Multilateralism No More? The Impact of the US Election on the UN
Youtong Liu
Abstract
Trump’s isolationist and anti-globalization tendencies have already been presented in the massive withdrawals during his first presidency. With the concern on global multilateralism, this article analyzes the impact and causes of Trump’s re-election on the UN’s main body (exemplified by UNSC reform) and entities (exemplified by UNESCO and UNRWA) in terms of the UN’s architecture. This article reveals that Trump’s attitude towards the UN system extends his domestic policies and political values, and argues that Trump’s foreign policy will exacerbate the divergence between the US and the UN, especially on key issues such as the Middle East peace agenda.
Introduction
Due to the growing bipartisan divide in US international affairs, Trump’s victory will significantly impact the US’s participation in the United Nations (UN), its funding and contributions, and its stance on the UN system reform. In Trump’s first presidency, his large-scale “withdrawal” from international organizations and global initiatives and his profit-seeking foreign policy have attacked the UN system’s stable operation and undermined the US’s leadership in the UN and its subordinate multilateral institutions. At present, in the global circumstance—the unprecedented increase in the intensity of the Israel-Palestine war and the pressure of international public opinion—the gap of views on US foreign policies between the two parties and between parties and citizens is also growing, marked by the Republican Party’s reorganization after the Trump’s assasination attempt. Moreover, the Republican Party’s victories in the Congress and Senate House have provided implementation space for Trump’s radical political philosophy.
This results in a return to Trump’s isolated strategy and anti-globalization in the UN system. According to official documents, the UN system is constructed by main bodies, the secretariat, and other entities (funds, programmes, and specialized agencies). Despite the US leadership in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council (UNSC), the two main bodies of the UN, the past decades have witnessed the US’s continued veto over the Palestinian and Cuba issues, with most of them against UNGA resolutions. Trump’s victory is likely to exacerbate the use of the veto and the divergence between the US, a permanent member, and the global majority on key issues, such as the Middle East peace agenda, thus creating a “butterfly effect” on the UNSC reform process. Simultaneously, the US attitudinal shifts on global issues could be channeled through its proposals, votes, funding, UN-based advocacy, and alliances to impact specialized agencies of the UN system.
This part aims to discuss the impact of the US election on the UN system by looking into the policies, personnel, and previous actions of the Trump administration. Firstly, it focuses on the UNSC reform negotiation, a core issue in global governance and the North-South development debate that has tightly connected key global crises, member states, the UNGA, and the UNSC. Secondly, it analyzes Trump’s attitude and previous policies towards the UN system entities. Finally, it selects three UN system entities that have been or will be impacted by Trump’s “withdrawal” policy as cases to reveal the continuity and changes in Trump’s international organization strategy.
The UNSC Reform
UNSC reform is important for the UN system to improve and maintain its global governance function and sustainable development goals (SDGs). Of the six UN main bodies, the UNSC is primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security. Based on the UN Charter, the UNSC has the power to determine threats, plan and take economic sanctions or military action. It is involved in the process of the Secretary General appointment and the admission of Member States. In the UNSC reform issue, the distribution of seats and veto power is the focus of debate among member states and academics. At present, the UNSC has a total of 15 members, five of which are permanent members with veto power, making it the body in the UN system that best embodies the “unanimity of major powers” in post-war global governance. Under the complexity of international relations and the securitization of economic issues, its traditional function of safeguarding international collective security is being extended to a wide range of global governance areas, thus magnifying the privileges of developed Western countries. As a result, the seat and power structure of the UNSC is increasingly becoming a focal point in global negotiations on equality and development.
The structure of the UNSC, derived from the Yalta Agenda, underwent its first reform in 1965 under the background of the national liberation movement. After the Cold War, the UN’s military mandate and operational power expanded dramatically under US domination, leading to widespread controversy and the emergence of proposals for UNSC reform. With the geopolitical turn of international relations and the rise of the “Global South,” UNSC reform has increasingly become a significant topic in the global arena. In 1993, with the adoption of UNGA Resolution 48/26, an Open-ended Working Group was founded to consider the issue of “the increase of the membership of the Security Council, and other matters related to the Security Council” (General Assembly, 1993).
