Introduction

The delay of the scheduled summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in early 2026, triggered by the escalation of conflict in the Middle East, appeared, at first glance, to signal a disruption in great-power diplomacy. During this time, the Chair of  Kuomintang (KMT), Cheng Li-wun, led a high-profile delegation to Beijing, where she met with Xi Jinping. Then, Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council followed closely on the release of a comprehensive ten-point policy package, aimed at expanding cross-Strait exchanges. These developments raise an important puzzle: why did a moment of geopolitical distraction and uncertainty generate conditions for temporary stabilization rather than escalation? This article argues that the answer lies in the strategic use of diplomatic sequencing as a form of agenda power. The delayed summit created an interim political window in which Beijing was able to reshape the structure of cross-Strait interactions, shifting Taiwan from a high-salience security issue to a politically manageable domain of engagement. Through party-to-party diplomacy with the KMT and the rapid institutionalization of economic and social cooperation measures, Beijing converted temporal advantage into durable channels of influence. At the same time, these actions placed Taiwan’s elected government in a reactive dilemma, forcing it to choose between accepting material benefits associated with cross-Strait engagement or rejecting them at the cost of domestic legitimacy.

By situating Taiwan’s domestic political contestation within the broader context of U.S.–China summit diplomacy, this paper highlights how the timing and sequencing of diplomatic events can redistribute bargaining power across actors and arenas.

Theoretical Framework: Strategic Sequencing and Agenda Control

Agenda-Setting and Temporal Power in International Politics

Traditional approaches to international relations emphasize material capabilities and institutional arrangements, yet they often understate the role of time in structuring political outcomes. Agenda-setting theory suggests that actors exercise power not only by shaping outcomes, but by determining which issues are prioritized and when they are addressed. In this sense, diplomatic timing is not neutral; it organizes the hierarchy of attention across issue areas and actors. As Schelling (1966) argues, the manipulation of timing and expectations is itself a form of strategic interaction, allowing states to influence opponents without immediate coercion. In crisis environments, the sequencing of diplomatic engagements can therefore redistribute leverage by shifting when sensitive issues—such as Taiwan—are activated or deferred.

Two-Level Games and Domestic Mediation

The dynamics of diplomatic sequencing are further conditioned by domestic political constraints. Putnam’s (1988) two-level game framework highlights how international negotiations are simultaneously shaped by domestic legitimacy, audience costs, and internal political competition. In the context of cross-Strait relations, Taiwan represents a particularly complex domestic arena embedded within broader U.S.–China strategic competition. Political actors in Taipei do not merely respond to external signals; they reinterpret them through competing narratives of sovereignty, security, and economic welfare. This creates a multilayered bargaining environment in which external diplomatic moves—such as summit delays or policy initiatives—reverberate within domestic legitimacy contests.

Signaling Hierarchy Across Issue Domains

Not all policy domains are activated simultaneously in international politics. Instead, states often prioritize certain channels—economic, political, or security—depending on strategic context. Jervis (1976) emphasizes that signals are filtered through perception and misperception, making the ordering of signals as important as their content. In periods of heightened uncertainty, actors may deliberately elevate lower-risk domains, such as economic cooperation or political dialogue, while deferring high-risk security actions. This produces a signaling hierarchy in which the meaning of restraint or escalation is structured temporally rather than uniformly across domains.

Strategic Sequencing as an Analytical Lens

Building on these insights, this paper conceptualizes strategic sequencing as the deliberate reordering of diplomatic actions across time to shape issue salience, actor roles, and bargaining leverage. Within this framework, three mechanisms are particularly relevant. First, peace ownership refers to the contest over which actor can legitimately define and claim credit for maintaining stability. Second, peace dividend brokerage captures the ability of political actors to translate abstract notions of peace into tangible economic or social benefits. Third, implementation asymmetry highlights how early movers can institutionalize policy channels and gain structural advantages over reactive actors. Finally, political bypass sequencing describes strategies that circumvent formal state-to-state channels by engaging subnational, societal, or partisan actors, thereby reshaping the locus of authority in international interaction.

