Abstract

This paper examines the political ecology of agro-voltaics on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, utilizing the lens of "slow violence" to analyze the Talatan Solar Park. While officially framed as a "win-win" example of "Ecological Civilization"—combining energy security with ecological restoration—this research lens uncovers unintended consequences and hidden costs. It argues that classifying pastoral lands as "unused" facilitates "green grabbing" and state appropriation. Although the "solar sheep" model preserves grazing, it might lead to "displacement without moving," eroding traditional pastoral autonomy. Ultimately, these projects lead to larger state control over the periphery.

Keywords: China, Renewable energy transition, Agri-voltaics

Introduction

Amidst growing pressure on China to increase its share of renewable energy and keep its claims and targets, a recent report by Ember, a London-based think tank focusing on energy policy, has stated that China’s fossil fuel use is approaching a plateau. This could mark a turning point and influence China’s image as a key actor in global climate governance (Yang et al., 2025). Despite the rapid construction of solar and wind farms, large-scale photovoltaic projects such as the Talatan Solar Park, located in Gonghe County, Qinghai Province, envisioned to amount to 130 MW, are expected to be completed by 2026 (GlobalData, 2024). This project is on its way to becoming the largest photovoltaic field in China, as well as globally (Tan et al., 2024; Bradsher, 2025; Moritsugu & Han Guan, 2025).  

Contextualization - China’s Renewable Energy Expansion

Amidst growing labor costs, widespread pollution issues in the early 2000s, and rapidly rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, China came to be internationally recognized as the largest polluter, surpassing the previously dominant United States. Such a negative image partially motivated decisions for investment into renewable energy and infrastructure technologies. The following five-year plans included “strategic investment in all aspects of renewable technologies, from solar and wind capacity, green hydrogen, and geothermal projects to research and investment in battery storage and its supply chains” (Hilton, 2024). After two decades, China dominates not only in photovoltaic and wind installed capacity, but also most of the supply chain for renewable energy technologies, all the way back to rare-earth mineral extraction. These massive investments have brought down prices for photovoltaics globally, reducing cost barriers for lower-income countries (Hilton, 2024; Lin & Wang, 2023; Patel, 2025). 

Yet despite these positive-looking impacts, the reduction of fossil fuel emissions has been rather slow. In fact, the Chinese economy is still heavily dependent on coal, which in 2020 comprised 67.07% of electricity production, and recent years have seen surges in permits acquired for the opening of new coal power plants (Lin & Wang, 2023; Yang et al., 2020; Hilton, 2024). 

However, the discourse regarding Chinese GHG emissions reductions has evolved as well. Claims of the Chinese right to develop, not being required to cut down emissions, have evolved into pledges to see a plateau of emissions originating from fossil fuels and more ambitious targets for renewable energy expansion. In 2020, Xi Jinping claimed that China’s emissions would peak well before 2030, and even the most recent Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) published earlier this year includes a target of cutting emissions by 7 to 10% from peak levels by 2035. It has also been ahead of its determined goals regarding installed capacity of renewable energy (International Energy Agency, 2021; You, 2025). Indeed, more and more experts are indicating that China’s carbon emissions peak might be in sight (Yang et al., 2025). 

However, this rapid expansion has revealed a significant spatial discrepancy between energy supply and demand. While the industrialized eastern and southern coastal regions drive the majority of China's energy consumption, the renewable resources required to power them are concentrated in the distant north and west. Consequently, provinces like Qinghai and Gansu have emerged as pioneers in renewable energy installation, with Qinghai leading the nation by generating nearly 46% of its power from wind and solar sources (You, 2025).

To bridge this geographical divide, the state has accelerated the construction of Ultra-High-Voltage (UHV) transmission lines under the "West-to-East Power Transmission" (xi dian dong song 西电东送) initiative (You, 2025; Yang et al., 2020). This infrastructure network is designed to export electricity from the resource-rich hinterlands to the economic hubs on the eastern coast, effectively integrating the peripheral landscapes of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau into the national industrial grid (Yang et al., 2020). Yet, as China’s renewable capacity expands, it faces the question of land-use rights, requiring new models of development such as "agro-voltaics"—the integration of agricultural or pastoral activities with photovoltaic infrastructure (Tan et al., 2024).

Theoretical framework

In this research paper, a theoretical framework of “slow violence” will be used to analyze Chinese photovoltaic and agrovoltaic projects with a case study of the Talatan solar park. The lens of “slow violence” might prove instructive to explore these projects beyond the publicly presented “win-win” narrative and account for possible hidden costs. Attention will also be given to the discourse of “ecological civilization” as a guiding imaginary, in contrast with the lived reality in environments where such large-scale renewable energy projects are implemented.

