Abstract

A week before the 2024 US Presidential Election, North Korea tested a missile capable of reaching the US, signaling its ambition to disrupt the election and gain nuclear state recognition. North Korea’s recent ties with Russia add urgency, as the election could reshape the Hub-and-Spoke system countering Pyongyang's nuclear threat. Kamala Harris would likely maintain Biden’s multilateral, passive approach, while Trump might attempt direct talks with Kim. However, his efforts could be weakened by South Korea’s current administration, which opposes dialogue with the North. Yet, North Korea remains secondary in US policy, which focuses on US–China competition.

Introduction

Following the signing of a strategic partnership between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un on June 19, 2024, the North Korean leader sent 3,000 troops to Russia to support his ally in Ukraine (Shear, 2024). The rapprochement between the two countries has alerted the international community to North Korea’s intentions. Indeed, it may potentially gain from Russian space technologies by completing its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities. This would allow Kim’s regime to be recognized de jure as a nuclear state and an existential threat to Northeast Asia, and modify the US-led Hub-and-Spoke bilateral security regime deployed in the region. 

In the context of the 2024 US election, this recent rapprochement and North Korea’s involvement on the world stage have strengthened the fear of the US abandoning the region. This fear is highlighted by “Asian NATO,” proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Hishiba, which locks the USA in the region’s security architecture.  

On the one hand, Kamala Harris will likely pursue President Biden’s “calibrated policy” (Bose, 2021) toward North Korea—strengthening its alliances with Japan and South Korea and retaining sanctions on North Korea while remaining open to dialogue.  

On the other hand, Donald Trump has already shown a unilateral approach during his previous presidency, as exemplified by his “one-to-one” meetings with Kim Jong-un while pushing for the peninsula’s denuclearization. However, suppose he was to be elected in 2024. In that case, his regional allies are concerned about a potential sanction relief “in exchange for a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear program” (Ward, 2023) to achieve short-term diplomatic improvement.

Nevertheless, no matter who gets elected, the US policy toward North Korea appears to be a substructure of the Sino–US competition, underlying the indirect independence of the degree of involvement of the USA in the North Korean issue from other conflicts such as the Hamas–Israel or Ukraine–Russia conflicts.

No matter the results of the 2024 US election, it is very probable that North Korea will “adhere to a strategy of relentlessly pursuing nuclear development over an extended period of time to compel acknowledgement of de facto nuclear status by the US and the international community” (Chung & Kim, 2024). However, the election results will modify the Hub-and-Spoke regime’s unity in containing North Korea—between the multilateral but passive approach of Harris and the unilateral and unstable approach of Trump, as a substructure of the Sino–US competition.

Harris

If Harris were to be elected President of the USA, her administration would likely pursue Biden's policy on North Korea. In her October 29, 2024 speech, she declared she would “stand with our friends, because I know that our alliances keep American people safe and make America stronger and more secure” (Willemyns, 2024). We can expect advanced ROK–US military maneuvers and an expansion of the deployment of US assets on the Korean peninsula, in continuity with the July 11, 2024, Joint Statement by President Biden and President Yoon Suk Yeol on US–ROK Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula (White House, 2024). Based on this statement, the US has committed to maintain their extended deterrence alongside their South Korean ally, promising to provide full-range military capabilities, including nuclear capabilities.

Yet behind an ironclad position highlighted in her speech at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago on August 22, 2024, in which she stated that she would not “cozy up to tyrants and dictators like Kim Jong-un” (Aoki, 2024), we could potentially observe a passive stance toward North Korea during her presidency, while keeping a heavy focus on China instead. Indeed, the threat posed by Kim’s regime appears to be a substructure of the Sino–US competition in Harris’ foreign policy. Harris would maintain US sanctions on Kim’s regime to sustain its isolation, avoiding concessions and refraining from direct engagement. However, this approach based on the Sino–US competition will not be efficient in pushing North Korea to abandon its 2021 Five-Year-Military-Development-Plan, and it would still allow the country to further engage with its Chinese and Russian allies. This would increase the support in the South Korean public for the nuclearization of the country, hence also creating a greater incentive for Japan to engage in its militarization. We could expect Japan and South Korea to get closer to deterring North Korea while at the same time increasing the risks of misperceptions and rivalries in the region. But more importantly, China would feel threatened, undermining the fragile status quo in North East Asia. Harris' approach reflects a broader tendency for change in Washington’s foreign policy, moving toward greater isolationism no matter who is elected.

Trump

If Trump were to be elected, we could expect the revival of “one-to-one” talks, which could reduce military provocations from Kim’s regime. Yet, simultaneously, we would witness an erosion of the ROK–US and ROK–US–Japan alliances due to his “America First” policy. In an October 16, 2024 interview, Trump criticized South Korea for not fully covering costs for the 42,000 US troops stationed there, proposing Seoul pay $10 billion annually—nine times the 2026 rate. Concerns about diminished US deterrence, highlighted by Trump’s comments and his prior term, may explain the recent 12th Special Measures Agreement, setting South Korea’s defense cost-sharing at 1.14 trillion won by 2026 (up 8.3% from 1.05 trillion in 2025), a move by Biden and Yoon to preempt Trump’s potential demand for higher contributions (Seo & Lim, 2024). A second Trump administration could bring instability to the trilateral cooperation beyond the North Korean issue, increasing doubts over the credibility of US engagement in deterring North Korea’s nuclear threat. North Korea may no longer perceive any benefits in engaging in talks with the US, even more so since its rapprochement with President Putin and a growing Sino–Russian–North Korean cooperation challenging the Hub-and-Spoke system.

However, no matter the results of the election, the US’s priority will remain China. Considering the North Korean issue as a substructure of the Sino–US competition, we cannot expect Donald Trump to remove US strategic assets from the peninsula. North Korea remains a “buffer zone” (Boc, 2024) to China, preventing a direct opposition between the two powers while constituting a legitimate justification for the USA to position military assets in Northeast Asia, notably in case of aggression of Taiwan by the PRC. 

Furthermore, today’s geopolitical landscape differs from Trump’s first term, with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, unlike Moon Jae-in, less inclined toward dialogue with North Korea, complicating prospects for US–North Korea negotiations (Snyder, 2023). South Korean domestic politics now hinder the US's intermediary role, and Trump's previous “one-to-one” diplomacy may not continue due to South Korea's shift toward more hardline policies.

The 2024 US election will influence Northeast Asia’s security approach to North Korea’s nuclear threat. Kim’s recent missile test underscores Pyongyang’s aim to retain attention in US foreign policy despite a likely lower priority. Any ICBM acquisition from Russia could shift US focus, though China may prevent this to avoid increased American presence in the region.