Introduction

India and Pakistan have been stuck in a perpetual loop of tensions for decades, inhibiting the growth of their unexplored socio-economic potential from plenty of natural resources, an enviable geography, a huge market, and a rich shared cultural heritage. Why do they continue to choose conflict over cooperation? This essay attempts to understand this question using the neoclassical realist theoretical framework to explain each state’s decision-making in light of the respective contexts, constraints, and capabilities.

Neoclassical realism

The neoclassical realist school of thought underlines the different causes of state behaviour. Borrowing from classical and structural realism, it contends that states seek power, survival, and self-preservation in an anarchic international system. Similarly, these theorists also believe that human nature, as reflected in states, is self-interested and acts out of fear of aggression. However, neoclassical realism posits that states’ outward display of power capabilities coexists with other intervening variables, such as state-society relations, leaders’ perceptions, and domestic politics. Therefore, it suggests that to understand policy decisions, one must take into account both external factors, such as the geopolitical environment, relative capabilities, great power competition, etc., as well as the internal contexts within which policy is formulated and implemented, such as the type of political system in a country, characteristics of the leader, etc. These external and internal factors are equally important to take into account when studying state behaviour, as they combine to create the environment and context for policy output. Therefore, because neoclassical realism adds to the factors influencing state behaviour considerably, compared to other realist theories, it is more holistic and comprehensive. (Rose, 1998)

Pakistan and India

Pakistan and India are two nuclear-armed states in South Asia, home to a combined 1.65 billion people. They formed independent states in August 1947, after which both religious groups lived under the direct rule of the British government, known as the “British Raj". Following a rushed British departure from the subcontinent amid a 2-month-long political deadlock, an unplanned, hurried separation was carried out, in which borders were not predefined, resources were unjustly distributed, and there was a complete absence of law and order. Pakistan was created out of concerns over unfair representation of Muslims in India’s politics, leading to persecution in a Hindu-majority India. Muslims from across India migrated to the Muslim-majority provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan. Similarly, many Hindus living in these provinces migrated to the eastern part of the subcontinent and to other parts of India, whereas a smaller migration happened within Punjab and Bengal, which were partitioned to manage both religious groups previously coexisting alongside other religious groups, such as Sikhs and Biharis. This event is known as the largest migration of people in history, besides war and famine-induced migrations. It was marked by violence, bloodshed, and chaos as around 12 million people became refugees within days. More than half a million people were killed in brutal acts of hate-fuelled aggression from both sides, and thousands of women were abducted. Local militias became active in the absence of a formal authoritative institution and carried out vicious crimes against common folks they suddenly saw as enemies. (Whitehead 2017) A people’s history is part of its lived experience. The remarkably dark history of the partition of India has left a mark on the consciousness of a whole generation, on both sides of the border. Today, Pakistani and Indian identities are inseparable from their shared traumatic history. Both derive their national identity from, and define state narratives based on, distorted historical accounts of the origins of the states and the need for independence from a ‘dangerous aggressor'. (Faisal, 2023)

External Variables

Structural Constraints/Systemic Pressures

At the time of partition, the princely states within the subcontinent were allowed to choose whether to join India or Pakistan. Most chose based on geography; however, Jammu and Kashmir’s fate remains undecided almost eight decades after partition. The Hindu Maharaja (monarch) ruling over a majority Muslim population initially delayed making the decision, which increased tensions between Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus. Pakistan wanted to claim Kashmir on irredentist grounds due to its Muslim-majority population. However, India disagreed because newly independent states tend to consolidate their territorial integrity to avoid disintegration, as they are at their weakest at the time. As if to confirm this fear, an incursion occurred in Muzaffarabad by the Pathan tribes in the West, within months after partition,  that easily took control and unleashed terror on the non-Muslim population in Muzaffarabad, setting shops on fire, plundering, and raiding the city. Within a few days, they were in Srinagar, the capital of J&K, unrestrained due to the small number of non-Muslims in Kashmir’s army. Meanwhile, the Indian leadership had convinced the Maharaja to join India in return for support against the Pathan guerrilla fighters. Pakistan’s military leadership still had a few British officers who resisted the idea of helping the Pathan tribesmen against India. The Indian Air Force managed to push them to Uri by the time Pakistan formally joined the war, and after a short war in 1948, the Line of Control (LoC), recognised to this day, formally divided Kashmir into two. The activity of armed non-state actors in Kashmir began in 1948 and has since been used by Pakistan as a formal doctrine in Kashmir, as witnessed during the 1965 war. (Khan, 2015) Since the partition, three wars have been fought over Kashmir—in 1948, 1965, and 1999—between Pakistan and India. The Kashmir issue is complex, multi-faceted, and still ignites conflict between the two. The plight of the Kashmiris cannot be ignored, as they are caught between the geopolitical rivalry between India and Pakistan. It’s the oldest dispute on the UN agenda, which suggests that a plebiscite be conducted after the removal of external armed forces; however, India refuses to carry it out, and currently, both sides, in attempts to consolidate territory, have a heavy military presence in the province.

