Abstract

This essay analyzes the continuities and divergences of U.S. economic policies toward East Asia and the Indo-Pacific across the Trump, Biden, and Harris administrations. While there are differences in their rhetoric and approaches, all three administrations recognize the strategic importance of the region and have built on each other’s initiatives. However, despite bipartisan consensus on the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical significance, the region should be viewed as more than a geopolitical battleground, with efforts focused on promoting prosperity aligned with each country’s interests. 

The world watches, with bated breath, as the U.S. Presidential elections draw near. For many, it seems that the future of not only the United States, but of the entire world, hangs in the balance. From the perspective of Trump’s last presidential term, as well as his present statements, there has hardly been much continuity (on certain foreign policy issues) from one administration to the next. For example, Trump coupled his “America First” rhetoric with repudiation of multilateral organizations, announcing the U.S.’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change on June 1, 2017. Furthermore, he officially withdrew from the U.N. Human Rights Council in June 2018 and the World Health Organization (WHO) in September 2020. More recently, in February 2024, Trump stated that he “would encourage” Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” to NATO allies that do not meet defense spending targets (Colvin, 2024). Although he later clarified that the United States will remain in NATO if he is reelected, these actions and statements reflect a sharp divergence from the Biden administration’s approach to foreign policy. The Biden administration rolled back many of Trump’s policies, rejoining the WHO and the Paris Agreement on climate change (Colvin, 2024). Biden has also placed heavier emphasis on multilateralism in his strategy to strengthen cooperation with allies, avidly arguing for U.S. commitment and support for NATO. 

However, despite the seemingly sharp divergence in foreign policy between the two administrations, there is, to a large extent, a continuation of policies and engagement with East Asia and the Indo-Pacific that has spanned multiple presidencies. Despite its rhetoric of “America first,” the Trump administration has continued to establish ties and promote initiatives in East Asia and the Pacific, representing a continuation of Obama’s “Pivot to Asia,” which shifted investment and resources away from the Middle East and toward East Asian countries (Ford, 2020; Goldberg, 2016). During his presidency, Trump highlighted three priorities for East Asian and Indo-Pacific regional cooperation: energy security, infrastructure, and digital connectivity (Ford, 2020). To achieve these goals, the Trump administration signed the Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2018 on infrastructure development with Japan and Australia. The trilateral partnership announced its plans of investing in infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region with the goal of promoting economic growth and increasing connectivity (Ford, 2020). The Trump administration also rolled out the Asia EDGE Initiative in 2017, designed to strengthen energy security through energy diversification and trade, as well as the U.S.-ASEAN Smart Cities partnership designed to promote urban quality of life through digital connectivity in Southeast Asia (Ford, 2020; U.S. Department of State, 2018). 

Furthermore, before Trump’s first visit to Asia as president, he worked to implement the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. The strategy called for the protection of a country’s sovereignty and open access to sea and airways. Economically, the FOIP emphasized fair trade, open investment, and transparency in negotiations and agreements, with the ultimate goal of promoting sustainable growth in the region (Congressional Research Service, 2018, p. 3). Simultaneously, at the 2017 ASEAN Summit in Manila, Trump, alongside Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, agreed to revitalize the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD), marking a significant move to bolster regional security after a nine-year hiatus (Panda, 2019). 

The Biden Presidency very much embodies a continuation of Trump’s policies on the topic of regional security in the East Asia and Pacific region. In February 2022, the Biden administration laid out five objectives in the Indo-Pacific: (1) advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific, (2) building connections within the region, (3) driving regional prosperity, (4) bolstering Indo-Pacific Security, and (5) building regional resilience to transnational threats (The White House, 2022). Both administrations have made the idea of “a free and open Indo-Pacific” a centerpiece in their foreign policy strategies. Furthermore, Biden has continued to build upon Trump’s policies by strengthening cooperation on critical technologies and clean energy through QUAD. Under the Biden presidency, the QUAD was upgraded to leadership-level talks and working groups under the Quad Investors Network were established focusing on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, clean energy, critical minerals, mobile networks, and quantum information sciences (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2024). The Biden administration, in their Indo-Pacific Strategy report, has made strengthening the role of QUAD as a “premier regional grouping” a priority on its agenda (Wei, 2022). 

Harris’s vision and policies can largely be seen as a continuation of the Biden administration. In her speech to the East Asia Summit in Jakarta in 2023, she reaffirmed the U.S. Commitment to the Indo-Pacific and underscored her commitment to working with allies and partners to ensure an Indo-Pacific that is “free, open, prosperous, resilient, and secure” (The White House, 2023). As vice president, she has sought closer ties with countries including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. In April 2024, Harris hosted the first trilateral summit between the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines (Council of Foreign Relations, 2024). This continuity reflects the geopolitical importance of Asia that was first identified under the Obama administration. Overall, there is a consensus in Washington that the U.S. strategy in Asia is crucial for U.S. national interests and that the United States will need Asia in the coming years. As Daniel Kritenbrink, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs noted, “The Indo-Pacific is the region where much of the history of the 21st century will be written” (VOA, 2024).   

