The Multilateral Sanctions Regime: Its Implications and Challenges

By SeungHwan (Shane) Kim

Abstract

The US, South Korea, Japan, and eight other like-minded countries released a new sanctions partnership called the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) to monitor sanctions on North Korea. The MSMT is bound to have several implications for South Korea, North Korea, and the international community. However, certain challenges remain, especially the continuity of the MSMT and stronger Russia–DPRK ties. 

The US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell visited South Korea and Japan on October 15–17, discussing bilateral and trilateral cooperation among the two major Asian allies (State Department, 2024b). The three nations held a US–ROK–Japan Trilateral Deputy Secretary Vice Foreign Ministerial Meeting in Seoul. The three nations’ foreign ministries agreed on various sectors such as economic security, supply chain resiliency, critical minerals, the Taiwan Strait crisis, and North Korea’s denuclearization (State Department, 2024a). One of the significant agreements was the creation of a Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT). 

The United States, South Korea, Japan, and eight other like-minded countries (France, the U.K., Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) agreed to participate in MSMT (Kim, 2024). It will constantly monitor and publish reports regarding North Korean trends and sanctions violations. 

This initiative is an alternative sanctions regime. Russia’s UN Security Council veto earlier this year ended the mandate of the Panel of Experts, which had monitored North Korean sanctions since 2009 (UPI, 2024). As the mechanisms of a new Cold War strengthened, the United Nations fell into a state of virtual shutdown due to the peculiar deviations of permanent members of the UN Security Council like Russia, supplementing the current transitional international order with a multilateral system with like-minded states that rose as an alternative. With this current state in mind, Washington and its allies have explored new oversight mechanisms after the panel officially stopped operations in April.

South Korea’s recent push to strengthen the sanctions regime multilaterally reflects several implications for the Korean peninsula and the international community: elevating South Korea’s role on the global stage as a “pivotal state,” sending a strong signal to North Korea on its recent cooperation with Russia and upholding the rules-based international order. 


Implications for the Korean Peninsula

The current South Korean president, Yoon Seok-Yul, reiterated the idea of a “Global Pivotal State (GPS),” which was used to coin South Korea’s active role in the international community. The Korean government stated that it would serve as a hub for the regional security of the Indo-Pacific through cooperation with like-minded states (Chung, 2023). In alignment with the administration’s vision as a global pivotal state, the Yoon administration released its first grand Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022, envisioning a “free, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023). To fulfill that goal, the Yoon administration strengthened the trilateral US–ROK–Japan partnership and other multilateral frameworks, such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) (Cimino-Isaacs et al., 2023).

The establishment of the MSMT underscores South Korea’s rising status as a responsible middle power in international security matters, following the Yoon administration’s GPS strategy. It signifies that South Korea is no longer just a passive participant in global sanctions regimes but an active enforcer. This will likely enhance South Korea’s response swiftness and coordination with key global powers like the US, the EU, and Japan, which share the same goals regarding North Korea’s denuclearization and military provocations. 

At the same time, this can be considered a strategic signal from Seoul to North Korea that can hinder the development of nuclear weapons and the ongoing rapprochement between Russia and North Korea. North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un even demonstrated his intent to solidify North Korea’s status as a nuclear state during his recent visit to a uranium enrichment facility in September 2024 (Seo et al., 2024). With Russia on his back, Kim Jong Un has overconfidence in his nuclear deterrent. However, by bolstering the MSMT, South Korea sends a clear message that it is committed to both enforcing these sanctions and upholding its responsibilities as a critical player in the global fight against nuclear proliferation and North Korea’s active role in the Ukraine war. 

Thus, the MSMT is a domestic apparatus and a tool of South Korea’s broader strategy to influence North Korean behavior through economic pressure. As Seoul steps up in strengthening this sanctions regime, it will be able to catch two birds with one stone: having more diplomatic leverage in this North Korea issue while sending a strong, strategic signal to North Korea’s recent provocations. 

Global Impact

The MSMT also has global implications, especially in preserving the rules-based international order. By fostering cooperation among nations with shared values and common interests, the MSMT strengthens collective efforts to uphold international laws and norms. It serves as a platform for countries to coordinate policies, share intelligence, and collaborate on addressing security challenges that transcend national borders. 

This multilateral approach helps deter unilateral actions that could destabilize regional or global peace. By reinforcing commitments to principles such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peaceful resolution of disputes, the MSMT contributes to a more predictable and stable international environment. It also sets a precedent for other nations to engage in similar cooperative frameworks, promoting a culture of compliance with established rules and reducing the likelihood of conflicts. 

South Korea’s proactive stance could also set a precedent for other nations grappling with sanctions enforcement challenges, such as those imposed on Iran or Russia. If successful, the MSMT could become a model for how countries with proximity to sanctioned or threatening states can take an assertive role in ensuring the effectiveness of international sanctions.

Challenges

However, South Korea’s efforts will not be without challenges. The sustainability of the MSMT will be challenging considering the upcoming US presidential election. If former president Trump is elected as president, there is a higher possibility that there will be a top-down summit between Trump and Kim Jong Un like the Hanoi Summit. Trump has continuously emphasized in his campaign that he is close to Kim Jong Un and that he is the one who can solve the global crisis (Irwin, 2024). If Trump decides to negotiate with North Korea about limiting ICBMs that can reach the US mainland rather than focusing on denuclearization in exchange for sanctions relief, the momentum behind the MSMT will weaken. Thus, the sustainability of this framework depends on the result of the upcoming US presidential election.