The Kashmir issue remains unresolved, and both sides are unwilling to make concessions. However, unresolved territorial issues do not directly lead to conflict between two nuclear-armed states. They can act as systemic pressure that compels a state; however, the decision-making is also influenced by several internal variables, such as domestic politics, state-society relations, leader perceptions, etc. A deadlock is typical of territorial rivalries, as political leaders lose support from their domestic political constituencies in the event of a loss of territory, and a firm stance on territorial conflicts increases support for them. Under a neoclassical realist assessment, we understand that both external and internal variables combine to create the context within which specific policy decisions are made, as both countries try to balance against one another.

Polarity and Great Power Competition

The Kashmir issue is not the only external source of persistent tensions in India-Pakistan relations. Another factor is the alignments and frictions arising from great power competition, first between Russia and the US during the Cold War and presently between China and the US. As the competition intensifies and expands, so does the room for middle powers to manoeuvre a diversified foreign policy.

During the Cold War period, both countries were faced with choosing between the two great powers then, Russia and the US. Pakistan’s policy-makers opted to side with the US for several reasons, the primary one being the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. India, under PM Jawaharlal Nehru, chose non-alignment and remained neutral rather than be confined to supporting one power bloc over the other. (Benvenuti, 2024) This choice shaped India’s future foreign policy as it has continued to project itself as an independent actor prioritising autonomy. The post-Cold War era and the unipolar moment necessitated another change in both countries’ doctrines. In India, the policymakers chose the path of multi-alignment and economic pragmatism amid regional struggles, including border disputes with China and a rift with Pakistan over Kashmir. It sought improved relations with the US since the Soviet Union was greatly weakened and no longer a reliable partner. (Mazumdar, 2011) Pakistan’s trajectory post-Cold War was characterised by tensions with the US over the development of its nuclear programme, the beginning of military cooperation with China, and continued tensions with India over Kashmir. (Mahmood, 1997)

Modi’s arrival in office, in 2014, came as the geopolitical environment was once again dominated by great-power competition between a rising China and the US. India and Pakistan faced the same foreign policy choice as they did during the Cold War—alignment or autonomy. A declassified security document on the strategic framework for the Indo-Pacific published by the US in 2021 stated that ‘a strong India would act as a counterbalance to China’, directly implicating India in its rivalry with China. (The White House, 2021) Although India’s participation in QUAD and increased military cooperation with the US (US State Department, 2025) display its commitment to this role, it also acts with restraint and caution. One of India’s long-standing foreign policy tenets is multi-alignment (previously non-alignment), rooted in the principles of strategic autonomy. Its attendance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in China last year and its participation in China-led multilateral bodies such as BRICS weaken its posture as a US ally in China’s neighbourhood and display its intentions to remain pragmatically multi-aligned. Amid great power competition, India projects autonomy. It tries to balance relations with all powers, which not only widens its foreign policy options but also makes it an unpredictable actor in the region. 

