Abstract

Under Shigeru Ishiba’s leadership, the future of Sino-Japanese relations is at a critical juncture. The new Prime Minister’s firm stance on issues like the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the Yasukuni Shrine, and an “Asian NATO” reflects Japan’s shift toward a stronger defense posture, challenging hopes for peaceful coexistence. As diplomatic gestures from China signal an interest in stability, Ishiba’s leadership raises pivotal questions: can Japan and China transcend historical tensions, or will strategic rivalry shape their bilateral future?

Amidst the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) political donation scandal, Fumio Kishida ultimately decided to forgo his bid for party leadership and, consequently, a second term as Prime Minister. In the LDP presidential election held on September 27, 67-year-old former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba emerged victorious in a narrow second-round vote, securing his place as the new party leader. On October 1, Ishiba formally succeeded Kishida, becoming Japan’s 102nd Prime Minister (Yamamoto & Jett, 2024). This date bears symbolic significance as it coincides with China’s National Day, subtly underscoring a moment of nuanced timing in Sino-Japanese relations.

On October 1, Chinese President Xi Jinping congratulated Ishiba, emphasizing aspirations for “peaceful coexistence, friendship, and mutually beneficial cooperation” between the two nations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The People’s Republic of China, 2024a). Xi expressed hopes that Japan would uphold the principles of the four China-Japan political documents, advancing a constructive, stable bilateral relationship. Shortly after, on October 10, Chinese Premier Li Qiang met with Ishiba at the East Asia Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting, reiterating the view that each country’s development is an opportunity, not a threat, and expressing China’s willingness to enhance multilateral cooperation with Japan for regional peace (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The People’s Republic of China, 2024b). 

While these diplomatic gestures suggest a potential for cooperation, there is also a question worth considering: Does this truly herald a new chapter in Sino-Japanese relations, or does it mask a deeper strategic contest?

The future trajectory of Sino-Japanese relations will inevitably be shaped by enduring challenges, including territorial disputes, historical legacies, and the concept of an “Asian NATO.” This article explores these key aspects, examining whether Ishiba’s government can effectively navigate the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape to forge a path toward coexistence with China. 

Territorial Disputes

Territorial disputes remain one of the most challenging issues in Sino-Japanese relations. The bilateral relationship between China and Japan is often seen as critical to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, yet the sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea adds significant complexity to this relationship (Takeuchi, 2013; Johnson, 2019). In 2010, tensions sharply escalated when Japan detained the captain and crew of a Chinese fishing vessel (Fravel, 2016); two years later, the Japanese government’s attempt to “nationalize” the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands by purchasing three of the contested islets sparked a strong reaction from China (Smith, 2013; Fravel, 2016). These actions challenged China’s previously “low-profile” approach to territorial disputes, prompting a more assertive strategy in defending its sovereignty claims (Fravel, 2016).

In response, the Chinese government not only suspended high-level political and diplomatic exchanges with Japan but also took a series of firm actions, including regular patrols in the waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands. There were also widespread anti-Japanese demonstrations across China (Smith, 2013; Fravel, 2016). Despite a temporary thaw through the “Four-Point Consensus” between China and Japan in 2014, where both sides committed to improving bilateral relations, they remain firmly opposed and uncompromising on sovereignty issues. The Chinese government asserts that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are part of China, historically tied to Taiwan, which it also claims as its own. Japan, on the other hand, argues under international law that it has exercised effective control over the Diaoyu Islands since 1895 (Sato & Chadha, 2022).

Upon assuming office, Shigeru Ishiba swiftly established a firm stance on territorial issues. During his diplomatic debut at the ASEAN Plus Three Summit, Ishiba demonstrated a nuanced understanding of the Asia-Pacific landscape. Not only did he express a desire to foster closer relations with ASEAN member countries, but he also voiced deep concern over China’s increasingly assertive maritime stance (Nakamura, 2024). In a post-summit statement, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveyed Ishiba’s position at the ASEAN Free Trade Area Summit, explicitly opposing any “unilateral attempts to alter the status quo by force or coercion” and highlighting the “increasingly severe” security challenges in the region (Nakamura, 2024). In discussions with various national leaders, Ishiba reaffirmed Japan’s unwavering position on sovereignty issues, particularly regarding the contested waters of the East China Sea— that Japan’s claim over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands remains unchanged (Nakamura, 2024). Ishiba’s remarks stress his commitment to defending Japan’s territorial sovereignty, suggesting that his administration may adopt a clearer, more resolute stance on the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute. This position not only responds to the shifting security environment in East Asia but also signals Japan’s evolving strategic approach within the Asia-Pacific framework.

Beyond territorial issues, Japan’s historical legacy, particularly the Yasukuni Shrine controversy, remains a source of tension in Sino-Japanese relations.