Beijing: Political Manageability Before the Summit

Strategic Space from U.S. Distraction

The escalation of the Iran conflict in early 2026 significantly reshaped the strategic environment in which U.S.–China diplomacy unfolded. As Washington redirected military assets and political attention toward the Middle East, its capacity to sustain coherent engagement in the Indo-Pacific was constrained. Analysts note that such diversion effectively created strategic space for Beijing, allowing it to operate with reduced external pressure in adjacent theaters (Brookings Institution, 2026). The postponement of the Trump–Xi summit to mid-May therefore did not simply delay bilateral engagement; it generated an interim window in which Beijing could act proactively while the United States was preoccupied. In this context, time itself became a strategic resource, enabling China to shape the pre-summit agenda rather than react to it.

Xi–Cheng Meeting as Narrative Reframing

Within this temporal window, the meeting between Xi Jinping and KMT Chair Cheng Li-wun functioned as a critical moment of narrative reframing. Official discourse surrounding the meeting emphasized themes of peace, shared identity, and national rejuvenation, shifting the Taiwan issue away from the language of military deterrence toward that of cultural and political belonging (Xinhua News Agency, 2026a). By foregrounding concepts such as two sides of one family and the shared aspirations for stability, Beijing effectively downgraded Taiwan from an immediate security flashpoint to a politically manageable question. This reframing reduced the salience of conflict-based narratives and created a discursive environment more conducive to engagement.

Equally important was the institutional channel through which this reframing occurred. Rather than relying on formal state-to-state mechanisms, Beijing leveraged party-to-party diplomacy, engaging directly with the KMT as a political actor. This approach allowed Beijing to bypass the constraints of official cross-Strait relations while maintaining a semblance of legitimacy grounded in historical party ties. As a result, the Chinese Communist Party–KMT relationship functioned as a flexible political instrument, enabling communication, signaling, and coordination outside conventional diplomatic frameworks.

Institutionalization Through the Ten-Point Package

The release of the ten-point policy package (Table 1) immediately following the meeting marked a transition from symbolic engagement to institutional consolidation. Central to this package was the proposal to establish a regularized communication mechanism between the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT, effectively locking in a stable political channel for future interaction (Xinhua News Agency, 2026b). This move transformed a one-off diplomatic event into an ongoing institutional arrangement, reducing uncertainty surrounding future exchanges.

Beyond political coordination, the package introduced a range of economic and social measures aimed at deepening cross-Strait interdependence. These included facilitating Taiwanese agricultural exports, restoring tourism flows, and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises seeking access to mainland markets (Xinhua News Agency, 2026b). Such measures created tangible incentives for engagement, linking political stability to material benefits.

The package also emphasized long-term societal integration through cultural exchange and youth programs. Initiatives promoting media cooperation, student exchanges, and shared cultural production were designed to reinforce a sense of common identity while cultivating future constituencies supportive of cross-Strait engagement.

Taipei: Competing Ownership of Peace and Authority

KMT as Peace Dividend Broker

The developments following Cheng Li-wun’s visit to Beijing reveal a deliberate effort by the KMT to reposition itself as a central broker of cross-Strait peace dividends. Cheng’s characterization of the visit as the first step, with 99 steps to follow, signaled not only a long-term commitment to engagement but also a strategic framing of cross-Strait relations as an incremental and actionable process rather than a static policy stance. This narrative was rapidly translated into organizational action upon her return to Taiwan, as Cheng directed party leadership to establish a working group and formal liaison mechanisms to coordinate with mainland counterparts (Lianhe Zaobao, 2026b). Such moves reflect a shift from symbolic diplomacy to structured implementation. By institutionalizing channels of communication and policy follow-through, the KMT sought to claim not only discursive ownership of peace but also the capacity to deliver its material benefits. In doing so, the party positioned itself as an intermediary capable of transforming abstract notions of stability into concrete economic and social outcomes, thereby strengthening its domestic political credibility.

