The Delicate Dance: Russia and India’s tumultuous partnership
By Kriti Dhodhi
Abstract
From the strong relationship that was established during the Cold War era, to a now weakening relationship against the backdrop of the Ukrainian War, the relationship between Russia and India is gradually eroding. The three pillars of this relationship, arms trade, public sector philosophy, and the favourable geopolitical alignment, are now in noticeable decline.
At the onset of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, the global order changed forever. Countries across the world were forced to choose between the two polarised ends; on one hand existed the West-supported Ukraine, and on the other, lay the rather vilified Russia. The severity of the war led to the erosion of bilateral relations and international trade, with the emergence of a unified West that implemented economic sanctions and prohibited trade with Russia, contributing to the implicit isolation of the country on an international scale.
Amidst this dichotomy, being in the middle seemed profitable – to benefit from the oil and arms trade that Russia had to offer without completely deteriorating its relationship with the West – but was rather unrealistic in the long run. Though in the initial months of the war, India had managed to avoid a direct condemnation of the Russian leader to preserve the strategic alliance between the two nations, we can now begin to witness a steady decline in the relationship between Russia and India.
Political scientists Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer have identified three pillars of the relations between India and Russia that allowed them to solidify their friendship during the Cold War period (Menon & Rumer, 2022, p.g. 6). This includes the Soviet arms sales to India that continued heavily after the Cold War as well, shared public sector philosophy and extensive Soviet aid, and Russian-Indian alliance against the United States-Pakistan-China bloc (Menon & Rumer, 2022, p.g. 6). However, in light of the Ukrainian War and the breakdown of relations with the West, Russia is increasing its partnership with China by increasing trade and developing ideological ties while India is developing a closer friendship with the West. The favourable geopolitical alignment that was once a cornerstone of the relationship between Russia and India is now eroding, combined with a substantial decrease in the arms and oil trade, elucidating the deterioration of the Russian-Indian relationship.
The Kremlin’s isolation from the West over the war on Ukraine increased Moscow’s dependence on China (Carafano, 2023). China has continued to trade with Russia, ignoring the West’s robust response to the Ukraine war, and even allowed its state-owned companies to sell se,iconductors to Russia that can be used in military technology (Chang, 2023). This “no-limits” friendship between China and Russia and their shared rejection of a West-dominated world demonstrates strong ideological and economic ties that are more beneficial to Russia than its relationship with India, which is unable to match up to the strategic and economic advantages that China has to offer (Chang, 2023). If another border dispute were to erupt between China and India, Russia would be placed in a tricky position to balance these tensions, but given the importance that China holds, Russia may just tilt in its favour and hence irrevocably damage ties with India. For the Indian foreign policy strategy, Moscow has become a less trusted ally for New Delhi. (Carafano, 2023).
With Russian interests aligning more closely with China, India is now developing a closer friendship with the West. Indian interests are now geopolitically inclining towards the Indo-Pacific region where it sees China as its main competitor (Carafano, 2023). The U.S. also believes that cooperation with India is necessary to help ease Washington’s concerns over the destabilising activities of China in the Indo-Pacific (Carafano, 2023).
Moreover, there have been considerable strains on the security partnership of Russia-India with the arms trade substantially declining as India turns towards Western countries as its new supplier. The USSR was and until its collapse remained India’s prime arms supplier, even supplanting Britain which India had turned to after its independence (Menon & Rumer, 2022, p.g. 13). As analyst K. Subrahmanyam noted in 2005, “After 1965, Moscow became almost the sole source of arms for India for all three services” (Menon & Rumer, 2022, p.g. 13). After the Cold War period, Russia supplied ⅔ of India’s total arms purchases as Russian weaponry were cheaper than the Western equivalents. Before the war in Ukraine, 60% of Indian weaponry was imported from Russia (Carafano, 2023), and the share has now declined to 45% as India is looking to diversify its suppliers and increase its own domestic production (Carafano, 2023). At the same time, India’s purchases from the U.S. have jumped almost 58% to 219 million (Bahree, 2023), and increased roughly by 6000% for France to 1.9 billion in 2021 (Bahree, 2023). Furthermore, there have been rumours that Russia is falling behind in providing deliveries for the Indian military contract due to the sanctions because of the war in Ukraine. Reuters on March 23rd reported that “Russia is unable to deliver vital defence supplies it had committed to India’s military because of the war in Ukraine, the IAF says” (Bahree, 2023). Therefore, the economic trade relations between the two countries, an important cornerstone in their friendship, is now in a precarious situation as well. Furthermore, India's foreign policy strategy seems to focus more on the recognition of the dangers of overreliance on Russia as a security partner and the need for New Delhi to diversify its partnerships.
According to political scientists Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer, Russia is also trying to respond to New Delhi’s closer security ties with Washington by adjusting its long-standing India-centred South Asia policy and developing a closer relationship with Pakistan (Menon & Rumer, 2022, p.g. 21). The closer relationship with Pakistan undermines the favourable geopolitical alignment of Russia and India against the US-Pakistan-China bloc, especially with increasing tensions between India and Pakistan with respect to Kashmir. In 2015, Russia arranged a major deal with Pakistan and sold them transport and attack helicopters (Menon & Rumer, 2022, p.g. 21). This is a further representation of the changing political dynamics that continues to put a strain on the Russian-Indian relationship.
A successful dynamic in the future between the two countries would need to entail the further solidification of the arms trade between the two countries. Furthermore, Modi would still need to continue to maintain the “middle-ground” that it has tried to maintain so far to retain its friendship with Russia. In saying that, though an official “break-up” with Russia is improbable in the short run, it is clear that the economic, political, and ideological divergence of the two countries from each other has led to a partial deterioration of their historical relationship.
References
Bahree, M. (2023, September 8). G20 Summit: Is India breaking up with Russia? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/9/8/g20-summit-is-india-breaking-up-with-russia
Carafano, J. J. (2023, May 16). India tilts West as Russian ties cool. GIS. Retrieved September 24, 2023, from https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/india-russia-united-states/
Chang, F. K. (2023, April 5). China's and India's Relations with Russia after the War in Ukraine: A Dangerous Deviation? Foreign Policy Research Institute. Retrieved September 24, 2023, from https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/04/chinas-and-indias-relations-with-russia-after-the-war-in-ukraine-a-dangerous-deviation/
Menon, R., & Rumer, E. (2022, September 20). Russia and India: A New Chapter. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/20/russia-and-india-new-chapter-pub-87958