan further situates these developments within Turkey’s trajectory from competitive authoritarianism toward full authoritarianism, highlighting how judicial reform and the narrowing of opposition channels institutionalized the regime. (Bölükbaşı, 2024).

2. Electoral Engineering and Coalition Strategies

Building on the foundational insights of Esen & Gümüşcü, Bermeo, and Neundorf, who underscore the role of loyalist support, institutional manipulation, and coalition strategies in sustaining authoritarian regimes, Gümüşcü offers a more granular account of the AKP’s electoral maneuvers. Specifically, he illustrates how repeated victories, referenda, and executive decrees were not simply instruments of governance, but strategic tools deployed to manufacture legitimacy and recalibrate the constitutional order in favor of the ruling bloc. This electoral engineering, therefore, complements broader coalition-driven restructuring, reinforcing the paper’s central claim that democratic backsliding in Turkey is structurally embedded rather than episodic (Bruff & Tansel, 2020) (Esfahani & Masdounia, 2025) (Farro & Demirhisar, 2014).

3. Research Question and Argument

Turkey stands as one of the most striking examples of this phenomenon. Once hailed in the early 2000s as a promising EU-oriented democratizer, Turkey has since undergone a steady transformation into a competitive authoritarian regime. This study seeks to explain why a country that initially deepened its democratic institutions ultimately witnessed their systematic weakening, and how this process reflects broader patterns of coalition-driven authoritarian consolidation.

4. Institutional Decay and Judicial Alignment

Building on this question, this article argues that Turkey’s democratic backsliding cannot be understood solely as a story of institutional decay. Rather, it reflects a coalition-driven restructuring of the state, in which ruling elites gradually subordinated the bureaucracy, captured the media, and neutralized civil society. Drawing on the safeguard framework (Wunsch & Blanchard), media capture literature (Akser), and coalitional politics (Coban & Yesilkagit), this study offers a holistic explanation of Turkey’s trajectory between 2002 and 2025. Comparisons with other Middle Eastern and post-communist cases further situate Turkey within broader patterns of democratic erosion, underscoring how diagonal, vertical, and horizontal safeguards can mutually reinforce authoritarian consolidation.

This article argues that Turkey’s democratic backsliding cannot be understood solely as a story of institutional decay. While institutional safeguards such as courts are conventionally treated as bulwarks against authoritarian encroachment, Turkey’s experience illustrates that formal independence alone is insufficient to prevent democratic erosion. Turkey’s democratic backsliding goes beyond institutional decay—it reflects coalition-driven restructuring. During the early AKP years, the Constitutional Court actively blocked government policies, imposing reputational costs on the executive. However, as judicial networks increasingly aligned with elite allies and electoral bases supportive of the ruling party, judicial intervention began to confer reputational benefits to the executive rather than costs, facilitating gradual democratic erosion. 

5. Party System Dynamics and Competitive Authoritarianism

Together, these dynamics demonstrate that democratic backsliding in Turkey was not only a product of weakened institutions but also of coalition-driven restructuring, in which judicial alignment, media control, and party fragmentation mutually reinforced authoritarian consolidation. Simultaneously, the AKP’s consolidation of power reshaped Turkey’s party system, as described by Bölükbaşı (2023). Competitive authoritarianism created an environment in which elections remained formally competitive but structurally biased, and the proliferation of new right-wing parties reflected both voter realignment and elite strategies to fragment opposition. Smaller parties, often operating as kingmakers under pre-election alliances, could gain influence disproportionate to their social bases, while opportunistic political entrepreneurs leveraged parliamentary entry for personal advancement rather than substantive opposition.  