Societal Reception and Economic Constituencies

The effectiveness of this brokerage strategy was reinforced by the rapid and favorable reception among key economic sectors in Taiwan. In particular, the tourism industry interpreted Beijing’s proposal to resume travel from Shanghai and Fujian as a “strong signal” of goodwill, emphasizing both its symbolic and practical implications (Lianhe Zaobao, 2026a). This response highlights the emergence of stakeholder coalitions—comprising tourism operators, airlines, hospitality providers, and related service sectors—that stand to gain directly from renewed cross-Strait exchanges. These actors, while formally outside the political system, play a crucial role in shaping domestic policy debates by articulating economic expectations and exerting pressure for accommodation. The alignment of material incentives with political engagement creates a feedback loop in which economic constituencies become invested in short-term stabilization. As a result, the notion of peace becomes increasingly tied to distributive outcomes, reinforcing the KMT’s role as a broker that can deliver tangible benefits rather than merely advocate for dialogue.

DPP Government and the Authority Dilemma

In contrast, Taiwan’s governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) faced a structurally constrained position in responding to these developments. The government’s strategy centered on reframing Beijing’s initiatives as politically motivated attempts to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. Official responses criticized the measures as efforts to “bypass the elected government” and to impose a “one-China framework” on cross-Strait interactions (BBC News 中文, 2026). This counter-framing sought to shift the focus from economic opportunity to questions of political legitimacy and institutional authority. However, this approach also exposed the DPP to a significant policy dilemma. Accepting the measures would risk legitimizing KMT-led engagement channels and weakening the government’s claim to authority over cross-Strait affairs. Rejecting them, on the other hand, could be interpreted domestically as obstructing economic recovery and disregarding public welfare. As observers have noted, Beijing’s strategy is structured in a way that even rejection can be reframed as evidence of the Taiwanese government’s unwillingness to pursue beneficial exchanges, thereby amplifying internal political pressure (BBC News 中文, 2026). This dynamic places the DPP in a reactive position, constrained by competing demands for sovereignty protection and economic responsiveness.

From Peace Ownership to Authority Competition

These dynamics indicate that the contest in Taipei extends beyond competing narratives of peace to encompass a deeper struggle over political authority and representation. The central issue is no longer simply who advocates for stability, but who possesses the legitimate standing to represent Taiwan in cross-Strait engagement, who is authorized to receive and interpret external policy signals, and who can effectively deliver their benefits to society. The KMT’s rapid organizational response and alignment with economic constituencies position it as an active implementer of engagement, while the DPP emphasizes its role as the formal guardian of sovereign authority. This divergence transforms the concept of peace ownership into a broader competition over governance capacity and legitimacy. In this sense, cross-Strait interactions become a site of internal political contestation, where diplomatic sequencing not only shapes external relations but also restructures domestic power dynamics within Taiwan.

Washington: Strategic Bandwidth and Deferred Signaling

Iran War and Strategic Bandwidth Constraints

The outbreak of conflict in the Middle East imposed immediate constraints on U.S. strategic bandwidth. Washington was compelled to redirect military assets—including naval and missile defense systems—from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, reflecting a classic case of resource reallocation under crisis conditions (Brookings Institution, 2026). This shift not only reduced operational flexibility in Asia but also created a condition of attention scarcity, in which policymakers faced competing priorities across multiple theaters. As a result, the United States’ capacity to actively manage cross-Strait dynamics in real time was diminished, leaving greater room for Beijing to shape developments during the pre-summit period.

At the same time, Washington entered the delayed summit environment with weakened bargaining leverage. Domestically, judicial constraints on executive authority over tariffs reduced the administration’s ability to deploy trade measures as negotiating tools against China (Reuters, 2026a). Internationally, the demands of managing the Iran conflict and broader geopolitical tensions placed the United States under multi-front pressure. These factors collectively limited the administration’s capacity to escalate or credibly threaten economic or military measures in the run-up to the summit, thereby narrowing its strategic options.

Summit Sequencing Logic

Given these constraints, the United States adopted a de facto strategy of pre-summit de-escalation. Avoiding major confrontations—particularly over Taiwan—became a pragmatic choice to preserve the conditions necessary for leader-level engagement. Public signaling emphasized continuity in bilateral relations and downplayed the implications of the summit delay, framing it as logistical rather than strategic (Reuters, 2026a). This approach effectively deferred high-risk issues to maintain a stable diplomatic environment.