Similarly, Pakistan’s deep strategic ties with China weigh on its foreign policy decisions. There is a clear imbalance in this alliance, which curbs Islamabad’s autonomy over decisions that directly impact Beijing. Pakistan imports weapons and defence systems from China, promoting interoperability between the two states. Although Pakistan has tried to diversify in the past year by improving ties with the US and signing a defence pact with Saudi Arabia, its dependence on China limits its options. (Ali, 2025) China will accept a weakened India on the regional and global stage, acting in response to the Indo-Pacific China-containment strategy, and will continue to support Pakistan in its conflicts against India, as displayed during the May 2025 war. (Honic & McGowan, 2025) 

Thus, both India and Pakistan have acted in a complex arena of great-power competition and changing polarities since coming into being. These shifting power dynamics shape the external environment for policy-making as both countries continue to try to balance choices of alignment and autonomy.

Regional Dynamics 

States’ policy decisions are also affected by regional dynamics, such as bilateral relations with other states in the region and respective regional aspirations. In South Asia’s case, the environment is competitive as multiple large states aim to expand their influence. India’s bilateral relations with China are shaped by a border dispute and economic interdependence. India and China have disputed territories in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, where skirmishes have escalated into deadly clashes in the past. While such events create tensions, India cannot completely decouple from China. This is due to interconnected supply chains, India’s dependence on China for manufacturing, and a trade deficit. (Sharma, 2026)

Perhaps, for India, China’s most troubling manoeuvre is its support for Pakistan. This impedes India’s regional aspirations. These aspirations encompass leadership in South Asia, provision of maritime security in the Indian Ocean, a central role in shaping the Indo-Pacific order, representation of the Global South, and eventual emergence as a developed major power under the Viksit Bharat 2047 vision. (Government of India, 2025; Indian MEA, 2023) India views Sino-Pak strategic cooperation as a collusive, two-front threat. (Singh & Singh, 2021) This assessment was proven correct during the May 2025 war, in which Pakistan employed Chinese-supplied weapon systems alongside its indigenous military capabilities against India. (Dalton and Krepon, 2025) India’s regional aspirations are challenged militarily and economically by a rising China, and the two are now locked in a perpetual competition for influence. Both try to achieve this by extending economic assistance to struggling states and posing as security guarantors/leaders of the international waters. (Dutta and Choudhury, 2024) Although Sino-Pak strategic cooperation, tested last year, emboldens the rivalry with Pakistan, it may also act as a deterrent in the future.

Pakistan has comparatively more modest regional ambitions, but significant ones nonetheless. Its cooperation with China over economic connectivity through CPEC serves its goals of becoming a regional connectivity hub. Its historically porous border with Afghanistan adds to its internal security issues and makes it an active recipient of terrorist attacks. This is the reason for cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. India’s improved relations with the Taliban government of Afghanistan are viewed as a threat by Pakistan. Pakistan does not have an active role in the Indo-Pacific; however, its increased diplomatic collaboration with West Asian nations improves its standing, such as the Mecca Defence Pact, and may further be explored in the future in the form of limited defence trilaterals or minilaterals. (Siddiqui, 2026) Pakistan’s strengthened regional standing will definitely have a bearing on its strategy vis-à-vis India, and vice versa. Therefore, in neighbourhood rivalries, states’ regional ambitions and bilateral relations with neighbouring states also weigh in on decision-making.

Relative Material Power

Relative material power refers to a state's tangible, physical, and economic capabilities measured directly against the capabilities of other states. A shift in the relative power of states also leads to a shift in foreign policy. Between two hostile neighbours, such as Pakistan and India, a demonstration of improved capabilities by one state can immediately alert the opponent and propel changes, creating a competitive environment between both states at all times. However, states’ assessment of relative power is not the only factor determining their decisions with respect to their opponent. For example, despite India's and Pakistan’s possession of nuclear capabilities, India retaliated against the alleged Pahalgam attack by Pakistan by launching a cross-border missile attack on Pakistan, leading to an escalation. This event demonstrates that an apparent balance in nuclear capabilities does not guarantee deterrence. Therefore, a multitude of factors are in place when foreign policy decisions are made, and states’ relative material power is one of them. 

