Abstract

This article examines China’s border policy regarding North Korean migrants through historical and political perspectives. It begins by contextualizing migration between North Korea and China within a historical framework, then analyzes the legal structures shaping China’s policies and their tangible impacts on refugees like Eunju. The discussion concludes by addressing international criticism of China’s approach and China’s response thereto, demonstrating how China’s policies, designed to prioritize national interests, create a precarious and often dehumanizing reality for North Korean refugees in their journey and resettlement in China.

“I didn’t know I was hungry until I was eight years old. Growing up, I had no concept of whether my hometown was wealthy or poor. Then when the great famine struck in the mid-90s, more people died in our city than anywhere else in the country” (Liberty in North Korea, 2017). This account from Eunju, a North Korean refugee who escaped to China twice before resettling in South Korea, encapsulates the desperation that drives thousands of North Korean defectors to leave their homeland in search of survival.

Flow of North Korean Migrants/Refugees into China

Starting from the mid-twentieth century, the flow of goods and people between China and North Korea has been significant. From the 1950s to the 1990s, North Korea was more stable and economically prosperous than China (King, 2023). During this time and especially during China’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), many migrants from China immigrated to North Korea to seek employment (King, 2023). However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, North Korea faced severe economic hardship, including a drastic drop in grain production (Ahn, 2018). By 1995, grain production had fallen from 5.4 million tons in 1989 to 3.4 million tons, triggering widespread famine and death of an estimated 300,000 to 3,000,000 people between 1994 and 1998 (Ahn, 2018). 

This economic collapse reversed migration flows, with North Koreans fleeing to China in search of survival. China was seen as the most accessible route due to the Yalu and Tumen River border and forested areas. Other escape routes, including those directly crossing into South Korea, were almost impossible due to the heavily guarded Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and stringent documentation requirements (King, 2023). Similarly, escaping through Russia or coastal routes is equally perilous due to stricter border controls and naval surveillance (King, 2023). 

While the precise number of North Korean refugees residing in China is unknown, data on the number of North Korean defectors is usually collected by tracking the number of North Koreans that arrive in South Korea from China and other neighboring countries, including Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand (Ahn, 2018). Due to the famine precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of North Korean defectors rose steadily each year from the 1990s to 2010, reaching its peak in 2009, with more than 2,914 defectors entering South Korea that year (Ministry on Reunification, 2024). However, stricter border controls implemented by the Kim Jong Un regime, coupled with China’s cooperation, drastically reduced defections. In 2020, Covid-19 further diminished defection rates, with only 63 defectors arriving in South Korea (Human Rights Watch, 2024; Ministry of Unification, 2024). 

China’s Policy: Legal Frameworks and Motivations

The foundation of China’s official policy towards North Korean refugees is based on its 1964 and 1986 protocols it signed with North Korea, which emphasize mutual cooperation on border security and migration management (Smith, 2012). The 1964 Protocol established between North Korea and China set the guidelines on authorized and unauthorized migration between the two countries. The Protocol articulates how both sides should cooperate on ancillary issues dealing with the outbreak of diseases to the wandering of poultry and livestock, and the returning of corpses in the Yalu and Tumen Rivers (“Protocol Between the PRC Ministry,” 1964). However, specifically on the topic of defectors, the Protocol states the two sides’ commitment to “cooperate on preventing illegal border crossings” by “sending crossers back to their origin country” providing the groundwork for China’s present-day policy of repatriation of refugees (“Protocol Between the PRC Ministry," 1964). 

The 1986 Protocol established between North Korea’s Ministry of State Security and China’s Ministry of Public Security supplements the 1964 protocols with more details regarding the implementation of border security. In the 1986 Protocol, North Korea and China outlined their plans for mutual cooperation regarding the patrolling of both countries’ borders and facilities and deemed the Yalu and Tumen Rivers a “joint patrol zone” (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea & People's Republic of China, n.d.) Meanwhile, to more effectively survey the passage area between the border, the two sides agreed to establish a mutual border passage inspection agency that operates a tight “invitation notice process” detailing visitation procedures, border operation hours, and border passes and certificates (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea & People's Republic of China, n.d.). Lastly, China and North Korea reaffirmed their commitment to cooperating on “the issue of handling criminals (antirevolutionaries, spies, and criminals),” “preventing illegal border crossings,” and “protecting national social property” through repatriation of “livestock,” “property,” and the “detention and deportation of illegal border crossers” (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea & People's Republic of China, n.d.).