Discourse of “Ecological Civilization”

In order to better understand the effects of the photo- and agri-voltaic projects on the Qinghai-Tibet plateau, it is first necessary to situate those within a broader political discourse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 

In 2007, under Xi Jinping’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, the term “Ecological Civilization” (shengtai wenming 生态文明) was coined as an explicit goal of the CCP. The concept of “ecological civilization” was then elevated to an official political philosophy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), enshrined within the Party Constitution. It aligns with the narrative of China's developmental trajectory under the CCP’s leadership, embodying the Marxist theory of stages of development with Chinese characteristics. Beginning from “agricultural civilization to industrial civilization under Mao Zedong, then to material civilization under Deng Xiaoping, and now to ecological civilization under Xi Jinping” (Li & Shapiro, 2020, p.6). Its theoretical foundations lie in two schools of thought–ecological Marxism and constructive postmodernism. An embrace of the notion of “Ecological Civilization” could be encapsulated by Xi Jinping’s ubiquitous quote: “Clear waters, green mountains are in fact gold mountains, silver mountains” (lüshui qingshan jiushi jinshan yinshan 绿水青山就是金山银山) (Li & Shapiro, 2020; Geall, 2017).

In the context of the expansion of renewable energy, economic development remains a priority, but shall not be pursued at the expense of the environment (Geall, 2017). Yet this discourse allows the commodification of natural resources under the banner of sustainable development. It provides a “sociotechnical imaginary”, combining cultural and moral ideas with political and technological goals of the Chinese state (Hansen et al., 2018). However, scholars like Li and Shapiro (2020) critique this discourse as a form of “coercive environmentalism,” a top-down project of state-led management of nature driven by national metrics, yet overlooking the specific contexts of land use and political power dynamics. Such governance helps to consolidate power, often resulting in non-environmental spillover effects.    

“Slow violence”

However, not all analyses of the “Ecological Civilization” have been positive; some critical approaches underline that it might not be as effective a vision as officially presented. The implementation of environmental policies with a top-down “one-size-fits-all” approach does not address environmental challenges as intertwined with the complex socio-ecological environments that oftentimes accompany them, leading to unintended consequences and further non-environmental spillover effects. Such unintended effects may account for the sedentarization of nomads in the name of grassland preservation, or impacts on everyday practices of the population due to stricter regulations (Li and Shapiro, 2020, p. 20-23; Li et al., 2019).

Building on similar critical approaches, this paper will aim to provide a critical analysis of the large-scale renewable energy projects on the Qinghai-Tibet plateau–mainly focusing on photovoltaics and agri-voltaics. The notion of Rob Nixon’s (2011) “slow violence” will be drawn upon, alluding to the possibly hidden costs of such projects when considered in the long run. Nixon defines “slow violence” as "a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space" (2011, p.2). 

The expansion of photovoltaic solar parks risks reproducing dynamics of “green grabbing” or “displacement without moving,” characterized as “loss of the land and resources beneath them, a loss that leaves communities stranded in a place stripped of the very characteristics that made it inhabitable,” as well as designation of “unimagined communities” facing forced resettlement justified by development projects and resource extraction in the name of nature prereservation (Fairhead et al., 2012; Nixon, 2011, p.7, 149-153; Li and Shapiro, 2020). In the case of agri-voltaics, a gradual enclosure of the commons may occur–altering the autonomy of local herders and their livestock. Hence, while the state claims to "improve" the land in the name of “Ecological Civilization” (e.g., by greening the desert, preventing fire hazards), it is simultaneously imposing a technocratic regime that marginalizes traditional ecological knowledge (Li and Shapiro, 2020).   

Thus, the following research question will be examined: What hidden costs might the lens of “slow violence” help reveal when applied to projects under the agenda of “Ecological Civilization,” and particularly in the cases of photovoltaic and agri-voltaic parks?

West-to-East Power Transmission

To lay the groundwork for a focused analysis of agrivoltaic projects, it is essential to understand the unequal dynamic between the Eastern and Western regions in China. Across the inland and coastal areas, there is a large discrepancy between them in renewable energy resources and electricity demand (Yang et al., 2020). Northwestern provinces are pioneers in the share of energy coming from renewable sources, with Qinghai, Gansu, and Jilin generating 46%, 36%, and 33% of total electricity from solar and wind (Xiaoying, 2025). 

The power grid infrastructure reflects this disparity and needs to be adapted for the transmission of generated renewable energy to the coastal regions. The shift from a coal-oriented power grid to one adapted to renewable energy has led to an increase in the construction of new ultra-high voltage (UHV) lines towards the industrialized coast, as reflected in the West-To-East Power Transmission initiative (西電東送) (Yang et al., 2025). This initiative focuses on three main transmission corridors supplying the Eastern provinces (Jinyu et al., 2024).

Seven northwestern provinces already generate more than 25% of their electricity from renewables, and among those, Gansu and Qinghai have been the first to begin large-scale photovoltaic and wind installation projects. In 2025, “the capacity of wind and solar combined overtook that of coal” (Yang et al., 2025, p.8). The remaining challenge is to overcome the gap between installed capacity and electricity used (Yang et al., 2025). 