Nuclear Deterrence

Although the limits of nuclear deterrence are often tested between India and Pakistan, its relevance can not be discounted. It may be the only reason the two are not fighting a prolonged battle over Kashmir. Instead, power asymmetry between nuclear-armed rivals promotes conflict in a different form, limiting the display of conventional warfare and encouraging multi-domain or hybrid warfare. Multi-domain warfare refers to the conceptually different domains applied symbiotically in a joint operation in attempts to disable the opponent’s retaliatory capabilities without getting involved in a full-scale conventional war. (Fleming, 2011) The employment of a combination of state and non-state actors to coercively weaken the opponent state is called hybrid warfare. These strategies are often enacted through economic coercion, the use of proxies or terrorist organisations, inciting and provoking local unrest, instigating cyberattacks, weaponising information warfare, and deploying regular military force. (Shah & Ehsaan, 2022)

Pakistan accuses India of employing hybrid warfare strategies in the following instances: The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, unrest in Karachi in the 1980s, support for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), keeping Pakistan on the FATF Grey List, weaponising the Indus Water Treaty, and the insurgency in Balochistan. (Mubarik et al., 2021)

Similarly, India accuses Pakistan of supporting Sikh separatism in Punjab to form Khalistan, operating insurgencies in Kashmir, and carrying out terrorist attacks in urban centres. (Gadeock, 2024)

Although Pakistan and India have accused each other of employing hybrid warfare strategies, the May 2025 war, initiated by India in response to the Pahalgam terrorist attack in Indian-occupied Kashmir, shows India’s willingness to indulge in conventional warfare techniques as a tenet of its new doctrine of deterrence. India claims to have given a disproportionate response to shrink the space for conflict below the nuclear threshold in the future. (Sahgal & Sahu, 2025) 

Therefore, the presence of nuclear capabilities is a structural reality that has continued to shape the policies on both sides. Where, at first, it limited space for conventional war and allowed both sides to expand unconventional strategic depth, it has now become a catalyst for small-scale cross-border kinetic action, as seen in Operation Sindoor. 

Internal Factors

Domestic Politics

While external realities explain the structural causes for the conflict between India and Pakistan, several intervening variables impact policy decisions substantially. For example, a country’s domestic political events play an integral role in driving its foreign relations. This includes the trends, processes, and internal political activities. Major stakeholders, such as the government, political parties, and citizens, act within the arena of the domestic political system, which is effectively the backdrop against which policy decisions are enacted. 

Pakistan’s domestic politics can be best described as a hybrid system consisting of a multi-party democratic system and a military dictatorship. There’s a persistent struggle between elected governments, the military establishment, and fragile institutions. Historically, Pakistan has spent 33 years under direct military rule, and currently the military establishment holds unparalleled power in the country’s domestic political affairs. It is accused of manipulating the previous election results of 2024 to achieve favourable outcomes. (The Commonwealth, 2024) The leader of the most popular party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Imran Khan became unpopular among the ruling establishment, after which he has been imprisoned for multiple bogus cases since August 2023. A coalition government formed through the rigged elections currently leads the country. (Ewe, 2025) A lack of legitimacy and failure to arrange fair elections have led to political instability inside Pakistan. The government, with the military’s backing, has recently assumed a more hardened policy towards dissent and criticism and tried to bring about authoritarian reforms to achieve stability through force, the introduction of constitutional amendments, and the manipulation of the judiciary. (Sheikh, 2024) The country’s internal security issues and worsening economic conditions add to public discontent. During times of great internal unrest, Pakistan's military has used confrontation with India and the threat narrative to reinforce its institutional legitimacy and political influence by giving rise to nationalist sentiments across the country. (Siddiqa, 2017)

India’s domestic politics is a complex mix of democratic competition, strong leadership, regional diversity, and evolving institutions. It's a federal parliamentary democracy with a multi-party system led by the BJP under Narendra Modi since 2014. The BJP is associated with Hindutva, a form of Hindu nationalism linked to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which promotes an ethno-nationalist ‘Hindu’ India. (Walter and Shridhar, 2019) Of the total 28 states, the nationally ruling BJP is now in power in 16 Indian states, with the NDA (a BJP-led coalition) seated in another 4. 

