Vietnam's Strategic Calculus between Ideology and Security Amid US-China Competition
By Thu-Hien Thi Do
Abstract
Vietnam's 2023 joint statements with the US and China offer a window into its strategic calculus amid intensifying rivalry. While elevating ties with the US to a "comprehensive strategic partnership," Vietnam also emphasized China as a "top priority" and jointly condemned "peaceful evolution", hinting at shared concerns around Western influence. The article points out that similar political systems foster convergence on threat perception, fostering Vietnam's cooperation with China despite maritime disputes, while fear of Western regime change limits trust in the Vietnam-US relationship. Finally, it highlights that ideology, however, shapes but doesn't dictate Vietnam's foreign policy.
The year 2023 witnessed Vietnam hosting leaders from the United States and China, each visit signifying a milestone in the respective bilateral relations. While initial concerns regarding a potential shift in priorities arose, President Xi Jinping's visit in December 2023 reaffirmed the enduring strength of the Sino-Vietnamese partnership. Besides the widely discussed “Vietnam - China Community of Shared Future”, a new point made in the current bilateral joint statement is the mutual coordination to prevent "peaceful evolution" and "color revolution" of hostile forces (Government News, 2023). This emphasis, initially alluded to in the joint statement following Nguyen Phu Trong's visit to China in late 2022, has now been elevated to a standalone short paragraph in the current document. Why is this relevant to the Vietnam-China-US triangular relationship? What could be inferred from this move? A comparative analysis of the current joint statements issued by both the US and China is helpful in comprehending Vietnam's diplomatic calculus in this complex geopolitical environment, illuminating how Vietnam leverages opportunities and navigates challenges presented by each power.
The opening of the Vietnam-China joint statement during President Xi Jinping's visit emphasizes shared socialist ideals and a common vision for the future: "Both are socialist countries led by the Communist Party, with similar political regimes and ideals. Mutual belief, close development path, same direction, sharing a common future, all efforts for the happiness of the people and a strong and prosperous country, efforts for the noble cause of peace and progress of mankind."(Government News, 2023). It is important to note that the survival of the regime is of utmost importance to the Vietnamese government. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) equalizes threats to its monopoly power as a threat to Vietnam as a nation-state. This approach is evidently expressed in Vietnam’s Fatherland Protection Strategy: “maintaining the leadership role of the Communist Party of Vietnam, improving the efficiency of State management in the cause of protecting the Fatherland.” (Chiến Lược Quốc Phòng Việt Nam, n.d.). The Communist Party of China (CPC) also share the vision of a Communist Party-led country as stated in their constitution: “It [CPC] is the leadership core for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics and represents the developmental demands of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation for China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the greatest possible majority of the Chinese people” (CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, n.d.). As political systems resemble, Vietnam and China inherently share the same direction to a socialist path. This not only makes China look more friendly in CPV’s eyes, but also opens room for high-level cooperation “through the mechanism of theoretical seminars between the two Parties, plans for cooperation in training cadres, exchanging Party channel delegations, strengthening exchanges and mutual consultation on Party building and national management” - a mechanism unfeasible for the US to establish with Vietnam.
Notably, in the Vietnam-China 2022 and 2023 joint statement, both sides agree to “strengthen intelligence exchanges between the two sides and coordinate to share experiences and cooperate in the issues of anti-intervention, anti-secession, and prevention of "peaceful evolution" and "color revolution" of hostile forces and the reactionary.” These factors were not mentioned at all in previous joint statements. How Vietnam and China will implement this cooperation has not been announced yet. Nonetheless, this shift indicates that the perversion of Western values is deemed as detrimental enough that it urges both sides to include them in the recent joint statements.
This might raise questions about the resurgence of ideology as a driving force in the Vietnam-China relationship. This approach, however, might mislead us into an unproductive black-and-white debate. Following Doi Moi reforms in 1986, Vietnam acknowledged the pitfalls of ideological rigidity and embraced a foreign policy guided by principles of independence, self-reliance, diversification, and credibility (Chính Sách Đối Ngoại Giai Đoạn 1976 – 1986 và Những Bài Học Kinh Nghiệm, n.d.). Therefore, Vietnam's current engagement with diverse partners demonstrates a pragmatic approach rather than a strict ideological alignment.