Beyond the logistical necessity of power transmission, the adaptation of the power grid is also driven by economic incentives. Yang et al. (2020) argue that investment in power grid infrastructure in less-developed inland provinces generates higher marginal returns compared to coastal regions with higher grid density. Thus, prioritizing such investments could contribute to reducing the development gap across regions while adapting the national power grid to renewable energy (Yang et al., 2020).

Agri-voltaics on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau

With the expansion of renewable energy capacity, China is increasingly facing a land-use dilemma, balancing energy security with agricultural production. As Xia et al. (2024) emphasize, photovoltaic development on cropland has been restricted within land-use policies, leading to the emergence of “agri-voltaics” as “PV systems [integrated] with crop production [or grazing], [...] as promising solutions to alleviate land-use conflicts” (p.205). A “Photovoltaic Plus” (PV+) model using agri-volaics has been increasingly adopted in peripheral regions, mainly in the vast arid and grassland environments in the northwest of China (Tan et al., 2024). Such dual purpose strategy, combining energy production with animal grazing, addresses the generation of clean power while contributing to the restoration of ecosystems.  

The “win-win” Ecological Narrative

Within the discourse of “Ecological Civilization,” these projects tend to be increasingly presented as “Nature-Based Solutions” (NbS) (Tan et al., 2024). Its proponents argue that the “PV+” model fosters a “co-evolution” between the PV technology and the local ecosystem, forming a positive feedback loop of industrial infrastructure supporting biological diversity (Tan et al., 2024). 

Research by Xia et al. (2022), based on satellite monitoring of China's twelve largest deserts, identified a "significant greening trend" within photovoltaic zones that contrasts with the surrounding degradation. More specifically, the photovoltaic arrays in degraded grasslands function as windbreaks, reducing near-surface wind speed while creating shade. These then help to reduce soil evaporation, creating a microclimate for vegetation to re-establish itself under the PV panels (Zhang et al., 2023; Tan et al., 2024). 

Consequently, the "PV Plus" model is promoted as a dual-purpose strategy: it generates clean energy while simultaneously combating desertification. This scientific validation underpins the "win-win" logic applied at major sites like the Talatan Solar Park, where the restoration of grassland is not just a byproduct, but a component of the park's operational design. 

Talatan Solar Park

The Talatan Solar Park is located in Gonghe County, Qinghai Province. Its construction began in 2011, with a planned capacity of 130 MW; it is on track to become the largest photovoltaic power base globally (GlobalData, 2024; Tan et al., 2024). 

Officially presented as a triumph of ecological engineering, with empirically proven positive ecological effects of “greening” China's deserts with up to nearly 80% recovery rates (Xia et al., 2022). However, in order to manage a fire hazard arising from newly growing tall grass, the park introduced 600 “solar sheep” in 2015 that would graze the grass below the PV panels. Presented as a mutually beneficial model, with sheep conducting a form of “weed-control,” while panels serve as their shelter, the park now hosts over 20,000 local Tibetan sheep (Tan et al., 2024). 

“Slow Violence” of Nature Engineering

Despite this “win-win” narrative, applying the lens of “slow violence” reveals tensions present beneath it. The development of such large-scale infrastructure on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau is predicated on land classified as “unused,” or “degraded” to justify its appropriation for industrial purposes (Tan et al., 2024). Yet such bureaucratic categorization risks erasing the local complexity of its use and the historical presence of pastoral communities, echoing some dynamics present in cases of “green grabbing” or designation of “sacrifice zones”. Such land appropriation may lead to dispossession or unintended consequences on local users of the land (Li and Shapiro, 2020). 

While the “solar sheep” agri-voltaic projects allow for some continuity of grazing, it alters the power dynamics of land use in place. Environmental policies aiming at natural conservation have often resulted in forced sedentarization (Du, 2012; Feng & Nursey-Bray, 2019).

In the case of the Talatan Solar Park, local pastoralists become tied to a locus of the Park itself, while losing their autonomy of mobility, creating a new reiteration of such restrictive policies. Creating a landscape where pastoralism survives in a limited form, integrated into energy production. This gradual loss of autonomy and adaptation to corporate schedules constitutes a form of slow violence—a "displacement without moving" where the land remains accessible, but the traditional ways of livelihood are slowly dismantled.

Conclusion

This research has examined the rapid expansion of renewable energy in the Chinese north-western regions, with a case study of the Talatan Solar Park in Qinghai. With intensifying pressure to reach the peak of emissions, such expansion needs to be accompanied by adjustments to the national power grid in order to account for the inequality between regions.  

A paradox appears between the positive ecological effects of the PV Plus agri-voltaic model, increasing the greening of arid landscapes, and long-term evaluation and application of the framework of “slow violence,” revealing a profound social reconfiguration. Thus, it is possible to move beyond the discursive “win-win” narrative in order to consider hidden or unintended consequences of such large-scale renewable energy projects.  

Ultimately, for China’s energy transition to be truly sustainable, it must move beyond socio-technical metrics and imaginaries to address the "slow violence" enacted upon the communities who steward the land beneath the panels.

Edited by Kaiyi Pan