Although India had remained stable with respect to institutional conformity to democratic principles, Modi’s election began eroding democratic norms within India. This is represented in a gradual decline in civil liberties and the regime’s intolerance towards opposition. (Tudor, 2023) The regime promotes a narrative of identity-based politics of Hindu majoritarianism, resting its legitimacy on its far-right Hindu identity and anti-Muslim policies. Majoritarianism refers to the idea that pre-existing ethnic, racial, or religious majorities have a natural right to dominate a certain political entity. (Chatterjee et al., 2019) This rhetoric has shaped BJP-led domestic political discourse, promoting controversial legislation, incidents of communal violence, hate campaigns, etc., against Muslims and other minorities. As a result, neutral institutions such as the bureaucracy and local governments have been politicised to deepen the social divide. (Modern Diplomacy, 2026) 

Several scholars argue that the BJP has strengthened its domestic political support by adopting a hardline foreign policy toward Pakistan. Through emphasising military retaliation, national security, and strong leadership during periods of bilateral crisis, the party has reinforced nationalist narratives that resonate with significant segments of the Indian electorate. While electoral outcomes are shaped by multiple factors, studies suggest that confrontations with Pakistan have contributed to increased public support for the BJP, particularly following the 2016 surgical strikes and the 2019 Balakot airstrikes. (Jaffrelot, 2021; Chatterji et al., 2019)

Both states are operating under varying kinds of domestic political institutions that compel them to act in ways that strengthen their rule. The narratives of national security are successful in rallying public support where they lend lost legitimacy and support to the increasingly authoritarian hybrid government in Pakistan and embolden the populist government in India.

State-society relations

State-society relations refer to the state’s role in defining its citizens’ position, their relationship with other citizens, and the state itself. This includes a moral order defined by laws, the education system, state-controlled media, and other state-imposed modes of influence. Therefore, this part examines the strength and structure of the state relative to its society, as they determine resource allocation for foreign policy and the internal constraints and support for the state when employing those foreign policy decisions and as a result of them.

In Pakistan, under the hybrid military-civilian governance structure, a significant amount of governing power is held by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). The military openly intervenes and manipulates political processes to achieve favourable outcomes. Dissent and debate are suppressed through the passing of censorship laws, controlling the media, and cracking down on protestors, and political accountability is absent. (Gkioka, 2024; Amnesty Int’l, 2024; Dawn Editorial, 2025) Moreover, the politicians lack the ability and capacity to formulate and deliver policy. (Davies, 2026) Therefore, the state of Pakistan lacks legitimacy and the support of the majority of its people. The country's economic woes exacerbate the prevailing discontent. Almost 30% of the country’s population lives below the poverty line, and the youth unemployment rate stands at a concerning 12.5%.

In addition to the absence of political accountability, there is deep-rooted corruption within the bureaucracy and the justice system. (Valerian 2024) Institutional corruption, failure to deliver, and low economic prospects for the general public lead to a crisis of trust. Moreover, it disintegrates everyday life through gradual erosion of healthcare and social services and deterioration of existing infrastructure. This further erodes democracy as it is evidence of authoritarian state capture. Corruption weakens the judiciary and initiates practices of media suppression. (Benson, 2025) As living standards of the masses, legal rights, and safety continue to deteriorate, the ruling class remains the primary beneficiary. This situation is a ticking time bomb for the ruling class, as it can quickly unravel into a nationwide movement to uproot the status quo. Under these conditions, external rivals may seek to exploit internal divisions through diplomatic, informational, or proxy means, while governments may prioritise short-term security measures and assertive foreign policy responses to reinforce state authority and maintain domestic stability. Leaders facing domestic legitimacy problems and weak state–society relations often prioritise policies that preserve political survival, even when those policies are suboptimal from a purely systemic perspective. (Lobell, 2009)

