Can a Multi-Aligned World Emerge from the Ashes of Binary and Multipolar World Lenses?

By Mathilde Barge

Abstract 

This article challenges the prevailing narrative of a rising threat from China and increasing bipolarity in Sino-American relations. It questions the historical U.S. conceptualization of China as a threat, which has been shaped by considerations of relative power, domestic interests, and perceptions of its undemocratic nature. This narrative contributes to the rhetoric of strategic competition and the possibility of a self-fulfilling prophecy. China's response embraces multilateralism, exemplified by the Belt and Road Initiative, presenting it as a peaceful alternative. The article explores the emergence of multi-alignment rhetoric among middle powers and concludes by advocating for a cooperative multilateral technology policy. 

Introduction 

The Xi-Biden discourse in San Francisco on November 15th signifies a notable shift in Sino-American relations, prompting a reevaluation of the narrative surrounding the perception of a China Threat and increasing bipolarity. The renewed talks between China and the US may be attributed to President Xi Jinping's recent announcement regarding global governance of AI, as well as developments of the Israeli-Palestinian war, underscoring the need for a global dialogue between the two powers. Security analysts have been warning of the emergence of a new cold war, underscoring the importance of comprehending the US conceptualization of China in order to decipher recent geopolitical events. In fact, the introduction of the term “China threat” by the theorist Graham Allison (2018) has been instrumental in describing a phenomenon wherein the conceptualization of a threatening China is employed by Americans to shape their identity within foreign policymaking. However, to grasp the significance of recent events, especially AI geopolitics, it is imperative to comprehend the principles of multilateralism. I will argue that the US and China are both evolving within a world characterized by multi-alignment. 

China threat 

The narrative surrounding the perceived threat posed by China has evolved in parallel with the rhetoric of a new Cold War and the adoption of a primacy strategy by the United States, which has significantly influenced its foreign policy discourse. The US defined this threat through three main lenses: relative power, domestic interests, and the undemocratic nature of China. First, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 and the slowdown of the Japanese economy, China emerged as the sole potential challenger to US hegemony. Unlike the safety net provided by the existence of the Soviet Union, China's rise appeared to plunge both nations into a possible Thucydides trap (1997), where the mere existence of a rising power poses a threat to established leaders. Thus, whilst China only had one-tenth of the American military power and defense spending (Winkler, 2023), Christensen argues that leaders sometimes adopt overly aggressive policies to mobilize the public behind long-term grand strategies (1996). This has been seen across successive administrations (Leigh, 2019), and most recently with Biden using the term “most serious competitor’. In addition, US domestic interests have shaped the discourse, which is evident in coalition-building within the government and advocacy groups like the US Navy during the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Moreover, a peace theory posits that non-democracies are often perceived as having aggressive intentions in the absence of cooperative measures. The Biden administration's emphasis on the authoritarianism versus democracy prism exemplifies this perspective. Ultimately, these three prisms helped the establishment of a Pax Americana, framing the discourse as a dichotomy between 'us versus them' and emphasizing a narrative of 'strategic competition.'Arguably, this process enables the US to justify its utilization of hard power against China and has been criticized for steering US-China relations towards increasingly tense territory, potentially becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. 

China’s response 

Beijing's response to the perceived threat posed by China's rise since 1990 has been to use multilateralism and the win-win strategy, presenting itself as a peaceful actor while leveraging geoeconomic tools to compete with the US's grand political strategy. The establishment of the Belt and Road Initiative has been seen as a response to the ‘China threat’ aimed at strengthening economic links with middle powers. This growing multilateralism, as encouraged by the Party, serves to offer an alternative worldview to the US-led rules-based order, advocating for an 'international order' rooted in UN leadership. By championing this approach, China seeks to move away from a simplistic binary view of the world and assert its own dominance. This has been paralleled by Xi’s assertion of a national rejuvenation and recent moves towards ‘strategic zones’, such as in the Middle East. This approach, which emphasizes soft power, as conceptualized by Nye (2004), presents a narrative of a peaceful China, contrasting with the US-centric threat narrative, as articulated by Weissman (2019). In fact, peace comes with economic rewards, as the examples of ASEAN and BRICS countries show. As China has 70 % shares of the BRICS GDP and more than half of its internal trade, economic dependence is framed in the language of multipolarity (Basu, 2020). This ‘carrot and stick’ narrative faces challenges, including a slowing economy and growing domestic issues, which have tempered China's ability to act as a global lender. Despite these challenges, recent BRI summits underscore China's unwavering commitment to positioning itself as a leading force in shaping a new world order, often accompanied by proposals for AI-driven global governance. Thus, China seeks to counteract binary discourse by promoting a multilateral discourse that acknowledges the US as a competitor. 

