Historical and Political Contexts for Reforms

Bureaucratic reforms have been a consistent goal of Vietnam, yet few have been successfully implemented since Doi Moi. The 1986 reform had both cultural, economic, and political changes. It has transformed Vietnamese economy from one that is under rigid state control to a socialist-oriented market economy, attracting foreign investments and integrating into the global values chain. Vietnam has since enjoyed economic growth and higher living standards (en.baochinhphu.vn, 2020). Doi Moi has brought not only the relaxation of state authority over the economic matters, but also Vietnam’s active and cooperative engagement in the international forums. However, ever since the historical Doi Moi reforms, Vietnam has failed to achieve another development of the same scale. After four distinct periods of governance, Vietnam’s political structure remains “one of the most extensive state bureaucracies in Southeast Asia” (Giang, 2025).

Not until the passing of long-time leader Nguyen Phu Trong in July 2024 was the proposal for radical bureaucratic reforms being brought up again in heated debate. During Nguyen Phu Trong’s era, streamlining the political process was a goal in Resolution 18-NQ/TW 25-07 (Nhận thức đúng về cuộc cách mạng tinh gọn bộ máy, n.d.). This was never fully implemented. The former General Secretary, however, left a strong legacy in his anti-corruption campaign. As an exemplified student of Vietnam’s beloved founding father, Ho Chi Minh, Trong’s passing was considered to be a huge loss for the Vietnamese population. His successors – current General Secretary and President To Lam along with Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh – undoubtedly have substantial ground to cover. The proposal for radical bureaucratic reforms presents an opportunity for the new leaders to establish themselves as “action-oriented reformists” (Hutt, 2024). 

Policy Components

Proposed in the latter half of 2024, the new Vietnamese government’s plan for bureaucratic reforms was recently approved on February 18, 2025. 97% of the National Assembly voted in support of the proposal (Vu, 2025). Both the words “bold” and “radical” have been used by different media, experts, and analysts to describe the plan. It entails actions with intensity and push with a sweeping speed that has not been seen since the 1986 Doi Moi.

First, the plan includes the elimination and merging of ministries. Starting from March 1, there will only be 14 ministries as opposed to the current 18 (Vu, 2025). Several major ministries are merged, most notably the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning. A “super ministry” is created called the Ministry of Finance and National Planning (Hutt, 2024). Restructuring will also happen within the Communist Party and the National Assembly. The second change is the dissolution of agencies and broadcasters that are under the Party’s authority. 

It is reported that the Vietnamese government’s size would be reduced up to 20% (Enoch, 2025). Official representatives have noted that 100,000 state employees would be affected by the cut, yet no further elaboration was given. While sweeping reforms will temporarily cause delays in government processes, this proposal is estimated to help Vietnam reach 8% economic growth by the end of the year (“Vietnam Endorses Sweeping Reforms to Spur Economic Growth,” 2025).

The Promise of an “Era of National Rise”

Economic motivations are part of the driving force behind the bold bureaucratic reforms. On a visit to Columbia University, To Lam remarked on the positioning of Vietnam in a world of globalization and persistent turbulence: “Viet Nam is standing at a new historical starting point – a new era of the rise of the nation” (en.baochinhphu.vn, 2024). Amid rising Sino-US tensions, Vietnam has benefited from the China+1 strategy in which multinational businesses seek for an alternative and diversify their investments. Not only did Vietnam become a key export destination for China (Vietnam’s Trade Performance in 2024, 2025), it also enjoyed cooperation with and investments from the US in important industries (Vietnam, US forge stronger trade, investment partnership, 2025). Through streamlining the bureaucracy, Hanoi will be able to reduce red tape, encourage foreign investors, and bolster economic growth. Effective and consistent cooperation with transnational cooperation will allow for trade and technological exchanges, accelerating both growth and innovation.

In the pursuit of national development, growth in numbers and percentages is not the sole mission, emphasized by To Lam on February 13 (Tổng Bí thư Tô Lâm, 2025). The proposal aims to improve people’s quality of life and achieve broader socio-economic goals. The needs of the Vietnamese population, from healthcare to public education, are the end goals of the cutting-driven policy. Furthermore, To Lam seeks to uphold international standards in Vietnam’s responses to climate change and other global issues (On the Threshold of the Era of National Rise, 2025).

Beyond the promise of an “era of national rise” is the warning of Vietnam’s limited time and resources. According to the World Bank, the country is on its path to becoming an aged society in 2035. It is one of the fastest-aging countries and might become one of the few that turn into an aged society before getting rich (Vietnam, n.d.). As the working-age population declines in number, Vietnam is set to lose its competitive advantage in labor-intensive industries. The era consistently pushed by To Lam has a limit and that limit is a close window of 10 years.

Concerns over Radical Reforms

While the restructuring agenda promises substantial reforms, it also poses administrative and political challenges that have sparked considerable debate. The representative newspaper for the Vietnamese Communist Party points out 4 main issues, namely organizational, human resources, culture and mindset, and policy structure (Cuộc cách mạng tinh gọn bộ máy, 2024). Organizational challenges of overlapping responsibility leading to the accumulation of costs are finally addressed with radical reforms. However, human-related policies are often sensitive as they might lead to public backlash. Appropriate support mechanisms are crucial. The plan also needs constant and effective feedback in order to enhance practical implementation.

Another criticism is how the reforms carry the risks of over-centralization (Giang, 2025). DW even compares Vietnam’s bureaucratic reforms with those of the Trump administration in the US (Hutt, 2024). Both are similar in their ways of giving trusted personnels into key positions that have great leverage over the political machinery. Overall, the downsizing of Vietnam’s bureaucracy raises a question of competence, fairness, and transparency. 

Conclusion

Vietnam’s reforms while brings concerns over power consolidation, shows positive signs of improving bureaucratic efficiency and enhancing economic activities. The country is set to go through a historic transformation. Radical bureaucratic streamlining is the first and important step toward To Lam’s vision for an era of Vietnam’s national rise.