In India, state-society relations are defined by an often-contradictory interaction between a comparatively robust democratic state and a deeply hierarchical, pluralistic society led by a populist government. Due to a large Hindu majority existing amid multiple minorities, we witness majoritarian and minority politics alongside identity politics. While there is a federal state system anchored in a constitutional democratic framework that encourages participation and protest and guarantees equality, religious freedom, and minority protections, there are increasing concerns about constricted civic space, constraints on journalists, selective law enforcement, and communal polarisation. (Modern Diplomacy, 2026)

Perhaps what is most damaging to a state's state-society relations is the erosion of civil liberties. Unlike Pakistan, India’s military does not exercise much control over its politics, but the civilian government under the BJP has enacted policies that erode the protection of civil liberties. According to Freedom House, India scores 31 out of 60 in civil liberties such as independent media, academic freedom, freedom of expression and association, trade unions and NGOs, an independent judiciary, legal equality, equality of opportunity, and more. (Freedom House, 2025) According to Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index, India has dropped to 161st place out of 180 nations since 2014, behind Afghanistan, Belarus, Hong Kong, Libya, Pakistan, and Turkey. Sedition laws from the colonial era and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) are two ways the state legally suppresses dissent.

Moreover, although urbanisation has combatted social stratification, segregation based on caste, religion, and class still affects access to state resources, policies, and political representation for many. For example, according to IndiaSpend, Modi’s rise to power was immediately followed by a rise in mob lynching and cow-related violent incidents against Muslims. (Baksi and Nagarajan, 2017) Through the census, the Indian government has formally recorded castes and sub-castes, mainly to identify those who qualify for reservation jobs, which relies completely on quotas. This encourages discrimination in employment and education opportunities. (Shrivastava, 2025)

The BJP-led majoritarianism in India has also weakened executive accountability to parliament. This is seen in the transfer of freely acting judges, the passing of laws without parliamentary consultation, and the fast-declining importance of parliamentary committees. (Tudor, 2023) Moreover, India's judicial system is paralysed by a staggering backlog of over 50 million pending cases, a crisis driven by severe understaffing of just 20 judges per million people. (DL News, 2026) This has delayed the distribution of due rights and resolution of conflicts to millions of people, exacerbating a law-and-order problem.

Today, India’s state-society relations are tainted by the loss of horizontal accountability and shrinking civil liberties for minorities, assisted by the judiciary and state apparatus, including the law enforcement authorities. Populist governments act to retain support and power; therefore, foreign policy decisions are, to some extent, driven by elections and public opinion. However, it may also simultaneously use the tools at its disposal to shape public opinion in favour of certain foreign policy options in attempts to consolidate support, manufacture consent, or suppress dissent. These tools include state-controlled media, censorship, the police force, law-making powers, the courts, etc.

Strategic Culture

Strategic culture can be defined as the manner in which a country’s policymakers and institutions conduct its security and military affairs and perceive threats, or more simply put, its way of warfare. Booth’s definition of strategic culture is helpful:

“A nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, customs, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force.” (Sondhaus 2006)

A nation’s strategic culture is largely shaped by its history. In Pakistan’s context, as discussed earlier, military leadership has historically played a primary role in devising foreign policy decisions. Whether we scrutinise the 33 years Pakistan was under direct military rule or the remaining years under hybrid rule, there are several examples of prioritising security needs, especially when addressing India. Commentators argue this is because Pakistan has evolved to be a security state owing to the persistent security threat from India. (Ali and Patman, 2019; and Cloughley, 2022). In this context, Pakistan’s military leadership has been, and is expected to continue to be, more likely to perceive external stimuli from a defence and security perspective. They operate with heightened threat perception, and in their view, national interest is closely linked with a strategic victory against the adversary, in this case, India. (Ali and Patman, 2019) 

This is not to say military-level threat perception and decision-making have always been hawkish. In 2003, President Musharraf, previously army chief, put together a joint statement with the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and addressed India’s concerns over cross-border infiltration and Pakistan’s desire to settle the Kashmir dispute. Similarly, its elected leadership has time and again produced policies to initiate goodwill, such as Prime Minister Imran Khan handing back a captured Indian pilot as a ‘peace gesture’ in 2019. (BBC News, 2019) This decision was supported by the then army chief, Bajwa, who was in favour of the normalisation of ties with India. (Haqqani, 2021) Thus, Pakistan’s strategic culture has changed with regimes and leadership.