6. State Resources, Media Capture, and Civil Society

Beyond formal institutions and party dynamics, Turkey’s democratic backsliding was reinforced through the strategic politicization of state resources and the co-optation of social and economic networks. The AKP leveraged public sector employment, municipal budgets, and development projects to reward loyalists while constraining the influence of opponents, thereby embedding patronage within both national and local governance structures (Esen & Gümüşcü, 2016). Media capture complemented these strategies: pro-government outlets received preferential access to state advertising and regulatory leniency, while independent or critical journalists faced economic pressure, intimidation, and dismissal, effectively narrowing the scope of public debate. Civil society was similarly constrained through legal harassment, heightened scrutiny, and restrictive regulations targeting professional associations, NGOs, and advocacy groups, undermining autonomous channels of political participation.

7. Reinforcing Ecosystem and Key Events

These mechanisms created a mutually reinforcing ecosystem in which bureaucratic loyalty, media control, and constrained civil society amplified one another, diminishing the effectiveness of formal checks on executive authority. Key political events—including the 2014–2015 election cycles, the Gezi Park protests, and the 2017 constitutional referendum—illustrate how these measures worked together to skew political competition while maintaining the appearance of democratic legitimacy. In this context, Turkey’s experience shows that competitive authoritarianism can endure over decades, not through overt coups or blatant electoral fraud, but through the systematic alignment of institutions, resources, and societal actors with ruling-party objectives.

8. Global Context and Loyalist Support

This erosion of democratic norms in Turkey reflects broader global patterns of democratic backsliding. Bermeo (2016) argues that contemporary autocratization often unfolds through subtle institutional changes rather than overt coups, making it harder to detect and resist. In Turkey’s case, the consolidation of executive power, weakening of judicial independence, and suppression of dissenting media exemplify this logic, where democratic rhetoric masks authoritarian intent. Moreover, the government’s strategic use of crises—whether economic, security-related, or public health emergencies—has enabled it to justify extraordinary measures that curtail civil liberties and concentrate authority.

Neundorf et al. emphasize the role of loyalist support in sustaining authoritarian regimes during periods of instability. In Turkey, nationalist narratives and appeals to religious identity have helped solidify a base that remains resilient even amid democratic decay. The opposition’s fragmented response and limited institutional leverage further complicate efforts to reverse this trajectory. While civil society and local governments offer pockets of resistance, their impact is constrained by legal and financial pressures. Understanding Turkey’s democratic decline thus requires a multi-scalar analysis—one that considers both domestic dynamics and transnational influences shaping the resilience of authoritarian governance.

Gezi Park Protests

The trajectory of Turkey’s institutional erosion is vividly illustrated by the 2013 Gezi Park protests, which scholars situate within the very dynamics of authoritarian consolidation described above. Farro and Demirhisar show how Gezi generated experimental forms of civic participation—from horizontal forums to creative performances—that temporarily disrupted hegemonic control of public space. Yet the rapid containment of these practices through state repression and media blackout underscores how coalition-driven restructuring had already subordinated civil society alongside bureaucratic and communicative institutions. In this way, Gezi exemplified the limits of grassroots resistance once the organizational infrastructure of the state had been recalibrated to reinforce executive authority.

Since 2013, democratic norms and institutional integrity in Turkey have steadily eroded. Tansel challenges the dominant narrative that frames this shift as a rupture from a previously democratic trajectory. Instead, he argues that authoritarian tendencies were embedded within the AKP’s neoliberal governance from its inception. By problematizing the analytical separation between economic and political domains, Tansel demonstrates that the AKP’s hegemonic practices—often interpreted as democratic consolidation—were in fact underpinned by mechanisms of state-led authoritarianism. This continuity challenges simplistic historical periodizations and underscores the need to reassess Turkey’s political trajectory.

Since 2013, democratic norms and institutional integrity in Turkey have steadily eroded. Tansel challenges the dominant narrative that frames this shift as a rupture from a previously democratic trajectory. Instead, he argues that authoritarian tendencies were embedded within the AKP’s neoliberal governance from its inception. By problematizing the analytical separation between economic and political domains, Tansel demonstrates that the AKP’s hegemonic practices – often interpreted as democratic consolidation – were in fact underpinned by mechanisms of state-led authoritarianism. This continuity challenges simplistic historical periodizations and underscores the need to reassess Turkey’s political trajectory.

