Agricultural Cooperatives in Russia: Between Tradition, Policy, and Modern Challenges

Abhilasha Nagendra

Abstract

This article examines the role of agricultural cooperatives in Russia’s food security policy. Despite challenges like inconsistent state support and inefficiencies, it suggests that cooperatives have the potential to significantly contribute to sustainable agricultural development and food security, given the right policy reforms.

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that Russia is home to approximately 12,000 agriculture cooperatives (co-ops) (International Labour Office, 2009), suggesting a thriving sector within the country’s agrarian economy. However, prominent scholarship on this topic seems to suggest that agriculture co-ops are being sidelined. Government spending at the federal and state levels seems to favour large-scale agricultural enterprises over smaller, family-owned “peasant” farms and household farms (Seligmann et al., 2009, p. 22). This disparity raises an important question: Does Russia consider agricultural co-ops to be a viable tool for achieving its state policy of food security, or are they just a symbolic remnant of the past?

To understand this tension, we must first examine Russia’s long-standing tradition of agricultural cooperatives, which have their roots in Tsarist Russia following the abolishment of serfdom in 1861, which marked the transfer of land ownership to village communes rather than individual peasants. Furthermore, the introduction of cooperative principles in Western Europe led to a boom in agricultural co-ops in Russia during the 1860s-90s (Yanbykh et al., 2019, p. 751).

Post-1917 revolution, national cooperative unions guided the top-down emergence of agricultural cooperatives, which coincided with a simultaneous increase in voluntary co-ops as people formed collectives based on the traditional Russian Arteli (farming associations). However, these were ultimately replaced by the Kolkhoz—a collective run on state-owned land by peasants—which was enforced through waves of forced collectivisation. Under Stalin, the lines between the state-controlled Kolkhoz and the state-owned Sovkoz (state farms) were blurred. This forced collectivisation reflected a change in Russia’s agricultural attitudes, i.e., the disappearance of cooperation. This pattern of state control persisted until the 1980s, when Gorbachev’s Perestroika reforms introduced significant changes. Under the new reforms, cooperative ownership was encouraged and afforded the same protection as government ownership. Cooperatives were also given the freedom to choose what they could produce and sell, representing a dramatic departure from the rigid control of previous decades under Soviet rule.

Despite a brief period of optimism during Gorbachev’s Perestroika, agricultural co-ops have struggled to gain substantial ground in contemporary Russia—both physically- and policy-wise. This is perplexing in the context of Russia’s focus on food security and, in particular, food independence, which was first crystallised in the food security program doctrine under the 120th Presidential Decree. Co-ops can be a part of the solution or policy for food security, as they have the ability to connect, create, and foster farmer networks, which helps agricultural producers overcome key problems, thus creating a secure pathway for production—a cornerstone for food security, as outlined by the both the FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization) and ICA (International Cooperative Alliance). Thus, the slow yet certain sidelining of agricultural co-ops in Russia comes as a surprising contradiction to its stated priorities.

So, the pressing question remains: Why is this happening?

One key aspect that remains under-explored is the mismatch between the evolving agricultural landscape and the largely unchanged structure of agricultural cooperatives in Russia. Agriculture has vastly changed from when farms could be viewed as independent units that could undertake both production and manufacturing. However, in this new age of agriculture that increasingly favours specialised production, farms have become dependent units that rely on a larger network to help with production (Fulton et al., 2003, p. 9).  Thus, agricultural services have emerged at the forefront of new-age farming. However, in Russia, as of 2017, service-based agricultural co-ops stood at 6% of the total share of cooperatives, whereas their production-based counterparts stood at 10% (Yanbykh et al., 2019, p. 757). This preference for production cooperatives likely stems from the legacy of collectivised farms in the Soviet era, which were primarily production-focused. Thus, we see that Russia has yet to fully adapt to the changing dynamics of the farming sector, leaving existing co-ops obsolete and unable to provide the services that modern farmers require.

While agricultural cooperatives face these structural challenges, another key factor hindering their growth is the shifting and often inconsistent nature of state policies. In 2006, Russia introduced the National Priority Project for the development of the Agro-industrial Complex. This project provided an impetus to service-based agricultural cooperatives through financial support. This initiative led to a five-fold increase in co-ops within just one year (Yanbykh et al., 2019, p. 751), offering a brief window of opportunity for these organisations to flourish. However, by 2010, the government drastically reduced state credits to cooperatives and cut subsidies to small-scale farms, effectively stalling the growth of cooperatives.

Furthermore, the introduction of significantly better-funded State Programs in recent years has further stunted the growth of cooperatives by favouring large agribusinesses known as agricultural enterprises. A 2020 World Bank report on Russia’s agricultural support policies highlights that government-backed agricultural enterprises distort the market by displacing smaller, more efficient, family-owned farms. Rather than supporting these smaller farms (Seligmann et al., 2009, p. 20), which could potentially offer more sustainable and effective solutions, the state continues to prop up larger enterprises, likely in response to their own declining productivity (Seligmann et al., 2009, p. 82). This policy approach seems counter-intuitive to Russia’s goal of achieving a stable and secure food supply chain, as it prioritises the short-term growth of larger corporations over the long-term sustainability of family-owned farms and cooperatives.

Despite these challenges, agricultural co-ops are not entirely without prospects. In recent years, there has been increasing recognition of the value of localised, sustainable farming practices that co-ops can offer. A fieldwork study from 2010 to 2013 in the Belgorod Region functions as a case for co-ops. The Belgorod region is located in the fertile Central Black Earth region and holds an important position within Russia’s agrarian economy. Within this study, it was shown that state-level officials in Belgorod, following the federal directive to form co-ops, had implemented a rather successful top-down cooperative program that focused on carving out niches within the market to allow small-scale farms to thrive without facing the harsh competition that they would otherwise face in the general market with larger Agri-holdings (Kurakin & Visser, 2017, p. 165). Indeed, this study found that the regional cooperatives did open a stable and sizable marketing channel to rural farms without access to them (Kurakin & Visser, 2017, p. 168). When asked about this, the farmers said that the stability and reliability of these co-ops were the reasons why they worked with them. This study demonstrated that co-ops can open new pathways for farmers and connect them, therefore allowing for productivity increases and better, reliable supply chains, thus reinforcing Russian food security objectives.

Interestingly enough, this study underscored the importance of co-ops in not just economically stimulating rural markets and farmers but also changing their societal outlook. Russia’s tumultuous history with cooperative farming and the deep-seated mistrust and indifference stemming from it might be the largest obstacle to the growth of co-ops. Yet this study shows that these co-ops can help overcome these social obstacles, thus creating a stable base for a more robust food security program that prioritises all the sections of the agrarian economy and not just the agricultural enterprises. Russia’s agricultural cooperatives have long been caught between state policy, historical legacies, and the changing demands of modern farming. While co-ops could serve as a powerful tool to strengthen food security and foster rural development, their potential remains largely untapped due to structural inefficiencies and shifting state priorities.

References

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