This research examines how territorially based insurgencies in South Asia have transformed into ideology-oriented, dispersed acts of neo-terrorism, by non-state entities as state surrogates, destabilizing the Indian subcontinent. It deals with India's perception of threat and defense strategies challenging Pakistan's militant surrogacy and inconsistent counterterrorism efforts by Bangladesh.

Cross-border terrorism flourishes in porous borders, ideological dissemination, and intelligence shortcomings deeply embedded in post-Afghan War dynamics and post-9/11 securitization. Even though Indo-Bangladesh cooperation prevails, operational inertia persists. It argues that India's counterterror success is grounded in regional geopolitics and it suggests a multilateral, intelligence-driven, diplomatically co-evolutionary security paradigm.

1. Introduction

The legitimacy of the South Asian states and their functionaries has been critically engendered by an unprecedented spike in acts of transnational terrorism over the past few years against the backdrop of the geopolitical tumult witnessed by this region. In the present context, the structural anatomy of ‘neo-terrorism’ in South Asia subverts conventional terrorism paradigms. Such an evolution in terrorism modalities in the sub-continental matrix necessitates a complete calibration of traditional security architectures. While terrorism existed in the early 1970s, it predominantly functioned as a strategic coercive mechanism often adopted as part of territorial nationalism that sought political redress while mainly being restricted to regional frontiers (Asthana, 2010). These terrorist outfits had adopted the modus operandi of tactically orchestrating their acts of terror to optimise symbolic resonance instead of mass lethality. The primary objective was, therefore, to popularise grievance narratives rather than causing indiscriminate casualties.

The emergence of modern terrorism has overarching intricacies interlinked to diverse ideological, religious, and political goals. This evolution is underscored by unprecedented operational capacity for asymmetric warfare, often resulting in unrestrained lethality transcending spatial or jurisdictional boundaries. With a deliberate, unpredictable ‘modus operandi’ to inflict psychological destabilization, these outfits have adeptly engineered a globalised architecture of insecurity. They have succeeded in (1) creating a sense of vulnerability across the world, (2) gaining attention and publicity through acts of violence and by the use of the media to enhance the effectiveness of their violence, and (3) gaining support from similar groups around the world (Asthana, 2010).

The hyper-religious radicalism of small militant offshoots sits in stark juxtaposition with the broader enabling environment. This has been characterized by institutional dysfunctionality,  governance deficits and non-existent public services collectively fuelling a cycle of self-perpetuating ideological militancy. This phenomenon, commonplace in the developing world, contributes to perceived injustices and grievances often conceptualized as the ‘knowledge gap’ (Persaud, 2001).

2. India and its Neighbors

Since its inception in 1947, India has been enmeshed in an unceasing confrontation with radical insurgency movements and terror outfits. One of India’s most proximal neighbours, Pakistan, is dubbed the breeding ground of terrorism and has played a rather pivotal role in disseminating the plague of terrorism across Southeast Asia and beyond. Pakistan’s propensity to engage non-state actors as proxies to fight its war exhibits a continuum from 1947 to the present. However, their exclusivism makes these operations unique in India (Chellaney, 2002). Providing credibility to this claim, the state of Pakistan, instead of overtly deploying the traditional military apparatus, orchestrated a territorial foray. This was achieved through the instrumentalisation of irregular state-supported tribesmen, which led to the ‘Indo-Pakistan War’ of 1947-48, marking the start of a protracted and multifaceted geopolitical conflict. The state apparatus revamped its doctrine for operation, moving towards sub-conventional warfare, a model that has  endured through varying expressions and levels of intensity throughout the sustained Indo-Pakistani competition.

The ideational and strategic underpinning of Pakistan’s support for mujahideen groups is intimately connected with its military’s entrenched goal of taking revenge for the profound geopolitical and psychological failure of 1971.  This conflict not only caused Pakistan’s complete military defeat but also brought about the separation of East Pakistan, creating the independent nation of Bangladesh.