New World Order?

Where do the Middle powers stand, and what should we make of India and rising powers? Arguments made by both the Chinese and Americans about a new cold war, coupled with rising distrust between the two countries, leave other countries wary of both structures. Indeed, a study has demonstrated that when citizens from countries across the globe are asked questions, more than 50% still adhere to American ideals. However, they also hold a more ambivalent view of China, particularly since the Ukraine War (Garton, 2023). This showcases a new rhetoric of multi-alignment, a term coined by the Indian leader Modi. Multi-alignment represents the ability of countries to effectively choose their alliances based on policies (Afzal, 2023). This flexibility has been exemplified by Saudi Arabia, which, while following Chinese diplomatic leadership in the Iran/Saudi deal, continues to engage in dialogue with the US. Whilst Western observers argue that this multi-alignment is a tool utilized by China to weaken the influence of the US, BRICS do represent a rising multipolar world. In fact, whilst it is still much weaker than the G7 in economic terms, it will soon grow to 11 members with the addition of Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This emerging coalition is cautious of Western structures, viewing sanctions as detrimental to their interests and questioning the moral justification of Russian involvement in Ukraine compared to US interventions worldwide.

Conclusion 

To conclude, whilst great powers remain entrenched in binary and multilateral mindsets, countries around the world are increasingly engaging in relations a la carte. A multipolar world is emerging, raising the question of whether both China and the US are ready to challenge their vision of a new world order. One area of cooperation lies in establishing a multilateral technology policy, as there has been a decrease in traditional military power and the escalating interdependence of data and internet networks, notwithstanding China's Great Firewall. America must reassess its export controls as they currently fail to serve American interests or rejuvenate technology policy. Drawing inspiration from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the nation should prioritize fostering collaboration and asserting its interests to enhance global cooperation.

References 

Afzal, M., Riedel, B., & Sachs, N. (February 2023). The United States, China, and the “New Non-Aligned” Countries. Global China, Brookings. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/FP_20230213_china_regional_strategy.pdf

Allen G. (2020), “Understanding AI Technology,” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Joint Artificial Intelligence Center). Retrieved from https://www.ai.mil/docs/Understanding%20AI%20Technology.pdf

Allison, G. (2018). Destined for War. Scribe Publications.

Basu, T. (2020). Sino-US Disorder: Power and Policy in Post-COVID Indo-Pacific. Journal of Asian Economic Integration, 2(2), 159-179. https://doi.org/10.1177/2631684620940448

Christensen, T. J. (1996). Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Garton Ash, T. (2023, November 17). In our new world disorder, the old bipolar frames of reference won’t get us anywhere. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/in-our-new-world-disorder-the-old-bipolar-frames-of-reference-wont-get-us-anywhere/

Leigh, M. (April 2019). Is multi-alignment a path to chaos or order? Published by Johns Hopkins University Press. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2019.0009

Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. PublicAffairs.

Thucydides. 1997. History of the Peloponnesian War.

Weissmann, M. (2019). Understanding Power (Shift) in East Asia: The Sino-US Narrative Battle about Leadership in the South China Sea. Asian Perspective, 43(2), 223-248.

William R. (2020). Crafting a multilateral technology and cybersecurity policy. Retrieved fromhttps://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Future-U.S.-policy-toward-China-v8.pdf

Winkler, S. C. (2023). Strategic Competition and US–China Relations: A Conceptual Analysis. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 16(3), 333–356. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poad008