The 2013 Gezi Park protests marked a critical juncture in this trajectory, revealing the limits of the AKP’s hegemonic control and catalyzing a new wave of grassroots mobilization. As Erdem Yörük illustrates, the protests were not merely a reaction to environmental concerns but the culmination of mounting discontent across diverse social groups, including Kurds, women, students, and labor activists. The AKP’s consolidation of elite power, achieved through its defeat of the secular-military establishment historically associated with the political philosophy of Kemalism, paradoxically generated a counter-hegemonic response from below. The state’s repressive reaction and subsequent polarization strategies further entrenched authoritarian governance while simultaneously invigorating civil society resistance.

Building on these insights, Esfahani and Masdounia provide quantitative evidence linking Erdoğan’s populist governance to the erosion of democratic quality. Drawing on international governance indicators such as V-Dem and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), they show that Turkey’s scores on rule of law, accountability, and government effectiveness began to decline sharply after 2013—marking a turning point that followed years of gradual institutional strain under the AKP. Earlier reforms in the 2000s, initially framed as democratizing steps aligned with EU accession, had already weakened judicial autonomy and concentrated executive influence over regulatory institutions. The post-Gezi period thus represents not the onset but the acceleration of democratic decay, as populist centralization and plebiscitary practices entrenched authoritarian tendencies. Collectively, these analyses underscore that Turkey’s backsliding is not an episodic deviation but a structurally embedded transformation driven by the fusion of neoliberalism, populist discourse, and institutional erosion.

The patterns Esfahani and Masdounia identify are best understood as the institutional manifestation of the broader coalition-driven restructuring underpinning Turkey’s democratic backsliding. The post-2013 decline in governance quality coincided with the AKP’s consolidation of a governing model that fused neoliberal market reform with populist centralization—an arrangement sustained through alliances across bureaucratic, business, and media elites. Economic liberalization, initially promoted under the guise of EU-oriented democratization, was gradually repurposed to entrench executive dominance and insulate key policy domains from public accountability. In this way, the deterioration captured by international governance indicators reflects not only institutional decay but the maturation of a competitive authoritarian order in which market imperatives, elite patronage, and political control became mutually reinforcing. This provides the context for understanding the repression of the Gezi Park protests: it was not a spontaneous overreach, but the predictable outcome of a system in which economic governance and authoritarian consolidation advanced in tandem.

Tansel’s concept of authoritarian neoliberalism explains why repression unfolded as it did. By embedding market liberalization within authoritarian institutions, the ruling coalition insulated its economic agenda from public accountability while simultaneously framing dissent as a threat to stability. The suppression of Gezi thus reflected not an exceptional overreach but a structural logic whereby neoliberal projects were secured through authoritarian means. Biscahie and Evrenosoglu extend this analysis by foregrounding the gendered dimensions of mobilization, highlighting how women’s disproportionate presence at Gezi revealed the strains authoritarian neoliberalism imposed on reproductive labor (Biscahie & Evrenosoglu, 2025). Their perspective situates Gezi within a wider crisis of social reproduction, showing that democratic backsliding relies not only on formal institutions but also on the reorganization of everyday life under conditions of precarity.

Yörük’s account of the diverse coalitions forged during Gezi further demonstrates how authoritarian regimes adapt to grassroots challenge. Cross-class alliances briefly threatened to destabilize the ruling bloc, but the government’s polarization strategies fragmented these networks and redirected them into politically manageable channels. This outcome reflects the core argument of coalition-driven restructuring: authoritarian consolidation persists not merely by weakening institutions but by recalibrating coalitions across bureaucracy, media, and civil society. In this respect, Gezi underscores how resistance can emerge within competitive authoritarian regimes while also revealing the mechanisms through which such regimes transform crises into opportunities for deeper entrenchment (Yörük, 2014). 

