Abstract

Since gaining independence, a critical component of Pakistan's foreign policy has been to reach out to the Islamic World to counter India. In recent years, in the absence of other Muslim countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, Türkiye has taken that position of representing Pakistan in the Islamic World. The expanding Pakistan-Türkiye relationship reflects Ankara’s ambition to extend its influence under its neo-Ottoman foreign policy, and for Pakistan to look for a new role model that is neither the West, Saudi Arabia, nor Iran. 

On February 13, 2025, Turkish President Reçep Tayyip Erdoğan was in Pakistan and met with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The two countries agreed to forge closer defense ties and signed 27 documents, including several memorandums of understanding (MoU) (Zaman, 2025). In addition, the two leaders vehemently criticized Donald Trump’s proposal to relocate Gazans and reiterated their solidarity with Palestinians (Ahmed & Fraser, 2025). 

Erdoğan’s visit highlights the growing strategic significance of relations between Ankara and Islamabad and how the new role model for the Pakistanis these days is Türkiye. 

The Turks have had a very long historical connection with the Indian subcontinent, as during the 11th to 16th centuries, most of the region’s Islamic rulers and dynasties, such as the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire, were originally Turks from Central Asia (Iwanek, 2020). During the 20th century, many Muslims in British India joined the Khilafat Movement, which was a movement supporting the Ottoman Empire prior to its collapse in 1922 (Bhutto, 2020). 

After Pakistan’s creation in 1947, while Türkiye was one of the first countries to recognize its sovereignty and offer rhetorical support to Pakistan’s position on Kashmir, relations were not as deep (Bhutto, 2020). At the time, Ankara’s Kemalist foreign policy prioritized strengthening its ties with NATO to counter the Soviet Union, and there was an effort to distance the country from the Islamic World as it saw itself as a ‘European country.’

However, at that time, Pakistan needed a Muslim partner for economic, political, and diplomatic support to balance against India. Many Arab states—such as Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya—were led by quasi-socialist Arab nationalist governments with close ties to the Soviet Union and, by extension, India. Saudi Arabia lacked the financial resources to assist Pakistan and other Gulf states like the UAE did not achieve independence until the 1970s. 

Consequently, Iran emerged as Pakistan’s most reliable regional partner during this period. Both countries were part of U.S.-led security alliances such as the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), and the Shah saw it in Iran’s strategic interest to assist Pakistan, given their shared goal of countering Soviet influence—and, by extension, India’s growing ties with Moscow. However, by the mid-1970s, the increase in Iran’s oil revenue elevated the Shah’s ambitions to increase Iran’s regional role and improve relations with countries like India, China, and even the Soviet Union owing to doubts about America’s commitment to Iranian security (Fair et al., 2004, p. 6). 

After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Tehran’s foreign policy took a drastic turn, leading to hostile relations with the United States and the termination of its participation in U.S.-led security forums like CENTO. Bilateral ties gradually deteriorated between Iran and Pakistan, largely due to the differing geopolitical priorities of the two countries. Since 1979, challenging the U.S. in the Middle East has been Iran’s central focus, while Pakistan’s central focus has been its conflict with India. Importantly, with the advent of American, U.N., and European sanctions, Iran considers the Indian market to be crucial as part of its Look East policy, looking to replace Western economies with Asian economies (Azizi, 2023). 

With the absence of Iran as a strategic partner, Pakistan turned to Saudi Arabia for financial, diplomatic, and political support. The relationship between the two deepened significantly following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Fearing both Soviet expansionism and the ideological influence of the Iranian Revolution, Saudi Arabia saw Afghanistan as a battleground to counter communist influence and promote its Salafi ideology, financing religious institutions in Pakistan that aligned with its Wahhabi doctrine (Afzal, 2019). Meanwhile, Pakistan’s leader, General Zia-ul-Haq, viewed the war as an opportunity to consolidate his rule and implement an Islamization campaign that transformed Pakistan’s political and social landscape—a stark contrast to the more socially liberal policies of the 1950s and 1960s. 