In 2005, the UN Secretary-General Annan’s report, In Larger Freedom, further brought UNSC reform into the spotlight, sparking widespread international discussion. He argued that the UN faced an urgent “reform-or-marginalization” situation and that the expansion of the UNSC and more equitable regional representation, primarily regional balance and participation in decision-making by the UN’s major contributors, were the keys to the UN system’s enhancing its legitimacy and efficiency (Secretary General, 2005; Imber, 2006). Amidst the calls for UNSC reform, a number of countries outside the permanent five (P5), motivated by the need to enhance international leadership and influence, have formed groups and proposed reform models. These groups include G4 (Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil), which aspires to be a permanent member; the Uniting for Consensus group (UfC/Coffee Club), which opposes the regional dominance of G4; and the African Union (AU), which represents the interests of Africa as a whole. Table 1 summarizes the reform models proposed by the above groups, their principle foundations, objections, and opposing voices.
Table 1: Major UNSC Reform Models Proposed by Promoting Blocs
(Secretary General, 2005; African Union, 2005; Imber, 2006)
Traditionally, the US has selectively supported countries from G4 based on their national interests and global identity. However, its support only includes a permanent seat but not veto power. In 1992, the Clinton administration suggested permanent seats for Japan and Germany and three developing countries (respectively from Africa, Asia, and Latin America), marking the start of the US attitude shift from negatively maintaining the current structure to supporting the expansion of the UNSC. In 2024, Thomas-Greenfield, former US ambassador to the UN, announced a new US stance of supporting two permanent seats for African countries, reflecting the rise of inclusivity in the US agenda on UNSC reform (Reuters, 2024). In the 2010s, India has also been supported by the US due to its emerging role in global governance.
However, it is also true that UNSC reform is destined to run counter to US national interests, and the only question is how to minimize losses. Brett Schaefer’s (1997) report suggested that though US attitude change aimed to democratize UNSC and strengthen its legitimacy, the expansion of UNSC could still undermine US’s national interests, as a larger UNSC would diminish US anti-terrorist efforts, obstruct US support for Israel, magnify the expansion of weapons of mass destruction, complicate the formation of UN military alliance, damage UNSC ability to act decisively, and fail to reduce cost for peacekeeping. Bosco (2015) also pointed out that US support for UNSC reform is not active due to the unalignment with its national interest and that although the US had to reform the UNSC, its agenda without sharing veto power with the G4 could not please any side in the negotiation.
For Trump, UNSC reform is not a priority of his foreign policy. His recent actions also reflected a bilateral trend to solve security issues beyond the UNSC framework. In Trump’s first presidency, the UNSC reform issue has been placed under the larger context of UN reform. During the 2017 Reforming the United Nations: Management, Security, and Development Meeting, Trump (2017) criticized the bureaucracy and poor management of the UN system and suggested that “people” should gain more attention. He also advocated reforming the unfair distribution of membership fees and military duty, calling for a quantitative assessment of peacekeeping results. Till now, Trump has not expressed his view on UNSC reform during this presidency. However, on the core issues of the current UNSC discussions—Ukraine and Palestine, Trump is inclined to propose unilateral solutions outside the framework of the UNSC mandate. Specifically, on the Gaza issue, Trump’s meeting with Netanyahu and his plan to take over Gaza were strongly opposed by Middle Eastern countries and other P5 members. Moreover, on Ukraine, Trump’s agenda of letting Ukraine exchange national security for rare-earth minerals has also inspired strong criticism from Ukraine and US European allies (Melkozerova, 2025).
UN Entities
According to Trump’s (2017) remarks at the UN reform meeting, his two significant focuses on UN reform are efficiency and budget. As the most important sponsor of the UN system, the US has traditionally used its funding decisions to reflect its attitude toward specific UN entities, but government attitudes towards these entities could also affect their institutional efficiency and even existence. For instance, Trump’s remarks highlighted the importance of the UN in fulfilling SDGs in “feeding the hungry, providing disaster relief, and empowering women and girls in many societies all across the world,” which was highly related to his support for WFP, UNODC, and UNICEF at that time. Table 2 compares Trump’s attitudes toward major UN entities by comparing Trump’s two presidencies.