The 2016 Coup Attempt: Catalyst for Authoritarian Consolidation

If Gezi exposed the social and civil dimensions of resistance, the failed coup attempt of July 2016 revealed how crises could be harnessed to deepen authoritarian consolidation. Iseri, Şekercioglu, and Panayirci analyze the role of Turkey’s polarized media system during this period, demonstrating that rather than producing unity in the face of existential threat, the press reproduced partisan cleavages. While theories of the “sphere of consensus” suggest that catastrophic events typically generate a convergence of narratives around shared values, their study finds that Turkey’s newspapers—Sabah, Hürriyet, Sözcü, and Cumhuriyet—framed the coup and its aftermath in divergent ways. Consensus was shallow and fleeting: all outlets opposed the coup itself, yet their coverage quickly reverted to entrenched political alignments.

This outcome reflects the structural features of Turkey’s media environment, where ownership is concentrated in conglomerates tied to political and economic elites. Pro-government outlets like Sabah amplified official narratives that legitimized emergency decrees and mass purges, while oppositional papers such as Cumhuriyet emphasized repression and rights violations. Moderates like Hürriyet occupied an ambivalent position, constrained by economic dependency and political pressure. Thus, even amid a moment of national emergency, the media system failed to produce a durable consensus, underscoring the degree of polarization entrenched under competitive authoritarianism.

The aftermath of the coup further illustrates how crisis politics accelerates democratic backsliding. The state of emergency facilitated large-scale purges of the bureaucracy, judiciary, universities, and media, reshaping the institutional landscape in favor of loyalists. As Iseri, Şekercioglu, and Panayirci show, this was not merely a temporary suspension of democracy but the consolidation of partisan control over the communicative sphere. The failed coup, therefore, acted less as a rupture than as a catalyst: it provided the AKP government with the pretext to eliminate remaining centers of opposition and reinforce the coalition-driven restructuring of the state (Iseri, Sekercioglu, & Panayirci, 2019).

Turkey’s 2017 Referendum: A Turning Point

This logic of authoritarian recalibration reached its apex in the 2017 constitutional referendum, which formalized Turkey’s transition to presidentialism under conditions that further entrenched executive dominance. As Esen and Gümüşçü demonstrate, the referendum was held under a state of emergency that curtailed freedoms of speech, assembly, and media access, enabling the AKP to run a one-sided campaign bolstered by state resources and religious-nationalist rhetoric. The opposition’s fragmented coalition, though resilient, was unable to counterbalance the structural advantages enjoyed by the ruling bloc, and serious allegations of electoral fraud—particularly the YSK’s decision to count unstamped ballots—cast doubt on the legitimacy of the outcome.

Rather than treating the referendum as a discrete event, Kersting and Grömping’s referendum cycle model invites a procedural dissection of how democratic instruments are repurposed under competitive authoritarianism. Their pilot study exposes how the Turkish case failed to meet baseline standards of referendum integrity—not only in terms of campaign equity and media pluralism, but also in the deliberate bundling of complex constitutional amendments into a single vote. This strategic compression of deliberative space reflects a broader logic: plebiscitary mechanisms are not deployed to enhance democratic legitimacy, but to manufacture consent under conditions of constrained choice. The model’s emphasis on pre-, during-, and post-referendum phases underscores how institutional manipulation is temporally distributed, not episodic.

Dikici Bilgin and Erdoğan’s account further clarifies the political calculus behind the referendum’s timing and design. The AKP’s long-standing ambition to restructure the executive was not simply realized through popular support, but through the systematic neutralization of veto players and the reframing of majoritarianism as democratic virtue. What appears as a constitutional reform is better understood as a consolidation strategy—one that leverages the symbolic capital of direct democracy to entrench executive authority while displacing parliamentary oversight. In this sense, the 2017 referendum exemplifies how authoritarian regimes adapt democratic forms to illiberal ends, embedding structural asymmetries beneath the surface of procedural inclusion. (Bilgin & Erdoğan, 2018)

