This article discusses the recent impeachment procedure of President Yoon Seok Yeol that is occurring in South Korea through normative and political science perspectives. Introducing some elements of comparative analysis, it brings a critical analysis of the constitutional binding of the impeachment procedure relative to Korean politics and Korean political party structure. The discussion concludes with the determining role of popular politics, through an examination on how People Power Party (PPP) politicians’ political behavior hindered the impeachment procedure. 

Introduction

On December 3, 2024, the President of the Republic of Korea, Yoon Seok Yeol declared Martial Law, after forty-five years of absence since the 12.12 Military Insurrection in 1979, which still remains a traumatic event for the Korean people (Tessa Wong et al., 2024). He accused the opposition, the Democratic Party (DP), of an “attack on the constitutional order,” and therefore regarding the enforcement of such a measure an“(eradication) of  pro-DPRK, anti-state forces”, without informing the Korean National Assembly (KNA) (Mark E. Manyin, 2024), an act that is unconstitutional by Art. 77(4) C (Art. 77(4) C, Constitution of the Republic of Korea, 1948). Some KNA MPs managed to convene at night and passed a bill for the martial law to end, carried out by 190 votes out of 300, including 12 votes from Yoon Seok Yeol’s PPP (Jung Min-kyung, 2024). On December 14, an impeachment motion of Yoon Seok Yeol was carried out by 204 votes after a failed attempt on December 7 and the boycott of the PPP. (Mark E. Manyin, 2024). These episodes are not unknown in Korean politics: in recent Korean political history, President Park Geun-hye was impeached in 2016 for criminal charges. This article discusses in the first place the checks and balances of such an impeachment procedure in a normative perspective, followed by the perspective of Korean politics, and eventually in light of the impact of Korean popular politics during this procedure in 2016 and  2024. 

The Limits of a Normative Perspective

In the first place, I stress that the constitutional design of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea as of the impeachment procedure is one of a hybrid regime (Pipa Norris, 2017) and thus not sufficient in guaranteeing an effective carriage of the impeachment procedure in a normative perspective. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea was drafted in 1948, and despite several autocratic regimes, it has been amended solely nine times (Chung-In Moon and M. Jae Moon, 2020). In fact, the amendment procedure is very rigid as it requires two-thirds of the KNA MPs’ votes and national referendum approbation through simple majority (Art. 129 C, Constitution of the Republic of Korea, 1948). The amendments of the Constitution mainly concerned the choice of political system (Constitution of the Republic of Korea, amend. 3 & 5, 1960 & 1962) the appointment of the PR (Constitution of the Republic of Korea, amend.  & 5, 1960 & 1962) and the length of political actors’ terms (Constitution of the Republic of Korea, amend. 7 & 8, 1972 & 1980), meaning that the other normative aspects of the Constitution, have not been revised since 1948. Thus, current checks and balances in the present presidential system inherited the conception of 1950s politics in Korea—moreover drafted on base of the U.S Constitution (Kim Hakjoon, 1992)—a past hybrid regime that presented weak checks and balances, allowed state restriction, abused human rights and tolerated authoritarian values (Pipa Norris, 2017). This inheritance applies to the rigid impeachment procedure in terms of weak checks and balances. First, a motion of impeachment must be proposed by more than half of the KNA and voted by more than two-thirds, suspending their functions (Art. 65 C, Constitution of the Republic of Korea, 1948). In the case of a simple majority—even a relative majority—for the President in the KNA and the assumption of a rational choice behavior, no motion could ever be passed. Second, this motion must be brought to the Constitutional Court (CC) and carried out by six judges out of nine (Art. 113 C, ibid). Yet three justices are appointed by the KNA, three justices by the President, and three justices by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for six years (Art. 111(3) C, ibid), themselves being the compromise of KNA and the President (Art. 104 C, ibid). In a nutshell, in case of the maintain supramajority of the former President’s party in KNA, impeachment procedure may encourage corruption, as six and even nine justices may be on the elected President’s side—since the President cannot be reelected (Art. 70 C, ibid). Normatively, this procedure presents weak checks and balances nonetheless, it is to be confronted in light of the realities of Korean politics. 

The Checks of Korean Politics

In the second place, I posit that most importantly, Korean political parties’ structure and political repartition in KNA enable an effective impeachment and are the sole empirical checks and balances against presidential impunity. The first check is the Korean parties’ structure. The grass-roots of modern Korean parties lies in the “top-down rather than a bottom-up process” of democratization in South Korea after 1987 (Youngmi Kim, 2017). It is notable in the “underdevelopment of Korean party system” that is to say enhancement of electoral procedures yet parties promoting their own interests (Choi Jang-jip, 1996). This “underdevelopment” has surely had an impact on party structures of Korean parties bonding civil society and the state. However, it is hard to class them under classical typology that are mass parties, cadre parties (Duverger, 1990) or even cartel parties (Katz and Mair, 1995). In some aspects, they can be considered as cadre parties: in their core elite composition, in the weak base of due-paying members. In aspects of organization, they can be considered as a mass parties: in the organization of central and periphery sectors and mass bureaucratic organization (Youngmi Kim, 2017). In aspects of political strategy and composition, they behave as cartel parties: headed by the elite, “brokers” of the bonds between civil society and the state and reliant mainly on the state’s subventions (Jang Hoon, 1997). These subventions give advantage to broader parties; as stated in the Political Fund Act, 50/100 of the national subsidies are proportionally distributed among each parties’ number of seats in the KNA (Art. 27, Political Fund Act, 2005). The last aspect of Korean parties is their particularity of being a “one-man-centered” party, that is to say that Korean parties only thrive as long as their leader remains in place, otherwise it collapses. Thus, I argue that the combination of aspects of mass parties, cadre parties and cartel parties make Korean parties coercively responsible before the citizens. First, their contact at the local and center level (mass parties) implies widespread accountability. Second, their strong reliance on national funds (cartel parties) makes them financially accountable nation-wide. Third, the presence of the elite (cadre parties) that are supposed to represent moral virtue (Duverger, 1990), plus the “one-man-centered” organization, makes the impeachment procedure a sword of Damocles on every political leader. In this sense, Youngmi Kim argues that a patron-client relationship has been installed in Korean politics (Youngmi Kim, 2017), which makes politicians vote against their own leader in times of impeachment. 