Moreover, the division of the Subcontinent on religious grounds and the formation of Pakistan and India based on religious majoritarianism shaped the strategic culture of both nations. Pakistan’s armed forces have undertaken the role of being the saviour of Muslims, invoking religious concepts of shahadat and jihad. (Briskey, 2022)

Further characteristics of Pakistan’s strategic culture are interventionism, as seen in Afghanistan in search of strategic depth, and the use of proxy warfare against India. The most dominant theme, however, has been the utilization of its strategic geography to play active roles in international conflicts alongside great powers such as the US, China, and Russia. (Liaquat & Abbasi, 2025) 

India’s strategic culture has evolved from Nehru-era Non-alignment ideology, towards a limited war strategy under Congress governments, into an assertive nationalist Modi doctrine post-2014. Post-colonial India’s foreign policy under Nehru prioritized sovereignty and autonomy by choosing non-alignment during the Cold War. Nehru’s ideas were a product of India’s colonial history. Moreover, Nehru’s hands-on approach to foreign policy affairs, driven by the needs of the hour, was less reliant on institutions and concentrated within the discretion of the prime minister, foreign minister, and a few select advisors. (Mazumdar, 2011) This allowed India to develop an independent foreign policy and a self-appointed route towards national security from an early stage (unlike Pakistan, which chose alignment with the US at the time), but also led to the growth of weak institutions and a person-driven strategic culture. These principles have continued to guide India’s strategic culture with the addition of Hindu nationalism and realpolitik since Modi came into office. (Aryal & Bharti, 2026) 

The historical events post-partition shaped the strategic environment between the two nations. From the beginning, due to contested land borders, unequal distribution of resources, violence during partition, and unfair British conduct, both became strong adversaries. The events that followed can be summarized as an arms race, further strengthening the rivalry and reducing trust.  

Leader Perceptions 

Another set of key domestic intervening variables that influence states’ threat perceptions and decision-making is the leader images. Unlike external variables such as relative power and structural factors, this component emphasises the leadership’s ‘perception’ of systemic changes and relative power, which directly influences their threat assessment, understanding of the national interest, and the corresponding policy response. A ruler's inclination towards risk-taking, his ambitions, and his appetite for confrontation determine how he interprets external stimuli, what information he deems important, and what he chooses to ignore. It also includes the individual personalities of the rulers formed by their past experiences. All this determines what kinds of policies they favour. (Mallet and Juneau, 2023)

This section of a neoclassical realist analysis is largely based on dissecting behavioral and psychosocial signalling of the leadership and may amount to conjecture. However, I will provide my reading of the current leadership’s leader images as an example. The current Chief of Defence Forces of Pakistan, Asim Munir, is a contradictory figure. On the one hand, he displays commitment to peacemaking by mediating between Iran and the US, whereas his stance on Afghanistan and response to Indian aggression during the past year have been exacting, if not escalatory. (Clary, 2025; Fong, 2026) He is balancing relations with two great powers, the US and China, while struggling to contain Pakistan's most pressing internal security challenge, terrorism. He has altered the constitution on multiple occasions to consolidate his rule and awarded himself lifetime immunity. (Davies, 2025) This displays his ambitious and authoritarian disposition that may act as a cognitive lens when he views changes in the country’s internal and external environment. His perception of national security appears to be linked to power and competition rather than growth and cooperation. He may be susceptible to viewing compromises as failure; hence, he is unwilling to engage with the Afghan Taliban. He has also participated in state visits and met with heads of state, showing his desire to appear as the head of state, despite the prime minister accompanying him on multiple occasions. However, these observations do not explain his decisions in their entirety. These assessments are highly arbitrary and should only be seen as a cognitive lens used to perceive external stimuli in order to understand policy decisions rather than to explain them.