Table 2: Trump’s Attitude to Major UN Entities (First & Second Presidencies)
Note: This table is the author’s own synthesis based on UN agency funding records, White House statements, and media reports (including Reuters and AP news) from 2017-2021 and 2024-2025.
Generally, the UN system is witnessing a trend of cutting funding and withdrawal from Trump’s first presidency to the second, reflecting the US attitude against multilateral diplomacy and its extreme pursuit of efficiency. Among all UN entities, the withdrawal and re-withdrawal of UNESCO, UNHRC, and WHO has reflected the Trump administration’s clear rejection of the responsibility of leading global health, education and culture, and human rights protection as a global hegemony. These withdrawals could also be viewed as an extension of domestic bipartisan conflict and a demonstration of the pendulum on foreign policy—the globalized hegemony and institutionalism of Democrats vs. the isolationism, populism, and realism of Trump-led Republicans. At the same time, the reduction of US funding from its traditionally dominant entities—WFP and UNICEF—also indicates the extremization of Trump’s foreign policy from critically engaged in multilateralism to completely shifting to bilateral or unilateral diplomacy.
Case 1: UNESCO—A Pendulum in Global Governance
In 2017, the Trump administration withdrew from the organization on the grounds of “continuing anti-Israel bias.” The Guardian (2017) identified a number of possible reasons for the US opting out, including dissatisfaction with the election result of UNESCO, protest against Israel’s designation as an “occupying power,” and Trump’s efforts to reduce the government budget. After the US withdrawal, China took over as UNESCO’s top sponsor. This allowed the Biden administration to re-emerge as an active player in “countering China’s influence” and “addressing the new challenges of the 21st century centered on freedom of education, science, culture, and information” (The Guardian, 2023).
The Western media publicized the US’s return during Biden’s presidency in the context of the US–China rivalry with a highlight on AI. Foreign Policy (2023) portrayed the return of the US as a form of heroism to restrain Beijing: The absence of the US allowed China to politicize the World Heritage List, while the return of the US and the full payment of its outstanding contributions would provide UNESCO with a large sum of money. France 24 (2023) also pointed out that the Biden administration’s efforts to return to UNESCO are tied to the US–China competition on AI ethics, revealing the US’s focus on ideological rivalry in the high-tech sector and its concern about China’s multilateral leadership to overtake the US in the global standard-setting of AI. However, with Trump’s re-election, the American “epic” of cultural depoliticization and AI multilateralism ended with populism and isolationism in foreign policy.
The history of the US quitting and returning to UNESCO is not new, but Trump’s re-election has made the Democratic efforts in vain and further damaged US leadership in the realm of education, science, and culture by policy discontinuity. Trump’s support for Israel and pussyfooting around the international affairs budget are the main obstacles to the US retaining membership in UNESCO during his presidency. Especially when it comes to arrears of contributions, Trump is likely to use anti-semitism as an excuse to refuse to pay. However, Trump is also forced to choose between UNESCO’s possible “anti-Semitic stance” and China’s de facto rising leadership. According to UNESCO’s (2024) official website, China has used this platform to promote its influence in STEM education, cultural heritage preservation, and technology development in Africa. As the historical and cultural foundation of the BRI, the Chinese-funded Silk Roads program is even more important in enhancing the shortcomings of Chinese soft power. Trump’s withdrawal from UNESCO reflects the increasingly sharp confrontation between the US and China over science, technology, culture, and education. For example, at the Paris Artificial Intelligence Action Summit, the US refused to sign the Summit Commitment and directly criticized the suppression of technological innovation by overregulation (Al Jazeera, 2025). Again, this reflected the Trump administration’s rejection of the values of digital inclusion and digital sovereignty and its increasingly aggressive actions in the US–China rivalry.
Case 2: UNRWA—Extremization of Previous Policy
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) was established on the basis of the UNGA Resolution 302 of 1949 to provide assistance and protection to Palestinian refugees. Global attitudes towards the Palestine-Israel conflict and the strategies of major donors largely constrain UNRWA’s progress. According to its 2023 donor ranking, the US topped the list, accounting for 28.8% of total contributions (UNRWA, 2024), making the attitude of the new US administration towards UNRWA crucial for the sustainability of its programmes and even the institution's survival.