Presently, China designates North Korean refugees as illegal economic migrants rather than political refugees, aligning with these aforementioned protocols and its domestic immigration laws (Kwan, 2017). This classification has multiple political and social implications as it allows China to repatriate North Koreans without granting them asylum or protection under the 1951 International Refugee Convention, which China is party to (Kwan, 2017). China’s interests and policy of repatriation go beyond its long-term ideological support of the North Korean regime. 

In managing flows along the North Korean border, China ensures its own domestic and international interests in several respects. Firstly, the Chinese government’s ability to determine defectors’ destiny “gives it a card to play in diplomacy with North Korea,” which trades with China but has been forging closer bilateral and military ties with Russia in recent years. By controlling refugee flows, China maintains leverage over its economically dependent but strategically significant neighbor (Park & Baptista, 2024). Secondly, China’s policy is also led by its practical considerations. Currently, North Korea acts as a “buffer zone” for China, reducing South Korea’s and the West’s influence and access. A mass exodus of North Koreans could have a destabilizing effect on the North Korean regime, potentially leading to reunification with the South, which China perceives as a threat to its geopolitical interests (Ahn, 2018). Lastly, domestically, China fears that a large influx of North Korean refugees could strain local resources and spark social unrest in its border regions (Park & Baptista, 2024). These considerations have guided China’s draconian access policies and airtight physical control over the border.

China’s Enforcement Practices Regarding Its North Korean Refugee Policies

The Chinese government has made efforts to enforce its policies and agreements with North Korea by pursuing an agenda of border securitization and repatriation of refugees. In recent times, however, it has adopted a more lenient and less stringent approach. Despite these shifts, the precarious challenges faced by North Korean refugees, such as trafficking, remain unchanged, as they are granted neither rights nor political recognition. 

China has pursued an agenda of border securitization through measures such as the construction of fences and walls along the Yalu River, the installation of surveillance cameras and barbed wire, and the deployment of advanced AI monitoring systems (Chosun Ilbo, 2024). For instance, in 2006, China began building a 2.5-meter-high fence topped with sharp wires along vulnerable sections of the riverbank (Guan, 2006). As of 2024, these efforts have intensified, with China spending more than 30 million yuan ($4 million in U.S. dollars) to upgrade border security, including deployment of new patrol boats and the construction of deportation centers in key border cities like Dandong and Changchun (Park & Baptista, 2024); border police have been given quotas to identify and expel undocumented migrants; smart facial-recognition cameras, boat patrols, and social media monitoring are used to track defectors (Chosun Ilbo, 2024). In Dandong, the phrase “securing the frontier is to secure the country” is posted on the roads, serving as a constant reminder of the increasingly militarized and securitized border (Chosun Ilbo, 2024). 

While these measures, coupled with Covid-19 travel restrictions within North Korea and China, have caused the number of defectors to decrease, they have also complicated the lives of North Korean refugees already residing in China. Shin Ju-ye, a refugee who fled North Korea in the 1990s, settling in Heilongjiang province in China, commented on the collection of biometric data during the Covid pandemic; she describes how others told her that it feels as if they are “trapped within a fishing net now,” elaborating, “if North Korea tells China to catch and send us, we’re dead” (Park & Baptista, 2024). The anxiety that develops as a result of surveillance is often paired with a looming fear of impending detention and deportation. The UN special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea has estimated that 2,000 North Korean defectors are currently held in China (“Large Number of North Koreans”, 2023). Furthermore, although the exact number of North Koreans repatriated by China remains uncertain, Human Rights Watch has reported that the Chinese government has forcibly returned more than 600 refugees since the lifting of pandemic travel restrictions in North Korea (Saluck, 2023). The evolution of the security apparatuses, combined with fears of detention and deportation, has forced many refugees into a state of constant vigilance, creating a pervasive fear of entrapment and a sense of alienation. 