Despite the continuity of the administrations’ policies, there remain nuanced differences between them on the means to achieve their objectives. Although Trump has engaged in numerous multilateral agreements within the East Asian and Indo-Pacific region, vis-à-vis Biden, Trump has placed stronger emphasis on bilateral agreements and unilateral efforts, focusing on reducing trade deficits and protecting American interests and industries. During Trump’s term in office, the president repeatedly decried the unfairness of U.S. alliance relationships and pressured countries to reduce their trade surplus with the U.S. For example, in September 2018, Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in signed a revised version of the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement (Campbell, 2018). The new version sought to bolster the U.S. car industry by removing regulatory burdens for U.S. automakers to export cars and extending a 25 percent U.S. tariff on imported Korean trucks (Campbell, 2018). Moreover, on his first day in office, Trump signed an executive order removing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration. The withdrawal from TPP could be viewed as part of Trump’s “America First” agenda, which placed a heavier focus on unilaterally advancing American economic interests (Haenle, 2022, p. 7). 

Biden has, comparatively, placed more emphasis—both through his actions and words—on multilateral cooperation in the region. In his first speech on U.S. foreign policy, he declared, “America’s alliances are our greatest asset, and leading with diplomacy means standing shoulder-to-shoulder with our allies and key partners once again” (The White House, 2021). Biden has oriented his administration towards seeking more multilateral agreements and utilizing new frameworks like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to engage the region on economic issues (The White House, 2022).

In addition to focusing on establishing fair trade practices and implementing protectionist elements as Trump did, Biden has also invited allies to join U.S. initiatives by placing emphasis on environmental standards and building resilient supply chains. In Biden’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, he outlined his commitment to work with allies and partners to develop approaches that meet environmental and labor standards, as well as develop strategies and plans to limit global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Lastly, he emphasized the need to advance and secure supply chains that are “diverse, open, and predictable” (The White House, 2022). 

Challenges for the future

One of the greatest challenges that both administrations face and will continue to face regarding their policies in the East Asian and Indo-Pacific region, is balancing the United States’ own objectives with those of its allies. Particularly under the Trump administration, an area that weakened trust and exposed differences in policy objectives between East Asia and the United States is in cooperation with China. As Ford (2020) states, “U.S. allies envision an Indo-Pacific order that is more accommodating to China, allowing for peace and stability in the region.” To the U.S.’ dismay, Japan was willing to accept China’s proposal to collaborate on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, Singapore also was willing to sign a Singapore–China defense agreement to enhance defense exchanges between the two countries. 

Perhaps the example that most encapsulates the difference in the objectives is the 2020 QUAD meeting in Tokyo. Pompeo urged QUAD to “collaborate to protect our people and partners from the Chinese Communist Party’s exploitation, corruption, and coercion.” However, the Japanese Prime Minister retorted that this Quad meeting was “not being held with any particular country in mind.” According to the report, Australia and India also refused to enunciate the Chinese threat and focused their attention on other topics, demonstrating the difference in United States and its allies’ objectives and approach to cooperation (Zeeshan, 2020). 

Although it has been more subtle than the Trump administration on “countering China’s influence,” the Biden administration has, at times, employed the same rhetoric when it comes to strengthening cooperation with allies. The Biden–Harris administration, in its Indo-Pacific Strategy, stated outright that the “intensifying American focus” in the Indo-Pacific region is due, in large part, to “mounting challenges, particularly from the PRC.” The Biden–Harris administration was quick to highlight the PRC’s “coercion and aggression” and its “bullying of neighbors in the East and South China Seas” (The White House, 2022).

Yet, in order to promote trust with Indo-Pacific allies, it is imperative that the United States not view its cooperation with the Indo-Pacific region as a zero-sum game. Doing so will only expose further fault lines between the United States and allies in the region. While it is important that the United States continues to build partnerships in East Asia and the Pacific, it must, at the same time, balance East Asian and Pacific countries’ own national interests, framing cooperation not in the context of U.S.–China competition, but rather in the context of bilateral cooperation and promotion of the Indo-Pacific’s stability and security. The Biden–Harris administration’s initiatives on “driving Indo-Pacific prosperity through strengthening economic competitiveness” and “building regional resilience to 21st century transnational threats and climate change” are a step in the right direction. 

While the foreign policies of Trump, Biden, and Harris have shown different approaches in various global arenas, there has been significant continuity regarding U.S. engagement in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. Each administration has recognized the strategic importance of the region and has implemented policies aimed at maintaining a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. This bipartisan consistency underlines a recognition in Washington that the Indo-Pacific will be pivotal to shaping global geopolitics in the coming decades. However, as the United States navigates future challenges in the region, the ability to balance national interests with those of its allies will be crucial to sustaining effective partnerships and promoting regional stability and security.