Due to Trump's extreme support towards Israel, UNRWA was considered to be one of the most influential international organizations after Trump took office. On Oct. 13, 2024, Trump announced to the American Lebanese community via X that he would bring real long-term peace to the Middle East and claimed that “during my Administration, we had peace in the Middle East.” However, during Trump’s first presidency, the Palestine-Israel conflict continued with 266 dead and nearly 30,000 injured in 2018 for the Return protest in Gaza (Al Jazeera, 2019), making the reality far from the “had peace” announcement.
On the contrary, Trump led the US defunding UNRWA in 2018, in line with Israel’s propaganda to abolish UNRWA and incorporate it into UNHCR (Al Jazeera, 2021), achieving “peace in the Middle East” by suppressing UNRWA’s influence in advancing the Middle East’s political agenda for peace, which is in addition to its function as a resettlement agency for refugees. Among the current appointees, core members of the incoming administration who are responsible for foreign affairs and national security, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth, and UN Ambassador Elise Stefanik, have reflected strong support for Zionism in their previous voices (Al Jazeera, 2024). These supports, based on Christian evangelical beliefs and far-right political positions, have also led to a more extreme approach to the Palestinian issue in Trump’s second presidency.
Of these, Stefanik, who represents the US in the UN system’s global governance negotiations, is particularly reflective of the new administration’s approach to the Palestinian issue and UNRWA, given the autonomy of delegate participation in day-to-day multilateral negotiations in the UN. Among her previous political actions, Stefanik is well-known for her pointed questioning of Harvard, MIT, and UPenn presidents in the congression of anti-Semitism on college campuses. Stefanik’s pro-Israeli stance has also extended to her criticism of UNRWA’s humanitarian aid: Stefanik (2024a, 2024b, 2024c) has repeatedly called for US divestment from UNRWA, arguing that by hiring Hamas leaders, UNRWA has become evidence of the UN as “a cesspool of anti-semitism” and that the Biden administration has used taxpayers’ money to feed “systemic anti-semitism and violent corruption.”
Currently, US aid to UNRWA has already been cut by Trump. However, it has also been argued that defunding could provide an opportunity for China to “fill the vacuum,” forcing Stefanik to balance Trump’s anti-China and anti-UN attitudes (Politico, 2024). However, while US aid to UNRWA has slipped in the long run amidst fluctuations, this does not suggest that UNRWA and the vulnerable refugee communities can cope well with this sudden shortage after Trump succeeds. Moreover, according to the UNRWA donor list, China was not even in the top 20 in 2023. Therefore, it remains uncertain whether Chinese capital will be able to seamlessly fill in the US’s irreversible defunding of the organization and avoid stagnating or regressing its work progress in Palestine and neighboring countries.
Conclusion
Based on the structure of the UN system, this article analyzes the policies and impact of the Trump presidency on the UN’s main body and other entities. It argues that Trump’s second presidency has generally polarized the “withdrawal policy” of his first presidency and demonstrated the nature of US pendulum politics in global governance. Trump’s extreme lack of support for the UN system also illustrates US domestic politics.
In UNSC reform, Trump is most concerned about the unfair distribution of fees and military duties. He has also tried to act as an independent “mediator,” bypassing the UNSC, the central multilateral negotiating platform for global affairs, with his administration known for anti-UN rhetoric. However, this does not mean that Trump will abandon the US’s long-standing position of not extending the veto in UNSC reform, but may instead signal a more conservative approach to the reform. In UN entities, Trump has generally favored funding cuts or reduced participation, especially in the areas of education, culture, health, and the Palestinian issue, which Democrats have always been keen on. However, the US’s traditionally dominant entities also show a tendency to cut funding, which indirectly illustrates the polarized foreign policy making of the Trump administration under their efficiency-led and populist values. In terms of rationale, anti-Semitism, China bias, and efficiency are the three most common excuses for withdrawal or funding cuts, closely linked to Trump’s domestic policies.
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