The end of the MAS: Bolivia’s 2025 Elections and the Conservative Reconfiguration of Power

Lucie Legoupil

December 15, 2025

Abstract

The first round of Bolivia’s 2025 presidential elections, held on August 17th, marked a turning point in the country’s political trajectory. The Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, which had been governing the country for the past 20 years, was eliminated in the first round. Instead, the election saw the emergence of two moderate right-wing candidates: Rodrigo Paz and Jorge Quiroga, reflecting a wider regional dynamic of the return of conservatism in Latin America. How can we explain the emergence of such a political turn in Bolivia? And what does a conservative president and government entail for Bolivia’s future? 



The first round of Bolivia's 2025 presidential elections demonstrated a clear rupture in the country's political landscape. For the first time in two decades, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) was eliminated at the first round, marking an electoral turnover towards moderate right-wing parties. This political reconfiguration is rooted in disillusionment with the MAS’s governance, resulting in a widespread economic and social crisis. Therefore, it raises critical questions regarding Bolivia’s future, including its stability. The fragmentation of parliament and the differing ideologies of the two emerging coalitions (Libre and the PDC) suggest that the challenges of governance remain profound. Bolivia’s conservative turn may represent a search for political renewal.

Historically, the MAS emerged under Evo Morales, the first indigenous president of Latin America, who was initially elected in 2005. This marked a historic break from neoliberalism, in accordance with the rise of the Latin American “pink tide.” This refers to a generalised switch to left-wing governments in Latin America at the start of the 2000s. Morales gained a support base among the coca leaf farmers through promises of social justice (Hollender, 2016). Initially, his mandate was successful, lifting over 2 million Bolivians out of poverty, expanding indigenous rights, and bolstering GDP growth. However, this idyll was quick to turn sour, plunging Bolivia back into its history of political instability (Aguirre & Cooper, 2010). Morales’s attempts to increase the number of consecutive mandates and allegations of corruption eroded his legitimacy due to these repeated attacks on democracy (ACLED, 2021). This was also seen in the current elections, where he called for the nullification of ballots, given that the vote is obligatory. Hence, this article aims to highlight the main takeaways of the first round of the elections.

The visible decline of the left: a stark rejection of the MAS’s governance

Beyond the political tensions between Arce and Morales’s camps within the MAS, the economic crisis Bolivia has been submerged under since 2017 has not helped the complicated position of the party in the political landscape. The distrust of the ruling party has been shaped by the economic difficulties, including an inflation rate above 16%, the collapse of the natural gas industry, and the shortages of basic products (Vaca Daza, 2025). This has been reflected in the opinion polls conducted by the Council of the Americas, with 24% deeming the economic crisis as the main issue in Bolivia and 17% blaming the increase in prices (Council of the Americas, 2025). 

This can be seen in the results of the first round, including in the parliament. Whilst Luis Arce gained 55.11% of the votes in 2020,  Eduardo del Castillo (MAS) received plummeting support, securing only 3.2% of the votes. This is reflected in the parliament, where the MAS secured only 3 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and none in the Chamber of the Senate.

The response is crystal clear: the disapproval of Arce’s current governance and Morales’s attempts to call for reelection despite its ban by the Constitutional Tribunal have disillusioned the voters. 

The unexpected victory of Rodrigo Paz

Rodrigo Paz, the leader of the Democrat-Catholic party (PDC), has won the most votes in the first round, representing 32.06% of the votes. The party’s success was visible in parliament by winning the most seats, including 16 in the Senate chamber and 49 in the Assembly chamber.  The PDC’s program is based on Christian democratic values, centered on faith and family as the fundamental cell of society. Its economic programme relies on a “capitalism for all” approach, such as working with the private sector and splitting funds between the federal government and the state (Paz Pereira, 2025). Therefore, it is no surprise that the party’s voter base has relied on the poorer and less educated individuals of Bolivia, including 54% of voters who have completed primary education or less (Council of the Americas, 2025). For this reason, the leader of the PDC largely emerged in the poorest regions of Bolivia, such as Potosí and Chuquisaca.

In addition, a strong emphasis has been placed on the reduction of inequalities and the promotion of sovereignty. This reveals a direct criticism of the MAS governance, with a strong disapproval of indigenism. In its program, the PDC underlines the “demagogical position of the far left” and a rejection of indigenous identity as a cultural threat to Bolivia (Paz Pereira, 2025). Furthermore, the PDC has built its legitimacy through Edman Lara as a vice president known more for his actions taken on corruption.

The PDC emerged as the new leading party of Bolivia, putting forward its aim to “restore Bolivia” through moral, spiritual, and economic renewal.

The ambitious promises of runner-up Jorge Quiroga

The leader of the LIBRE coalition, Jorge Quiroga, was the second to emerge from the results of the elections, gaining 26.70% of the vote. Holding the second-largest number of seats, the coalition is currently the country’s second strongest political force. It is formed among two parties with opposing ideologies: the Revolutionary Left Front (FRI) and the Social democratic movement (MSD). This goes in accordance with the claim of the coalition as a centrist party, “not from the right, not from the left” (Quiroga Ramirez 2025). However, the coalition has demonstrated its clear ambition to “save the economy”. Quiroga wishes to work with the IMF and encourage private investment. There is an ambition to reduce public spending, reduce the deficit, and encourage foreign investment to stimulate the private sector (Quiroga Ramirez, 2025). Quiroga has benefited from a support base from upper-income voters, who tend to be educated, as 65% had completed university (Council of the Americas, 2025).

The uncertainty surrounding Bolivia’s future 

This election has demonstrated how the decline of the left has been compensated for by a rise of the moderate right.

On one hand, these results follow the regional trend of the “blue tide”, the return of conservatism in Latin America after socialist governments. On the other hand, the case of Bolivia calls for a nuanced analysis, given the moderate aspect of the PDC and LIBRE, unlike, for instance, the case of Argentina under Milei. Consequently, Bolivians favour moderate alternatives over far-right populism (Sabatini, 2024).

Although these elections call for change, uncertainty regarding future stability remains. The elections demonstrated that Bolivia is a working democracy, where pluralism, alterance, and free elections are possible. Given the history of the disputed 2019 elections, there is not sufficient hindsight to tell if the stakeholders will accept the results and if the upcoming months will be spared from political violence.

Furthermore, the question of stability has stakes given the fragmented legislature in parliament. Out of the 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 36 seats in the Chamber of Senators, no absolute majority has emerged, although the PDC and LIBRE have gained the majority of seats. This poses the question of future governance, especially given the configuration of LIBRE, consisting of parties with widely differing political ideologies.

Overall, the right-wing swing has consisted of a hard blow to the MAS, as a response to the economic crisis, which has worsened in Bolivia. However, the country is not spared from possible upcoming difficulties in its governance by moderate right-wing parties.

References

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