Historical Legacy Issue

The Yasukuni Shrine remains an enduring and deeply sensitive issue in Sino-Japanese relations. Serving as a memorial site honoring approximately 2.5 million war dead, Yasukuni Shrine not only fulfills a commemorative role within Japan but also generates significant international controversy due to its enshrinement of Class A war criminals. For China, the Yasukuni Shrine symbolizes the unresolved traumas of war; each time Japanese leaders or officials visit the shrine, whether in an official or private capacity, China reacts strongly, perceiving these visits as a minimization of wartime atrocities and, at times, a glorification of Japan’s history of aggression. Consequently, Yasukuni stands as more than just a place of reverence; it embodies Japan’s stance on its historical responsibilities.

On the morning of October 17, Japan’s newly elected Prime Minister, Shigeru Ishiba, made a symbolic offering of a “masakaki” branch to the Yasukuni Shrine. Though he did not attend in person, this gesture, made under the title “Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba” and at his personnel expense, drew immediate concern and apprehension from China. In a routine press briefing that same day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning addressed the issue, emphasizing that the Yasukuni Shrine served as a spiritual tool and symbol of Japanese militarism’s external aggression, as it houses 14 Class A war criminals responsible for grave offenses (Ministry of Foreign Affairs The People’s Republic of China, 2024c). Mao stated, “We urge Japan to confront and reflect on its history of aggression, exercise caution on historical issues like Yasukuni Shrine, fully sever ties with militarism, and commit to a path of peaceful development, thus building trust with neighboring Asian countries and the international community through concrete actions” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs The People’s Republic of China, 2024c). Her response highlights the sensitivity and importance China continues to place on the Yasukuni Shrine issue.

As Japan’s new Prime Minister, Ishiba’s actions reflect both a traditional stance within Japan’s domestic political scene and the introduction of new uncertainties in the realm of bilateral relations. His symbolic offering highlights that the Yasukuni Shrine remains a contentious point impacting Sino-Japanese relations. Both countries, while striving to improve bilateral ties, are compelled to confront this historical burden, adding complexity and challenges to the future trajectory of their relationship.

Moreover, Japan’s defense posture, notably the idea of an “Asian NATO,” reflects a shift toward a more assertive regional security strategy.

Asian NATO

Shigeru Ishiba has openly acknowledged the “proliferating challenges” Japan faces in the realm of national security. Like Fumio Kishida, he advocates for significantly strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities. In the days leading up to the election, Ishiba presented an ambitious vision: establishing an “Asian NATO.” This proposed alliance would function as a collective defense mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region, akin to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, with the goal of countering China’s expanding military influence in the area (Caprara, 2024). However, this proposal immediately sparked widespread discussion across the region, especially among ASEAN countries. ASEAN members expressed concerns that such an alliance could intensify economic friction with China, compromise their long-standing non-alignment policies, and further strain the geopolitical landscape in the Asia-Pacific (Caprara, 2024). While Ishiba’s vision demonstrates his strategic insight into regional security, its compatibility with the interests of all parties remains uncertain.

Reflecting on the implications of this proposal, Robert Ward, Chair of the Japan Program and Director of Geo-Economics and Strategy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), noted in an interview with UPI that Ishiba’s initiative signals a redefined approach to Japan’s future security strategy (Caprara, 2024). It also reflects his aspiration to collaborate with like-minded countries in countering China’s threat. Ward suggested that Ishiba’s proposal seeks a balance of power in the Asia-Pacific based on cooperation, thereby aiming to mitigate uncertainties associated with unilateral military expansion (Caprara, 2024).

Meanwhile, Wu Qian, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Defense, responded earlier this month to Ishiba’s position by stating that Japan “frequently exaggerates a ‘China threat’ that does not exist to divert international attention from its own military expansion (Caprara, 2024).” Wu’s remarks underscore China’s caution and opposition toward Japan’s strengthened security alliance concept, further highlighting the divergence between the two countries’ security perspectives.

The concept of an “Asian NATO” reveals Ishiba’s bold thinking regarding Japan’s future security strategy while also highlighting the region’s complex reactions to this vision. Given the delicate balance in Sino-Japanese relations, whether Japan’s new administration can navigate a nuanced coexistence between regional defense and economic interests will be a crucial test for the geopolitical stability of the Asia-Pacific.

The future trajectory of Sino-Japanese relations under Shigeru Ishiba’s leadership will be shaped by key issues such as the Diaoyu Islands dispute, the Yasukuni Shrine controversy, and the concept of an “Asian NATO.” These factors reveal deep-seated historical entanglements and strategic divides between the two nations. In the current sensitive international climate, Ishiba’s diplomatic maneuvers reflect Japan’s attempt to establish a stronger defensive stance within the region while striving to balance relations with China. However, this equilibrium is bound to be fraught with challenges, making the future direction of Sino-Japanese relations increasingly complex and delicate. Against this backdrop, whether Sino-Japanese relations can transcend historical burdens and achieve stable cooperation remains an open question.

Looking ahead, it is noteworthy that Ishiba has announced an early election scheduled for October 27. Leveraging the “honeymoon period” typical of a new prime minister, he aims to consolidate power and build a solid foundation for his policy agenda. This election holds particular significance for the LDP; the electorate’s stance will determine whether the party can retain its majority in the Diet. Should this goal not be achieved, Ishiba may have to take responsibility for the election’s outcome and resign immediately, potentially making him the shortest-serving prime minister in Japan’s postwar history.