Comparative Analysis: Tunisia

Tunisia’s democratic reversal offers a critical variation within the broader landscape of competitive authoritarianism explored in this paper. Unlike Turkey’s coalition-driven institutional recalibration, Tunisia’s shift has been shaped by a convergence of executive populism and international permissiveness. As Maria do Céu Pinto Arena (2024) argues, Western actors—particularly the US and EU—have deprioritized democratic norms in favor of migration control and regional stability, creating a permissive environment for Kais Saied’s consolidation of power (Arena, 2024). Domestically, as Gabsi and Sarihan (2025) demonstrate, Saied has reframed the post-revolutionary social contract through anti-corruption rhetoric and populist appeals to national unity, enabling the dismantling of pluralist institutions with minimal resistance (Gabsi & Sarihan, 2025). This section situates Tunisia within the comparative logic of this paper, showing how democratic erosion can emerge not only through elite coordination and institutional capture—as in Turkey and Hungary—but also through the strategic exploitation of legitimacy crises and the absence of external constraint. Tunisia’s trajectory thus expands the typology of competitive authoritarianism, revealing how populist personalization and geopolitical indifference can accelerate democratic breakdown even in contexts once considered resilient.   

Tunisia offers a contrasting trajectory to Turkey’s democratic backsliding, illustrating how institutional safeguards and coalition dynamics can support democratic resilience. As Bellin (2012) argues, Tunisia’s relatively autonomous bureaucracy and active civil society mitigated elite capture and constrained executive overreach, even amid economic and political pressures. Unlike Turkey, where coalition-driven restructuring eroded checks and balances, Tunisia demonstrates that coordinated elite strategies do not inevitably produce authoritarian consolidation. By situating Tunisia alongside Turkey, this analysis underscores the interplay between institutional strength, media freedom, and civil society capacity in shaping regime trajectories, highlighting the structural and coalition-based mechanisms driving divergent outcomes (Bellin, 2012).

Tunisia also illustrates how elite action interacts with public perceptions and legitimacy concerns in shaping democratic outcomes. Ridge (2022) emphasizes that Saïed’s emergency measures gained traction not merely through institutional maneuvering but because many citizens viewed existing parties and government institutions as corrupt or ineffective. Economic hardship and security concerns amplified tolerance for extraordinary measures, yet widespread support for civil liberties and participatory norms prevented full authoritarian consolidation. This case highlights that, unlike Turkey’s top-down coalition-driven restructuring, democratic erosion depends on the interplay between elite strategies, citizen expectations, and institutional resilience, revealing that public constraints can decisively shape regime trajectories (Ridge, 2022)

Rivera-Escartin’s process-tracing analysis identifies three agency-driven mechanisms—politicization, exclusion politics, and delegitimization—through which elite polarization enabled Tunisia’s democratic backsliding. The Parti Destourien Libre (PDL), by antagonizing Ennahda and politicizing foreign policy, reinforced pre-existing cleavages and framed politics as an existential struggle (Rivera-Escartin, 2023). This elite antagonism created a climate in which Saïed could dissolve parliament and centralize power with minimal resistance. Yet, as Ridge (2022) shows, public support for protest rights and civic freedoms persisted, complicating efforts to entrench authoritarian rule.

Syahba and Fahadayna’s quantitative study adds a structural dimension, showing that economic stagnation and limited freedom were statistically linked to Tunisia’s democratic decline. They argue that political culture—shaped by decades of authoritarian rule—left both elites and citizens ill-equipped to sustain democratic norms (Syabha & Fahadayna, 2024). The failure of political parties to engage meaningfully with the public further eroded legitimacy, reinforcing the appeal of Saïed’s unilateral actions. Together, these studies reveal that Tunisia’s backsliding was not inevitable, but the product of elite polarization, institutional fragility, and public ambivalence. While democracy endured for a decade after the Jasmine Revolution, its collapse under Saïed reflects the cumulative impact of elite strategy and societal disillusionment. 

The limits of Tunisia’s democratic erosion are further illuminated by Yssen and Stokke’s analysis of civil society responses. While autocratization under Saïed was swift and institutionalized—culminating in a 2022 referendum that vastly expanded presidential powers—civil society resistance remained fragmented and subdued. The authors attribute this to long-standing divisions between Islamist and secular groups, state co-optation, and disillusionment with post-2011 democratic elites. Rather than mounting a unified defense, civil society actors responded slowly and unevenly, revealing that resistance to autocratization is not automatic but shaped by historical legacies and organizational capacity (Yssen & Stokke, 2024).

Comparative Analysis: Hungary

Hungary’s democratic backsliding under Viktor Orbán presents a paradigmatic case of elite-driven erosion within the institutional framework of the European Union. Since Fidesz’s 2010 electoral victory, Orbán has systematically dismantled liberal democratic constraints through constitutional engineering, media centralization, and judicial restructuring. These reforms—often cloaked in legalistic procedure—have enabled the consolidation of executive power while maintaining the formal trappings of electoral democracy. Furthermore, much like Turkey, Orbán’s regime has also been characterized as “hybrid” by academics (Krekó & Enyedi, 2018).

Orbán’s 2011 constitutional overhaul redefined institutional balances, curtailing judicial independence and entrenching partisan control over key oversight bodies. Simultaneously, the government’s acquisition and redistribution of media outlets to pro-Fidesz actors has produced a hegemonic information environment, undermining pluralism and insulating the regime from public scrutiny. Civil society has likewise been targeted through restrictive legislation and rhetorical delegitimation, particularly against organizations receiving foreign funding.

Ideologically, Orbán has framed these transformations within the concept of “illiberal democracy,” positioning Hungary as a sovereign alternative to liberal pluralism. This narrative—echoing Erdoğan’s majoritarian legitimation—recasts democratic norms as externally imposed and culturally incompatible, thereby justifying institutional erosion as a defense of national identity (Wunsch & Gessler, Who tolerates democratic backsliding? A mosaic approach to voters’ responses to authoritarian leadership in Hungary, 2023)

Yet Hungary’s EU membership introduces a distinct constraint. While formal mechanisms such as Article 7 exist, enforcement has proven inconsistent, allowing Orbán to exploit institutional ambiguity. Compared to Turkey, where geopolitical maneuvering affords greater latitude, Hungary’s backsliding is more incremental but no less entrenched. Both cases underscore the centrality of elite agency in democratic decay, albeit within divergent international contexts.

Ultimately, Hungary serves as a critical comparative reference point: a case where democratic erosion proceeds not through overt rupture, but through calibrated legalism and ideological reframing. This reinforces the broader argument that backsliding is often a strategic, elite-led process—one that adapts to institutional constraints while hollowing out democratic substance.

Conclusion

Turkey’s democratic backsliding from 2002 to 2025 offers a compelling case of how competitive authoritarianism can be constructed incrementally through elite-driven institutional transformation. The majority of this paper has focused on the mechanisms and strategies employed by the AKP to erode democratic norms while maintaining electoral legitimacy. Through a detailed analysis of judicial restructuring, media capture, and the weakening of civil society, the paper demonstrates how the AKP leveraged crises—both real and manufactured—to centralize power and dismantle checks and balances. These processes were not isolated events but part of a coherent strategy of authoritarian consolidation that repurposed democratic institutions to serve executive dominance.

While comparative insights from Hungary and Tunisia enrich the analysis, they serve primarily to highlight the uniqueness and complexity of Turkey’s trajectory. Hungary’s EU-constrained illiberalism and Tunisia’s abrupt democratic rupture contrast with Turkey’s hybrid model of gradual erosion and institutional co-optation. Together, these cases underscore that democratic decline is context-dependent, shaped by elite coalitions, institutional legacies, and international dynamics.

In sum, Turkey’s experience reveals that democratic backsliding is not merely a deviation from liberal norms—it is a deliberate recalibration of power. Understanding this transformation requires attention to the slow, strategic dismantling of democratic infrastructure from within.