PM Modi’s rise to domestic power is through majoritarian politics, and his foreign policy reflects the projection of a strong, self-reliant India. His notion of national interest has moral connotations borrowed from Hindu scriptures. Under his leadership, India has made notable escalations while responding to the 2016 attacks in IAK, the Pulwama attack in 2019, and the Pahalgam attack in 2025 by launching surgical and air strikes into Pakistan’s territory, risking a full-scale conventional war. (Vohra, 2025) 

The intervening variables act in tandem as the policymakers react to systemic variables, formulate a threat assessment, and eventually devise a policy output. They weigh in on the policymaking elite’s decision-making by shaping the domestic political environment and through the form of cognitive biases of the leadership. The systemic/external variables are the starting point indeed and essentially the driving force of these decisions. However, neoclassical realists emphasise the relentless pervasiveness of the intervening variables. Their impact on the policy output can not be discounted. Scholars argue that in most instances, these domestic pressures lead to over or underbalancing against an adversary. (Mallet and Juneau, 2023)

Conclusion

While it is difficult to pinpoint a single reason for the perpetual conflict between India and Pakistan, understanding the relationship between power and policy necessitates a deep reading of the internal and external contexts of policy-making. Neoclassical realism allows us to analyze the depth and breadth of the external and internal contexts of foreign policy decisions. In the case of Pakistan and India, bilateral relations have been stained with conflict, tensions, and mistrust ever since the two nations gained independence from the British and formed separate countries. The origin of the conflict lies in the events of partition, primarily the unresolved border dispute over Kashmir and unfair resource distribution. These events created grounds for enmity and opposition very early on. In Kashmir, the introduction of non-state actors and heavy military presence on both sides keeps the conflict ripe. However, Pakistan and India’s bilateral relations have also been affected by factors beyond Kashmir. External factors include polarity and great power competition, regional dynamics, relative material power, and nuclear deterrence. Pakistan’s policy of aligning with great powers in times of competition has put both countries at odds. In Afghanistan, where Pakistan decided to support the US against Russia, India remained non-aligned. Post-Cold War, India grew closer to the US, especially with the introduction of the US Indo-Pacific policy. In contrast, Pakistan’s long-term strategic partnership with China placed it at odds with India once again, in the context of Indo-China border disputes and great power competition between China and the US. More recently, both have sought to diversify relations across the spectrum, with India actively participating in China-led multilaterals such as BRICS and SCO, and Pakistan growing closer to the Trump administration. Therefore, states’ decision-making in an environment of great-power competition has implications for their bilateral relations with other countries. Moreover, Pakistan’s cooperation with China weighs heavily on India’s assessment of Pakistan in terms of regional dynamics. India’s regional aspirations and China’s rise to power create friction between them. Although nuclear defense capabilities deter both countries to a great extent, at the same time they also promote the use of unconventional war strategies. In this competitive external environment, the two countries with similar material capabilities may act differently owing to intervening variables such as varying state structures, domestic political realities, and leader perceptions. Foreign policy helps shape narratives for the regime in order to rally public support. 

Exaggerated threat perceptions help lend legitimacy to the increasingly authoritarian hybrid government in Pakistan and embolden the populist government in India. Moreover, fractured state-society relations, eroded over time by the rise in military intervention in domestic politics in Pakistan, weakened civilian oversight and accountability for policy decisions and exposed vulnerabilities that have been exploited by rivals such as India. Meanwhile, in India, persecution of minorities, democratic backsliding, and a judicial crisis have diminished civil liberties. Unchecked majoritarianism also weakens accountability and limits parliamentary participation in strategic decision-making in the long-term. Another intervening factor influencing the policy-making process is the country’s strategic culture. Both countries have developed a distinct manner of conducting their security and military affairs and perceive threats over time, which has reflected in their bilateral relations. The final category of intervening variables is leader images. Pakistan and India have seen a mix of civil and military leadership holding varying beliefs, character traits, and ideologies which form a perception lens during the processes of threat assessment and policy decision-making. In this essay, we have attempted to display the complex web of external and internal variables influencing decision-making in both countries, driving bilateral relations ultimately towards long-term mistrust and antagonism.