China, Russia, and Censorship

By Poorvi Hosabettu

Internet Censorship in China

Chinese censorship now functions primarily through the Internet, an expansive modern-day source of information. China practices both surveillance and censorship of its citizens’ internet usage. It has developed its own internet filtering software, which prevents its citizens from accessing political content and non-Chinese internet sites and services (MacKinnon, 2006). Internet Content Providers (ICPs) in China are required to filter politically sensitive content – whether their own or uploaded by users – to maintain their business license. If ICPs are caught being negligent and/or displaying politically charged content, they may receive warnings from state security organs and eventually face revocation of their business license. Search engines also have a list of keywords they routinely tailor their search results by, blocking potentially inflammatory content from appearing in search results. 

The Chinese government has developed an efficient system to reduce its workload in internet censorship, part of which is known as the Great Firewall of China (Xu, 2016). While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains official lists of banned keywords used for internet filtering, but these lists are not directly provided to Internet Content Providers (ICPs). Instead, ICPs engage in educated guesswork, constantly testing what content is likely to be flagged through a trial-and-error process. They possess a general understanding of the government's preferences, often erring on the side of caution by over-blocking content and limiting traffic/information on their site. This approach aims to avoid potential Party disapproval, relying on instinct rather than risking under-blocking, even if the content doesn't explicitly violate any laws or regulations. Google, Yahoo!, and other prominent internet giants function as ICPs in China, assuming the role of censors instead of the government. Thus, the CCP stipulates the large-scale blocking of information without expending as much manual effort, delegating the work to the players on the internet instead.

State-sponsored media across borders

China’s attempt at controlling the narrative of Chinese media and government has extended well beyond its own borders. There is a slew of Chinese state-sponsored journalists who are building an international follower base on social media under the guise of being independent writers. Particularly, their proficiency in English has enabled these reporters to gain a global audience for spreading rampant disinformation, often concealed within seemingly innocent sponsored posts. There is also an increasing demand by the Chinese Communist Party for influencers to promote Chinese tourism destinations in locations facing allegations of human rights violations and to engage in other forms of propaganda across multiple languages. Despite the efforts of the social media giants to reduce the reach of state-affiliated media by restricting paid promotion and advertising, China’s systematic removal of affiliation labels has made this restriction a lot harder, and state media’s reach a lot wider (Schoenmakers, 2022). 

The Collaboration with Russia

The cooperation between Russia and China has been deepening due to their shared interest in controlling internet information and a “shared distaste for the United States and the West” (Bandurski, 2022). Both countries have imposed stricter controls on the international information available to their respective domestic audiences, particularly targeting content that poses a threat to their authority.

Russia has sparked global outrage for its methods of warfare in Ukraine, and is reporting disinformation to its own populace of “sparing civilian sites,” despite evidence to the contrary (Amnesty International, 2022). Collaboration between the two countries has deepened over the course of the invasion, with China also relaying these claims to its own population. Internationally, Beijing has kept its claims intentionally vague regarding the direction of China's support, but domestically, they are crafting a different narrative (Bureau, 2022). During a press conference in March 2022, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian purported false claims of the presence of US biological labs in Ukraine to support Russia’s invasion (Zhao, 2022). This was picked up by over 17 state media outlets within a matter of hours, quickly becoming the top trending hashtag on China’s most popular social media platform, Weibo. With both the Russian and Chinese populations mostly isolated from the global internet, they are largely dependent on state-controlled news outlets to stay informed about global events.

Aligned with this perspective, China has spoken about its own vision of “Cyber Sovereignty,” a version of the internet that would be much more tightly monitored and regulated by countries, thereby limiting the freedom of the global online space (Sherman, 2019). Russia was among the first countries to endorse this vision, the two nations advocated for the 'internationalization of Internet governance,' emphasizing the demand for equal sovereign power among countries in regulating the Internet (Russia and China Call for Internationalization of Internet Governance — Statement, 2022). 

Recently leaked reports

Russia has been regarded as a late entrant in the realm of internet censorship, blocking access to sites like Facebook and other social media well after countries like China had already done so. Russia relies less on the technical finesse and underhanded methodology of censorship that China employs. Instead, it employs a more direct approach through a set of laws that criminalize government criticism and use intimidation to ensure compliance from Internet service providers (ICPs) and other groups.​​(Bandurski, 2022). Adding to this is the cooperation between Russia and China. Recently leaked reports provide evidence of multiple high-level meetings held between China's internet regulator, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), and its Russian counterpart, Roskomnadzor, in both 2017 and 2019. In May 2019, the Russian government hosted Fang Binxing, the computer scientist largely responsible for China’s internet censorship. Subsequently, Russia enacted a law known as the “Iron Curtain,” granting the country significantly heightened control over the flow of the Internet. (Bandurski, 2022). The Iron Curtain allows the government to both cut off Russian internet from the rest of the world and give them a “legal basis for mass surveillance” (Schulze, 2019).  

Conclusion

China’s extensive internet censorship network is essential to maintaining the web of alternative news and information it presents to its citizens. But with an increasingly globalized world and technological advancements that have grown more accessible to the common man, this is proving to be a far more difficult task than before. Its partnership with Russia in this effort has proven fruitful for both countries, as they share technology and methodology in reducing the internet freedom of both citizens and commercial bodies in the country. While up till now, China employed more roundabout methods like random ISP-blocking, filtering online search results, and planting state-sponsored media channels and journalists globally, Russian influence is likely to encourage China to use more straightforward legal techniques in controlling the online flow of information.

References

Amnesty International. (2022, August 4). Ukraine: Ukrainian Fighting Tactics Endanger Civilians. Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/08/ukraine-ukrainian-fighting-tactics-endanger-civilians/

Bandurski, D. (2022, March 11). China and Russia are joining forces to spread disinformation. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/china-and-russia-are-joining-forces-to-spread-disinformation/

Bureau, S. M. and Cnn. B. (2022, March 10). China’s promotion of Russian disinformation indicates where its loyalties lie. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/10/china/china-russia-disinformation-campaign-ukraine-intl-dst-hnk/index.html

MacKinnon, R. (2006, August). “Race to the Bottom”: Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship: II. How Censorship Works in China: A Brief Overview. Www.hrw.org; Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/3.htm

Russia and China call for internationalization of Internet governance — statement. (2022, February 4). TASS. https://tass.com/economy/1398177

Schoenmakers, K. (2022, January 7). Personal Brands for Party Agendas. China Media Project. https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/01/07/personal-brands-for-party-agendas/

Schulze, E. (2019, November). Russia just brought in a law to try to disconnect its internet from the rest of the world. CNBC; CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/01/russia-controversial-sovereign-internet-law-goes-into-force.html

Sherman, J. (2019, October 30). How Much Cyber Sovereignty is Too Much Cyber Sovereignty? Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-much-cyber-sovereignty-too-much-cyber-sovereignty

Xu, Y. (2016, March 8). Deconstructing the Great Firewall of China | ThousandEyes. Www.thousandeyes.com. https://www.thousandeyes.com/blog/deconstructing-great-firewall-china

Zhao, L. (2022, March 8). Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference.