Abstract

Under Emmanuel Macron's second mandate starting May 2022, France underwent a democratic crisis with several key drivers. In addressing them, analysis within the narrative will focus on circumstantial and functional reasons behind the consecutive mandates of five prime ministers and the succession of six governments over three years. This paper will examine how growing democratic distrust and the perceived erosion of institutional legitimacy shape public interpretations of the government's authority. By drawing on debates around hyper-presidentialisation and the emerging features of post-democratic governance, it analyses how dynamics contribute to patterns of political and institutional instability.

Contextual introduction: from bipartisan “stability” to a crisis in the foundations of democracy

France experienced several crises of democracy in the past decade, represented by Emmanuel Macron's victory in 2017 and then in 2022, a candidate who claimed to be non-partisan and broke the traditional left-right party structure. The latter is embodied by the policies of the Parti Socialiste and the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, which attempted to reinvent itself by becoming Les Républicains in 2016. Although the French model of democracy was not conceived to be de jure bipartisan from the dawn of the Fifth Republic in 1958, it became a de facto bipartisanship between the communist-socialist left and the Gaullist right. Yet, it is because electors no longer support this structure, not voting for either party, that the election of Macron is symptomatic of such a political crisis.

Nevertheless, in 2022, Emmanuel Macron's second term began with both international and domestic crises:  the war in Ukraine, a pension reform, and the social movements that the latter caused between 2022 and 2023. These crises gradually made the French President unpopular, with an approval rating of 25%, well below that of other political leaders such as Dominique de Villepin (49%) or Jean-Louis Borloo (44%) (IFOP, 2025). It is interesting to note that these former leaders of the Republican right still remain popular despite not having been at prominent functions in the early 2010s. For De Villepin’s case, it is actually quite informative to know that he might himself run for the presidency, relying on his persisting popularity, as documented in several media over the last few months.

Subsequently, the key moment of the dissolution of the National Assembly ordered by the President Macron in July 2024 called into question the already precarious control of the relative presidential majority. Indeed, their loss of the control over centre seats, as well as the influence gained by both extremes, completely swept away the existing majorities, and accentuated polarisation. It hence created an institutional gridlock that paralysed the parliamentary process. Meanwhile, it also reinforced the French people's sense of increased inefficiency, despite the welcome respite offered by the Olympic Games; The latter allowed a thoughtful “avoidance of the political” (Morteau, 2024), and the interruption of the talks for the appointment of a new government.

These events are evidence of a dual crisis of democratic legitimacy (Rouban, 2023), with, on the one hand, the unpopularity of leaders linked to a lack of representation and, on the other hand, the presence of dysfunctioning institutional mechanisms that further reinforce polarisation.

A lack of political embodiment increasingly undermining an entire regime 

A distinctive feature of the French system is that, in line with the monarchy, the Empire, and subsequently the Gaullist era, leaders have taken on the role of ‘providential man’ (Garrigues, 2019). This vision is reflected in today's democracy, where each candidate, including Emmanuel Macron, seeks to embody the people while positioning themselves as the ‘providential man’, thus combining the images of ‘leader’ and ‘saviour.’ 

Institutionally, this tendency of presidentialisation can be explained by the constitutional reform of 1962, which transformed the French parliamentary system into a semi-presidential system with a presidentialist tendency (Duverger, 1986), giving rise to communicative strategies of ‘hyper-presidentialisation’, as under Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012). Nevertheless, the Macron era stands out because, while Sarkozy made himself omnipresent, particularly through his significant television presence, Macron is criticised for his Jupiterian, distant, and solemn style of governance (Garrigues, 2019).

It is all the more relevant to link this distance with the rise of populism from new opposition parties that have emerged in recent years. Among other things, populist rhetoric crystallises the democratic crisis around the figure of the presidential majority, holding it responsible for three problems: criticism of representation, demands for efficiency, and rejection of political life (Souban, 2023). In this sense, they seek to identify with the people (‘we’) and ostracise the presidential group Ensemble pour la République as ‘them,’ the establishment.

Returning to the issue of government, the presidentialisation enabled by the 1962 reform and the impossibility of cohabitation institutionalised by the 2000 reform have reinforced presidential majoritarianism (Constitutional Council, 2021). Thus, the role of the Prime Minister has been diminished within the diarchy, transforming him into a mere extension of the presidential will, accentuating the disconnect and inefficiency pointed out by the opposition and perceived by the population.

In this regard, on 8 September 2025, when François Bayrou resigned, he was disapproved of by 81% of the French population (IFOP, September 2025). In contrast, Sébastien Lecornu, the new PM who arrived with difficulty, is on the rise, garnering 41% favourable opinions, particularly with proposals that resonate with the people, having slowed down the implementation of the controversial pension reform. 

A fundamental problem of representation and instability in Parliament 

A second angle that must be included in the analysis is the role of party politics, which suggests developing the notion of ‘polarisation.’ While the emergence of La République en Marche in 2017 is undeniable, the 2022 election must be seen in the context of the desire to preserve a republican front against the rise of the far-right. This leads us to a “post-democracy” scenario (Insel, 2005) in which the representation of the people has been overshadowed by the mere exploitation of institutional mechanisms for personal gain. At the same time, the absence of a majority in the 2024 legislative elections has led to the emergence of distinct blocs, between the left-wing coalition, the centrist presidential group, and the far-right alongside its Republican allies, which oppose each other in parliamentary debates. 

The consequence was that the PMs, following the president's wishes, resorted to Article 49.3 of the Constitution as a means of forcing through legislation such as finance bills and pension reforms, particularly under Elisabeth Borne, who was heavily criticised for this use of the article. In contrast, since 2024, the opposition was able to form a coalition to pass motions of no confidence under Article 49.2, leading to the dismissal of Prime Ministers Michel Barnier (December 2024) and François Bayrou. The pattern of obstructionism is seriously hampering the legislative process and, by extension, the concrete implementation of measures for the people.

In this context of sterile antagonism, where everyone is entrenched in their positions, any form of social dialogue reaches an impasse. The CGT, a workers' union, symbolically left the Conclave organised by François Bayrou (Winock, 2025)Thus, the reforms that are taking shape point in two directions. On the one hand, the inclusion of citizen representation, notably with the RIC (Citizen Initiative Referendum). On the other hand, the resolution of institutional deadlocks by restricting the use of Article 49.3, a desire articulated by PM Lecornu to revive dialogue and, perhaps, breathe new life into French democracy (Barbarit, 2025).

Conclusion

The French democratic system, which was originally described as semi-presidential, became heavily presidentialised, with the increased powers for the president and reduced powers for the Prime Minister granted by the 1958 Constitution and the 1962 constitutional reform. Despite the increased powers conferred on Parliament by the 2008 constitutional reform, the perceived inefficiency of the system has resulted in low voter turnout, which compromises the proper functioning of institutions. Furthermore, increased polarisation between parties and the rise of populist movements, in a context of multiplying political crises, have both led to the emergence of new actors fragmenting Parliament. These phenomena have thereby accentuated institutional deadlock and the perceived inefficiency by the people. While reforms such as the Citizens’ Initiative Referendum (CIR) are being suggested to ensure the effective integration of popular representation, specialists question  how effective these projects will really be in improving the state of French democracy.