Alongside China’s agenda of securitization and deportation, the country has also sometimes taken a less hard-line approach regarding the control of its border. Today, there are an estimated 50,000 North Koreans residing in China, demonstrating China’s tolerance of North Korean migration (Smith, 2012). Many of these North Koreans have found ways to repeatedly cross the border through rivers and forested areas—many of which are unimpeded by Chinese authorities (Ahn, 2018). The Chinese government has even regularized the legal status of some children born to Chinese nationals and illegal North Korean migrants, granting them hukou (household registration) status, allowing them access to basic civil services such as education. However, despite the fact that China has permitted many of these refugees to reside within its borders, many of these migrants face extremely exploitative situations due to their lack of political rights. One of the main reasons why the Chinese government has continued to allow border crossings and the residence of North Korean illegals is that they are often willing to take up low-paying jobs in the agriculture or lumber industry that are not attractive to local residents, demonstrating China’s exploitation of these migrants (Smith, 2012). Tens of thousands of female migrants are also sold into sex slavery by brokers upon arrival in China, including some as young as 12 (Yeung & Seo, 2024). Moreover, as many as 30,000 children born in China to North Korean women were not registered upon birth nor given legal status, rendering them stateless and easy targets for traffickers (U.S. Department of State, 2021). 

International Criticism of China’s Policy and China’s Rebuff

China’s treatment of North Korean refugees has drawn sharp criticism from international human rights organizations and governments. While some of the North Korean escapees do not meet the traditional criteria for a refugee, the international community, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), designates them as refugees sur place—individuals who become refugees due to changes in circumstances that arise upon their departure (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 2023). Advocates argue that China’s policy violates international law, citing the principle of non-refoulement under the 1951 Refugee Convention, which prohibits returning refugees to a country where they face persecution (HRC, 129). These advocates, including policy professionals and special rapporteurs, state, “no one should be returned to a country where they would face the risk of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or other irreparable harm, including the use of the death penalty, and enforced disappearance” (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 2023). China is currently party to the 1951 Refugee Convention ratified in its constitution in 1982; however, it has not implemented legal mechanisms for determining the status of refugees. Therefore, critics argue that China’s treatment of refugees is not only a violation of international principles but also of its domestic law. 

Critics of China’s policy also argue that even if China did designate North Korean refugees as “economic migrants,” they could still qualify as refugees if they have been compelled to leave due to unjust economic policies that have shown a history of discrimination and deprivation of the “hostile” or “impure” classes (Cohen, 2012). Therefore, in many cases, the refugees’ economic reasons for leaving may have been inextricably tied to political discrimination or persecution. To pressure China, the Committee Against Torture (CAT)—the body of independent experts that monitors the implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Torture—has urged China to establish a screening process to ensure that North Korean refugees will not face torture or persecution upon return, to permit the UNHCR to access North Korean persons of concern, and to adopt more substantive legislation incorporating China’s obligations under the convention (Cohen, 2012). 

The Chinese government has consistently dismissed international criticisms as unwarranted intrusions into its domestic affairs. Beijing argues that its policies are grounded in its sovereign right to regulate migration and uphold border security (OHCHR, 2023). The Chinese government cites its bilateral agreements with North Korea, particularly the 1964 and 1986 protocols, as the legal basis for its repatriation practices (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, 2023). These agreements obligate China to return unauthorized border crossers. The Chinese government has also argued that it takes a “responsible approach” and “guarantees the rights of the persons involved” by providing for their basic needs in regard to living conditions, diet, and medical treatment when detained (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, 2023). On the issue of refoulement, China argues that there is no factual evidence that the persons being repatriated are subjected to flagrant violations of human rights or torture since China and North Korea do not allow international missions or similar endeavors to observe their compliance (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, 2023). 

Conclusion 

China’s handling of North Korean migrants reflects the inherent tensions between national interests, humanitarian imperatives, and international legal obligations. By prioritizing geopolitical stability and state sovereignty, China enforces policies that align with its strategic goals—maintaining North Korea as a buffer state, preventing mass migration from North Korea, and preserving its domestic order. However, these priorities often come at the expense of individuals such as Eunju and Shin Ju-ye, as well as China’s own international human rights commitments, particularly the principle of non-refoulement and the protection of refugees sur place. This dynamic illustrates refugees’ lack of political rights when their only option is to flee to a country that flouts its obligations under international law. The plight of North Korean refugees reveals the persistent conflict between state-driven security interests and the individual rights of refugees—a challenge that China will continue to confront in the years ahead.