Abstract

Again and again, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) makes headlines, revealing tensions between France and Germany. In a podcast published on 18 February 2026, just a few days after the Munich Security Conference, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz addressed the different sets of requirements that France and Germany have for the FCAS fighter jet. Against the backdrop of years of often complex and technical discussions, the latter shall be unravelled and outlined for a basic understanding. For this purpose, explanations will be provided on what FCAS actually comprises, who the key players are, and how their opinions have come into conflict. 

Introduction 

Since its launch in 2017, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) is regarded as a symbol of Franco-German defence cooperation and a flagship of European efforts to achieve autonomy in armaments (Thillaye, 2026). However, instead of demonstrating European strength and independence, the project, also including Spain—and Belgium as an observer (Mattissek & Ruppert, 2025)––repeatedly causes tensions (Vogel, 2021). An example entails the distribution of workshare, responsibilities and leadership between the companies involved, or the fighter jet’s capabilities. FCAS recently made headlines again after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz addressed unresolved issues concerning FCAS (Alexander & Rosenfeld, 2026). 

What is FCAS?

The FCAS system not only stands for a fighter jet. Rather, it consists of various components and, due to its complex digital network, is also known for its ‘system of systems’ principle (Henrich, 2023; Mattissek & Ruppert, 2025). The overall FCAS system is divided into seven pillars (Calcara & Simón, 2024): Remote Carriers (RCs), the Next Generation Fighter (NGF), the Air Combat Cloud (ACC), the engine, simulation, sensors, and stealth technology (Henrich, 2023).

Included in the Next Generation Weapon System (NGWS), RCs are unmanned components that interact with the aircraft and support it, for example, in reconnaissance (Vogel, 2021; Henrich, 2023), while the NGF designates the fighter aircraft. The ACC allows for secure data exchange (Vogler, 2021). However, the IT system not only connects the RCs and the NGF, but also allows for the integration of existing and new systems as well as other dimensions (Henrich, 2023).

By referring to the fighter aircraft system as ‘Next Generation’, reference is made to the classification of fighter aircrafts into different generations. This classification is essentially based on the level of technical development and development period, but is not always clear-cut and also under discussion in various respects (Vogel, 2021). Given these criteria, the FCAS fighter aircraft system is to belong to the sixth generation (Bundeswehr, 2026; Mueller, 2025). Since European-produced systems have so far been classified as generation 4 or 4+, successful implementation of the NGWS would mean skipping a generation (Vogel, 2021). 

Who is involved?

Each of the pillars is led by a company from one of the partner countries (Calcara & Simón, 2024). Launched in 2017 by French President Emmanuel Macron and then German Chancellor Angela Merkel, it was a Franco-German collaboration, convening Dassault Aviation on the French side, and Airbus on the German side. In 2019, Spain joined FCAS, adding Indra Sistemas in addition to Airbus; in 2023, Belgium joined with an observer status (Mattissek & Ruppert, 2025; Vogel, 2021). Other companies are also involved as participating partners in the processes of the various pillars (Vogel, 2021). With regard to production, the ‘best athlete’ principle is applied, meaning that tasks are assigned based on existing and proven skills and capacities (Mueller, 2025).

As per the funding of the FCAS, the original 100 billion euro project (Eydlin, 2025; Franke, 2025) could end up being way more expensive. Although the expected costs vary widely due to the early stage of the programme, the full life-cycle costs of the NGF is estimated to represent 445 billion euros between 2017 and 2080 (Mueller, 2025). FCAS was initially planned to be operational in 2040. This is now considered unrealistic, and instead, the aim seems to be 2045 (Eydlin, 2025; Franke, 2025). As this already suggests, FCAS has been a source of tension for some time, and again most recently, primarily between Germany and France. 

What is causing tensions? 

With regard to economic cooperation, there are reports of disagreements between Dassault and Airbus. In 2021, Dassault CEO Éric Trappier commented on issues relating to the intellectual property rights of certain technologies, which would have to be shared primarily by France with its German partner. In the summer of 2025, Dassault demanded an 80 per cent share in the development of the NGF, which was seen by some as an attempt to obtain German funding without having to share much technology. On the other end, the French side reportedly pointed to Germany’s lack of expertise and expressed the assumption that Germany wanted to increase its own market share (Eydlin, 2025). Discussions regarding the management of the project are also linked to questions about future requirements for export licences by the different partner countries (Rienäcker, 2025).

Furthermore, economic tensions appear to be accompanied by differing perspectives among companies regarding FCAS. While Dassault seems to be focusing on NGF and considers it to be the core of FCAS, Airbus appears to be placing greater emphasis on cloud communications and crewed-uncrewed teaming (Archambault, 2025)—this practice refers to the cooperation between a manned and unmanned accompanying assets during a joint mission (Airbus, 2026).

Recently, doubts have been expressed at the political level. In a podcast, Merz raised the question of whether manned fighter jets would still be needed in twenty years’ time and also addressed other questions that have remained unanswered to date. These questions particularly concern the requirements profile for the fighter jet. While according to Merz, France wants to build a fighter jet that can land on aircraft carriers and carry nuclear weapons, these are not requirements that currently apply to the German Armed Forces (Alexander & Rosenfeld, 2026). Unlike France, Germany does not have an aircraft carrier (Buske, 2025). In the context of the different requirements for the ability to carry nuclear weapons, the discussion regarding the nuclear umbrella for Germany is also sometimes raised (Momtaz, 2026). While Germany has so far been under the nuclear umbrella of the United States and German fighter jets can carry American nuclear weapons, Merz revealed in his speech at the Munich Security Conference that he is interested in talks with France for a European nuclear deterrent (Alexander & Rosenfeld, 2026). This could be relevant when it comes to the question of what fighter jets transport whose nuclear weapons.

Responding to Merz’s comments on the joint project, Macron stated that he remained committed to FCAS. Similar optimism could also be found in the remarks made by the French Minister Delegate to the Minister for the Armed Forces and Veterans, Alice Rufo, who emphasised the need for European cooperation at the Munich Security Conference and expressed confidence regarding FCAS despite the complicated situation (Tagesschau, 2026).

Conclusion 

FCAS and the debates associated with it are much more complex and technical than outlined here. Nevertheless, the basic concept of FCAS has been summarized, detailing the rough constellation of actors and the main areas of tension.

The future of FCAS remains uncertain. However, it should be noted that the concerns recently expressed on the political side refer to the fighter jet as only one component of FCAS. Merz’s statements indicate that questions which have long remained unanswered are now to be addressed. Against the backdrop of current security policy developments, FCAS and the cooperation are certainly under particularly close observation.