However, this restraint was not indicative of a long-term shift in policy. Instead, it reflected a sequencing decision in which sensitive Taiwan-related actions were postponed rather than abandoned. Reports indicating that additional U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were likely to follow the summit underscore this logic of deferred signaling (Reuters, 2026a). By delaying such measures, Washington avoided complicating summit diplomacy while preserving its ability to reassert security commitments afterward.

These dynamics had important implications for U.S. signal coherence in the Indo-Pacific. The combination of military redeployment, diplomatic restraint, and delayed security actions produced a perception of inconsistency in American commitments. Allies and partners may interpret such shifts as evidence of weakened focus, while Taiwan itself faces mixed signals regarding the timing and strength of U.S. support. In this sense, strategic sequencing allowed Washington to manage immediate constraints but at the cost of introducing ambiguity into its broader regional posture.

Implications for the Triangular Relationship

Stabilization & Re-Politicization Scenario

The sequencing of events surrounding the delayed Trump–Xi summit creates the conditions for a plausible short-term stabilization scenario across the triangular relationship. Beijing’s rapid engagement with the KMT, combined with the rollout of the ten-point policy package, facilitates the emergence of a pre-summit coalition linking political intermediaries and economic stakeholders. This coalition—comprising Beijing, the KMT, and sectors such as tourism and trade—generates shared incentives for maintaining a low-tension environment in the lead-up to the summit (Xinhua News Agency, 2026b; Lianhe Zaobao, 2026a). As economic actors anticipate tangible benefits from resumed exchanges, domestic pressure within Taiwan may favor accommodation or at least restraint. Under these conditions, Taiwan is temporarily recoded as a politically manageable issue, reducing the likelihood of escalation and enabling a relatively smooth progression of leader-level diplomacy.

However, this stabilization is inherently fragile and contingent on domestic political responses in Taipei. A re-politicization scenario emerges if the DPP government rejects Beijing’s initiatives and reframes them as politically coercive or illegitimate. In such a case, cross-Strait engagement may be recast domestically as a contested political instrument, with the KMT accused of facilitating external influence and the government positioned as defending sovereignty. Beijing, in turn, can respond by amplifying narratives that portray the Taiwanese government as obstructing economic development and public welfare, thereby shifting pressure onto domestic audiences (BBC News 中文, 2026). This dynamic risks deepening internal polarization within Taiwan. Simultaneously, the United States may reassert its presence in the post-summit phase through renewed security signaling, particularly via arms sales or military cooperation measures (Reuters, 2026a). Such actions would reintroduce Taiwan into the security domain, reversing the earlier political reframing and potentially escalating tensions.

Regional and Alliance Implications

These competing trajectories have broader implications for regional stability and alliance dynamics. For U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, the temporary de-emphasis of Taiwan as a security issue may create uncertainty regarding the consistency of American commitments. The perception that Washington defers sensitive issues for diplomatic expediency could weaken confidence in its long-term strategic posture. At the same time, Taiwan’s internal signaling becomes increasingly fragmented, as competing political actors project divergent interpretations of cross-Strait engagement. This inconsistency complicates external assessments of Taiwan’s policy direction and may reduce the clarity of deterrence.

Conclusion

Diplomatic timing itself functions as a form of power: by shaping when and how issues are addressed, actors can influence both the structure and the outcomes of political interaction. In this case, Beijing leveraged the interim window created by the delay to recast Taiwan from a high-salience security issue into a politically manageable domain, institutionalize engagement through KMT-linked channels, and generate material incentives for stabilization. At the same time, this sequencing placed Taiwan’s government in a reactive position, illustrating how temporal ordering can redistribute bargaining leverage across actors. In addition, similar patterns of strategic sequencing can be identified in other geopolitical contexts, including crisis management in the Middle East and maritime disputes in the South China Sea. In each case, the ordering of diplomatic, economic, and security actions shapes not only immediate outcomes but also the longer-term trajectory of competition and cooperation.

Future research should further examine how signaling across the Taiwan Strait is mediated by domestic political competition and how different actors interpret and respond to temporally structured diplomatic moves. More broadly, integrating domestic politics into the study of sequencing offers a promising avenue for understanding how international strategies are translated, contested, and institutionalized within local political systems.