In February 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, adopting a total war doctrine following its failure to capture Kyiv. This approach has brought carnage and destruction to Ukraine and continues to devastate the country. Following its total war, the Kremlin quickly moved to blockade Ukraine’s ports on the Black Sea to halt the country’s grain exports and thus starve its economy. Subsequently, global food prices experienced a sharp increase, and fears loomed of mass hunger. However, by July 2022, Russia and Ukraine agreed to a deal, brokered by Turkey and the UN, which resumed the unencumbered movement of Ukrainian cargo ships carrying grain under the condition of UN inspection of the vessels. While Russia would unilaterally break this agreement the following year, Moscow’s decision presents an important nuance to its overall strategy in Ukraine. What role did Turkey play in Russia’s decision? More broadly, why do states adopt different doctrines to different theaters of a conflict? Drawing from press releases, news media, and think tank reports, this paper examines why Russia, despite having adopted a total war doctrine to its ground war in Ukraine, employed a limited war approach to the naval theater of the conflict.