The overwhelming asymmetry between the country’s military, demographic, and economic capabilities provides testimony to the fact that Pakistan’s military advances, in more recent times, have been neutralised effectively by India. Quantitatively illustrative of this disparity, contemporary estimates indicate a presence of 400000 military troops in Kashmir alone—an operational force that exceeds 1/3rd of Pakistan’s entire standing army (Stern, 2000).

3. The Roots

The recent upsurge in terrorist operations in the South Asian region is linked to the 1980 Afghan War. The period was marked by a substantial hike in U.S. aid and Saudi funneling of arms to Afghanistan for countering the neighbouring Soviet Union through Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI).

It is speculated that large portions of the CIA’s funding to the anti-Soviet rebels of Afghanistan, which had been channelised through Pakistan’s ISI, were used to ignite bloody insurgencies in the Kashmir region (Azizi & Batish, 2025) after failing to fuel insurgencies in Punjab.

Post the U.S. operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in 2001, the Taliban were defeated and forced out of their native lands, compelling them to seek refuge in Pakistan. Since then, most of the Taliban kingpins have settled there, using it as a rear base of operation.

Both in the Afghanistan and Kashmir conflicts, Pakistan has advocated and fostered the ideology of a pan-Islamic jihad and a jihad culture fed by vast amounts of American-provided arms into the black market in Pakistan (Stern, 2000).

The numerous border crossing points between Pakistan and Afghanistan allow the Taliban to cross over the border to conduct attacks on the Afghan government and civilians. They are seldom obstructed by any interceptions or resistance (Gohel, 2020).

4. India & Bangladesh

Since its inception, India has witnessed uncontrolled in-migration from Bangladesh. This issue has not yet been resolved but has been amplified by the more recent security threats South Asia is facing. The relatively loosely guarded frontier, coupled with the unbridled flow of illegal immigrants, has further aggravated the already worsening situation.

In more recent times, a significant portion of the Indian Muslim community has attempted to align with more secular factions as a reaction to the aggressive ‘Hinduism’ that has taken root in the country, while a smaller portion consciously resorts to ‘terrorism with global links’ (Panwar, 2017).

Empirical evidence indicates that cross-border terrorism comes in various forms: infiltration of militants, networks of logistical support, and spread of ideology. Recent terror operatives’ arrests near the Indo-Bangladesh border point towards an active network operating to take advantage of border loopholes (Kumar & Bhatnagar, 2020). Research also points towards radicalization in some areas of Bangladesh being based on socioeconomic factors and outside ideological influences, adding to security issues (Lutful, 2023).

The Sheikh Hasina administration’s complete crackdown on fundamentalist insurgent groups triggered the augmentation of the Indo-Bangladesh counterterrorism matrix (Bhattacharya, 2024). Bilateral security agreements, as reflected in the Coordinated Border Management Plan (CBMP) and the orchestrated counter-insurgency operation ‘Operation 
Sunrise,’ has strengthened mechanisms for intelligence sharing and operational cooperation between the two nations (Chowdhury, 2022). However, Bangladesh’s internal political landscape’s volatility, in addition to the ebb and flow of Islamist political groups, introduces a latent unpredictability into the counterterrorism trajectory.

Despite the extensive counterterrorism protocols in place, formidable structural bottlenecks do exist. The sensationalization of radical ideologies among the socioeconomically marginalised strata of the demography remains a primary vector for militant recruitment. In addition to this, the deplorable state of border security infrastructure, coupled with systemic lapses in surveillance architecture, has exacerbated the problem.

The time calls for concerted and sustained cooperation within the global community on issues incorporating, whilst not being singularly confined to the sharing of intelligence, cooperation on extradition. Extradition paints a vivid picture of the international community united in its efforts to contain terrorism. The success of counterterrorism cooperation for India is fundamentally grounded in its immediate neighbours’ attitude towards it. Pakistan, for instance, continues to unofficially harbour several terrorist factions, utilizing them as non-state proxies against India. While Pakistan has sealed back its assistance for ‘jihadist’ factions publicly, it ceases to overtly meddle with their operations, owing to the possible fear of facing backlash. It is high time for the Pakistani elites to realise the grave consequences of supporting these factions, especially when the nation is uncertainly poised at the brink of catastrophe and political instability.