What agitated Vietnam might look like ideological differences, yet the actual threat comes from regime change, a direct threat to the survival of Vietnam’s political system. In the Political report of the 12th Party Central Committee at the 13th National Congress of the Party, the CPV calls upon defeating the plots and activities of "peaceful evolution", riots and overthrow of hostile and reactionary forces (Báo Cáo Chính Trị BCH TW Đảng XII, n.d.), which is typically identified as “Western” or “American values”(Nhận Diện Chiến Lược “Diễn Biến Hòa Bình” Của Các Thế Lực Thù Địch Trong Thời Kỳ Mới, n.d.). Indeed, The CPV, in the past, has had a negative impression of the US as advocating for neo-imperialism and regime change embedded in human rights and democracy discourse. CPC shares the same worries that if “socialist countries and political parties lose their dominance and voice in the ideological field, they will inevitably be led astray by the "peaceful evolution" carefully designed by the West.”(习近平反对历史虚无主义的思想结构与启示--旗帜网, n.d.) This is the reason why the Vietnam-US joint statement mentions that “the fundamental principle for Vietnam-US relation is mutual respect for political institutions”, while there is no such statement in that of Vietnam-China.
Therefore, while both the US and China present distinct challenges to Vietnam's national interests, their nature differs significantly, respectively regarding maritime security and regime security. Despite the fact that the prior pulls Vietnam closer to the US, the fear of a “peaceful revolution” causes skepticism and prevents Vietnam-US bilateral relations from prevailing in the Vietnam-China bond. Conversely, while being caught on guard by the South China Sea issue, further enhancement of relations with China, rather than abandoning it, is less risky to trigger China and cause hard conflicts on sovereignty, which is also the first and foremost object of the protection in Vietnam’s foreign policy. Vietnam, at the same time, could still harness political commonality with China to its own advantage economically and diplomatically while pushing an agenda to subdue China and engage it with different instruments of negotiation regionally and internationally, particularly through ASEAN Centrality (Vietnam Calls for More Support to ASEAN’s Centrality, n.d.).
Ideological differences, thus, should not be seen as either the driving force or roadblocks for foreign relations with Vietnam nowadays. However, it also should not be disregarded as completely irrelevant. As previously mentioned, the degree of convergence or divergence between political systems can hold significant implications. It can pave the way for unique and exclusive avenues of cooperation unavailable to one partner or the other, ultimately leading to varying levels of depth and breadth in their relationship with Vietnam. For example, during Xi’s visit in December 2023, Vietnam and China signed an Agreement on the cooperation between the CPV Central Committee’s Commission for Popularisation and Education and the CPC Central Committee’s Publicity Department for the 2024-2028 period, MoU between CPV Central Committee’s Commission for Popularisation and Education and the CPC Central Committee’s Publicity Department on the translation and publication of classical works; Plan on the implementation of the MoU on cooperation between the CPV Central Committee’s Commission for Internal Affairs and the CPC Central Committee’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission for the 2023-2027 period.
Beyond mere ideology, Vietnam's strategic calculus towards the US and China hinges on balancing pragmatism and nuanced threat perceptions. While ideological affinity with China opens doors for unique cooperation, particularly evident in the joint statement's focus on enhancing political trust, Vietnam remains wary of regime change threats associated with Western values, as the Vietnam-US statement's emphasis on requesting respect for political systems suggests. This cautious balancing act reflects Vietnam's recognition of the maritime security threat posed by China, yet ultimately prioritizes long-term stability and security cooperation with its socialist neighbor. As it navigates this delicate balance, Vietnam's ability to leverage its relationships with both powers while upholding its national interests will be crucial to its future stability and broader regional security in an increasingly contested geopolitical landscape.
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