However, Saudi-Pakistan relations have been experiencing problems within the past few years. A key element stems from Pakistan’s refusal to send troops to fight in Yemen despite Riyadh’s request (Afzal, 2020). Despite its close relationship with the Saudis, Pakistan shares a border with Iran and has a large Shi’a population within the country. Thus, it was insistent on ‘neutrality’ during the Iran-Saudi rivalry to avoid antagonizing Iran even further. 

Moreover, the coronation of Mohammed bin Salman as Crown Prince (MBS) has drastically shifted Saudi foreign policy away from its association to Wahhabism and towards a nationalist foreign policy. Under this paradigm, maintaining good relations with countries like India, China, and Russia is part of MBS’ desire to lessen Saudi dependence on the Americans, as Donald Trump’s first term raised doubts about the reliability of the U.S. commitment to Saudi security (Jacobs, 2023). 

It was in this context that the Turks started to become more important to the Pakistanis. 

In 2019, after the Indians abrogated Article 370, ending Kashmir’s autonomous status in India, it reinforced the Pakistani narrative of portraying this decision as a sign of ‘Indian aggression.’ As a result, Pakistan sought to mobilize the Islamic World against India. However, while Iran and the Arab countries issued minimal to no criticism of India’s actions, Türkiye vehemently criticized India’s decision. 

During the 2020 United Nations General Assembly, Erdoğan compared the Kashmiri cause with Türkiye’s War of Independence. In the speech, he said, “It was Canakkale [Gallipoli] yesterday and it is Kashmir today, [there is] no difference” (Morrow & Zorlu, 2020). Erdoğan kept mentioning Kashmir in his 2021, 2022, and 2023 speeches as well, which were warmly received by the Pakistanis. (News18, 2024). 

In addition to Erdoğan’s support to Pakistan regarding Kashmir, the two countries have been increasing defense cooperation in recent years. Pakistan has been buying arms from Turkish firms, such as the anti-tank guided weapons system (Deshpande, 2023). As of November 2023, “Islamabad has at least three Turkish-made UAVs in its inventory,” such as the Bayraktar TB2, Bayraktar Akıncı and Bayraktar TB3. (Deshpande, 2023). Pakistan looking to Ankara for weapons comes at a time when relations with the West have significantly deteriorated. Notably, Pakistan participated in the Three Brothers military exercises in 2021, along with Türkiye and Azerbaijan in Baku (Radio Free Europe, 2021).  

From the Turkish side, these growing overtures to Pakistan illustrate the growing influence of a neo-Ottoman foreign policy since 2002. “Neo-Ottomanism refers to a strategic and ideological framework in which Turkey seeks to extend its… influence across regions historically under Ottoman control, including the Middle East, North Africa and the Balkans” (Latham, 2024). Hence, forging close ties with Pakistan and publicly siding with Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir reflects Ankara’s desire to portray itself as the leader of the Islamic World in opposition to the Saudis and Iran (Öztürk, 2024). 

Aside from increasing defense ties, the growing importance of Türkiye within Pakistan extends to the cultural sphere, as evidenced by the growing popularity of Turkish television dramas, known as dizis. One of these Turkish shows, Diriliş Ertuğrul, has become immensely popular in Pakistan and former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has expressed admiration for the show as well (Iwanek, 2020). In fact, Pakistan represented about a quarter of the audience for Ertuğrul on YouTube. (Bhutto, 2020). 

The growing popularity of these dizisi illustrate how Pakistanis are increasingly looking toward Türkiye as a country to emulate. (Bhutto, 2020). As explained earlier, since the 1980s, the Pakistanis forged deep relations with the Saudis, which extended to the religious and social sphere. However, the presence of Saudi-inspired Salafism has had devastating consequences for Pakistan, such as the growth of terrorist organizations, sectarianism, and deteriorating social freedoms (Bhutto, 2020). 

As Pakistan aspires for a national identity, for now, Türkiye seems the model to emulate that is neither the West, nor Saudi Arabia, nor Iran.