At the same time, the ongoing Russia–DPRK rapprochement after the signing of the mutual defense treaty on June 19th might hinder the effectiveness of the MSMT. Russia was one of the UNSC members that vetoed the extension of the Panel of Experts that monitored North Korean sanctions. At the same time, Russia seems to provide, although not confirmed, economic support and cutting-edge military technologies such as nuclear technology, nuclear submarines, and missiles after receiving 3 million rounds of ammunition and manpower from North Korea for the Ukraine war (State Department, 2024a). Given that Russia and China also being patron states of North Korea, the feasibility of the MSMT framework will likely be weakened without their participation.

Policy Recommendation

Since the MSMT was just initiated, what South Korea should consider is actively expanding the membership of MSMT as a two-track approach: inviting states that are competitive in areas useful for reducing sanctions evasion and persuading China. 

Sanctions enforcement is notoriously tricky, as those evading sanctions continue to evolve their methods. The growing sophistication of Pyongyang's evasive tactics, such as using hard currency generation, cryptocurrency hacking, and illicit maritime transfers (Mallory, 2021). The MSMT must employ cutting-edge technology, intelligence-sharing, and diplomatic coordination to stay ahead of North Korea’s evasive strategies. Even if all 11 countries that participated in the MSMT have competitiveness in those strategies, it would be more effective to invite more states from Africa, considering North Korea’s active evasion activities in 38 African states (Mallory, 2021), along with countries like Serbia that were ranked Tier 1 in the 2024 Global Cybersecurity Index (RATEL, 2024). 

At the same time, persuading China will bring more feasibility to the MSMT, and this is the golden time to bring China on board. Beijing is likely concerned about Russia–DPRK military cooperation because it could escalate tensions in the region, particularly affecting security on the Korean Peninsula. This can lead to a larger US presence in the Indo-Pacific region, complicating China’s influence in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. China’s main focus is on maintaining stability in the region, but it has continuously been worried about losing transparency and leverage over North Korea due to Moscow’s growing support. Since Beijing has a precedent of joining the UN sanctions regime in the past, South Korea can have the leverage to persuade China into the MSMT. This will reduce the blind spots that the MSMT could not cover in the first place. 


Conclusion

South Korea’s strengthened MSMT represents a pivotal shift in how Seoul engages with its immediate security challenges and its elevated role on the global stage. By taking the lead in sanctions enforcement, South Korea bolstered its strategy against North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and reinforced its image as a proactive, responsible actor in international affairs. The success or failure of this initiative will have significant ramifications for the Korean Peninsula and the broader global community as Seoul steps up to the geopolitical challenges. Although this was the first step of the Seoul-led multilateral sanctions regime, still more needs to be done. 

SeungHwan (Shane) Kim is currently a researcher based in Washington, DC at the Korea Foundation and a research fellow at the Vanguard Think Tank. He is a master’s graduate from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), focusing on security, statecraft, and East Asia. His previous experiences include roles at the East-West Center, the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, the Korea Economic Institute, the Korea Studies Institute, and the ROK National Assembly. His works were published in numerous publications, including the Diplomat, the National Interest, East Asia Forum, the Asia Times, the Pacific Forum, and more.

References

Chung, K. (2023, November 4). South Korea’s quest to become a global pivotal state. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/south-koreas-quest-to-become-a-global-pivotal-state/.

Cimino-Isaacs, C., Kitamura, K. H., & Manyin, M. E. (2023). Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) (IF12373). Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12373

Irwin, L. (2024, October 13). Trump touts relationship with Kim Jong Un, Putin. The Hill. https://thehill.com/policy/international/4930932-trump-kim-jong-un-putin/.

Kim, H. (2024, October 17). Gov’t, 10 countries launch team to monitor sanctions on NK. Korea.net : The Official Website of the Republic of Korea. https://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=260078.

Mallory, K. (2021, September 23). How does North Korea evade sanctions? RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1537-1.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2023). Introducing the Indo-Pacific Strategy: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_26382/contents.do.

RATEL. (2024, September 19). ITU publishes the 2024 global cybersecurity index list. https://www.ratel.rs/en/blog/itu-publishes-2024-global-cybersecurity-index-list#:~:text=Serbia%20was%20placed%20in%20category,with%20relevant%20institutions%20and%20organizations.

Seo, Y., Lilieholm, L., & Valerio, M. (2024, September 14). North Korea releases images of Kim Jong Un visiting a uranium enrichment site, giving a rare glimpse inside its nuclear program. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/12/asia/north-korea-uranium-enrichment-intl-hnk/index.html.

State Department. (2024a, February 23). Responding to Two Years of Russia’s Full-Scale War on Ukraine and Navalny’s Death. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/imposing-measures-in-response-to-navalnys-death-and-two-years-of-russias-full-scale-war-against-ukraine/#:~:text=Since%20September%202023%2C%20the%20DPRK,conflict%20since%20early%20October%202023

State Department. (2024b, October 13). Deputy Secretary Campbell’s travel to Japan and the Republic of Korea. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-campbells-travel-to-japan-and-the-republic-of-korea/.

UPI. (2024, October 18). U.S., allies establish North Korean Sanctions Monitoring Team after Russian veto. https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2024/10/17/North-Korea-multilateral-sanctions-monitoring-team-MSMT/3231729148672/.