The second check is political repartition. Since the late 1980s, Korean party politics have been the history of dominant bipartism (Sunghack Lim, 2021), be it the Grand National Party vs. the Millennium Democratic Party in 2000-2004, or the Democratic Party vs. the People’s Power Party in 2024. In both recent impeachment cases, the government have lost its majority in the KNA: after 2016 South Korean legislative election, Park’s Saenuri had 122 seats (Choe Sang-Hun, 2016); after 2024 South Korean, Yoon’s PPP 108 seats (Mark E. Manyin, 2024). In both cases it has facilitated the carriage of the motion. Nonetheless, even though the struggle for political dialogue among Korean parties is inherent to Korean politics (Youngmi Kim, 2017), the 2024 procedure reveals to be harder: there was much resistance that is to say several boycotts of the PPP MPs first on the impeachment motion on December 7, then on the nomination of three justices for the CC (Mark E. Manyin, 2024); the Acting President Han Duck-soo’s veto of the KNA on matters such as  establishment of special counsels to probe President Yoon and First Lady on December 2024 (Mark E. Manyin, 2024). This may not be solvable only through the lenses of political parties but through the bonds political parties maintain with their electorate.  

Popular Politics: “People Power” and Media. 

In the third place, I argue that the political responsibility of Korean politicians is less and less coercive, for there is the decay of  people power in media dynamics, and that this has contributed to the institutional blockade for the impeachment procedure. The concept of people power is according to the “capacity of citizens to collectively determine the course of events, working outside the state’s formal institutions but exerting pressure on them to act in particular ways.” (Turner et al., 2018). In the impeachment of Park in 2016, they state that the procedure would have had another trajectory if the people had not come massively in the streets on a regular basis to protest. They also mention several characteristics of this people power in 2016: a large number of people, a diverse body of people united for a common aim, low level of trust in the government, a considerable engagement of civil society, and mistrust of governmental media or close (Turner et al., 2018). Are those conditions present in the current case? There is as a matter of fact, a huge number of protesters; nevertheless, the unity of protesters is compromised: contrary to the situation of 2016, rival nonviolent demonstrations occurred, such as the one that opposed 38,000 pro-Yoon protesters against 6,000 anti-Yoon protesters as estimated by the police on December 21 (Yonhap, 2025). Moreover, even though it is relatively low, Yoon’s popularity rises and has even reached low pre-martial law levels (Min-ho, 2025).

This decay in people power may be the result of a change in the relationship with the Korean media, since the Korean media has an active role in the influence of public opinion. Since democratization, there is still a constant skepticism in Korean political institutions: according to OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2024 Results - Country Notes: Korea, trust in national government in 2023 is only 37% among Korean people, trust in news media 30%, while trust in the national parliament and in the political parties are roughly 20% (OECD, 2024). This unequal trust in the media and former national government in the impeachment procedure may be at the origin of the pro-Yoon protesters in some aspects: media, including social media, are a medium for political discourse. According to Kim Sung-soo, a professor of political science and diplomacy at Hanyang University, “Yoon provided an opportunity to express their frustration toward that party [DP] by presenting himself as a platform-like figure to do so” (Min-ho, 2025). On the other side, there is a huge impact of social media on the recent younger male electorate of Yoon. Even though social media may improve political mobilization through the share of demonstration places, it has in fact a huge impact on political knowledge of its users: a higher use of social media reduces the gap of political knowledge among individuals but also reduces the latter (Lee, 2018). Therefore, slogans such as “Stop the Steal” or even demonstration figures such as “Captain America” spread across the net, reducing political knowledge in a manner that resembles the one observed in Trump’s supporters in January 2021 (Chaigne, 2025). In a nutshell, the convergence of both these media dynamics led to a certain radicality among Yoon’s electorate that enabled PPP politicians to stay still for some time against DP pressure and hinder the impeachment procedure. 

Conclusion

On February 25, 2025, the President of the Republic of Korea, Yoon Seok Yeol attended his final impeachment hearing. His lawyer advocated that “the declaration of martial law was not intended to paralyze the state” (AFP, 2025). The reality of the unfolding events has revealed the normative weakness of the impeachment procedure because of the constitutional inheritance of a hybridregime; the lack of responsibility of the supposed checks that are Korean political parties; the decay of people power and the rise of political divide and populism in the era of media. Korean democracy, considered improving over time, may have gone backward after this. Presidential elections are to be held sixty days from his final impeachment by the Constitutional Court expected in mid-March (Yeon-soo, 2025), opening a period of political uncertainty.