Abstract

During Donald Trump’s first term as US President, relations improved between China and Japan, two bitter East Asian rivals who sought to mutually overcome the negative effects of Trump’s transactionalism and aggressive trade policy. While bilateral relations have once again deteriorated over recent years, upcoming security talks between the two countries are raising hopes of another thaw in Sino-Japanese relations. I will argue, however, that the two countries will find it difficult to meaningfully improve ties due to mutual distrust, fundamental cleavages relating to China’s rise, regional conflicts, and a likely resilient, even if somewhat turbulent, US–Japan alliance under Trump.

Introduction

On the last days of 2024, Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya met with Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his first trip to China, resulting in an agreement between the two countries to set up bilateral talks concerning contentious security issues (Moritsugu & Yamaguchi, 2024). The two countries have a robust economic relationship, as China is Japan’s second-largest trading partner, whereas Japan is China’s largest trading partner. However, over the last few years, political tensions have been frequent between the two Asian neighbors, concerning, among other issues, the ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, Chinese military activity in and around Japanese waters and airspace, and the journey of a Japanese Navy destroyer through the Taiwan Strait in July (Johnson, 2024). 

Optimism about the talks is prevalent in both Chinese and Japanese media (“Now Is the Right Time,” 2024; “Japan, China Can Work Together,”  2024). An opinion piece in the South China Morning Post even argues that due to Donald Trump’s re-election and stark political changes in Japan and South Korea, China has a chance to “hasten the breakup” of the US–ROK–Japan alliance and “win over” the two US allies (Cao & Cao, 2024). In this article, however, I will argue that while Trump’s return to the White House may offer China an opportunity to mend ties with Japan, achieving anything more than pragmatic cooperation will prove to be difficult. Continued fundamental cleavages between China and Japan and the US–Japan alliance—facing challenges but nevertheless resilient—will likely continue to hinder any profound improvement in relations between the two Asian nations.

Trump’s Transactionalism as an Opportunity For China

The effects of Donald Trump’s foreign policy, which has so far been highly focused on protectionism, transactions, and equality in international partnerships, may lead both China and Japan to seek a closer relationship during Trump’s second term as US president. During his first presidency, the fallout from Trump’s trade war with China caused Beijing to turn to Japan for trade, which was accompanied by high-level visits between the countries not seen for years. At the same time, contentious political issues were largely overlooked (Eves, 2024). Japan, too, was faced with a high tariff on its steel imports to the US (“US and Japan Agree,” 2022). Trump has already promised another 10% tariff on imports from China (Hoskins, 2024), which, along with possible direct tariffs on Japanese imports, would also heavily hurt Japan’s economy (Goodman, 2024; “Trump Tariffs,” 2024). Thus, the upcoming security talks between China and Japan likely foreshadow another period of closer economic cooperation between the two countries as they seek to soften the coming blow from Trump’s trade policies.

Moreover, the US–Japan alliance could face challenges under Trump, as the incoming president may push Japan to contribute more to its defense spending to align with the scale of the US military presence in the country. During his first term, Trump demanded Tokyo to quadruple its payments to US troops in Japan and complained about the inequality of the alliance since Japan is not obligated to defend the United States in case of an attack (Seligman & Gramer, 2019; Higgins, 2019). The Trump administration may force Japan to increase its defense spending further, which will only achieve the NATO-level target of two percent of GDP in 2027. Earlier this year, a senior defense official appointee in the incoming Trump cabinet urged Japan to increase its defense spending to 3%, a difficult target considering Japan’s current budgetary pressures (Wintour, 2024). Given Trump’s transactionalist approach, if Japan were to fall short of meeting his demands, it is plausible that he might resort to strong rhetoric directed at Tokyo. This could be coupled with economic actions or even hints at reducing the US military presence in Japan, the likes of which he directed against South Korea during his first term (Martin, 2024). Such developments may damage Japanese trust in the US and make it easier for China to approach Japan as a stable, pragmatic partner.

Continued Obstacles

Nevertheless, it is also certain that China and Japan will have to overcome significant hurdles if they wish to improve bilateral relations meaningfully. A recent poll revealed that a very large majority of Japanese and Chinese citizens continue to hold negative opinions of each other’s countries (“Nearly 90%,” 2024). In addition to topics such as World War II history and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute that have contributed to simmering tensions between the two countries for decades, the last few years have seen the rise of several new bitter points of contention. Both countries have hardened their conflicting stances on the Taiwan issue; China expressed outrage over Japan’s release of treated Fukushima wastewater into the ocean, and Japan is concerned by China’s recent arrests of Japanese nationals over allegations of espionage, as well as two stabbings of Japanese individuals in China this year (“Nearly 90%,” 2024).

Some progress has been made on a few issues, such as China agreeing to gradually lift its seafood import ban on Japan, which was enacted following the release of Fukushima wastewater (“Japan, China Can Work Together,” 2024). However, in more fundamental questions, it is hard to see how the two nations could achieve a common understanding in the near future. Japan is anxious about China’s rise and its influence in East Asia in particular, which has led to debates about a possible reform of its pacifist constitution. Japan’s possible remilitarization, in turn, has raised concern in China about a renewed threat from its previously belligerent neighbor (Eves, 2024). Moreover, with the US and China continuing to wage a war of influence across the world, it is highly unlikely that even a Washington under Trump would allow Japan, the world’s third-largest economy, to draw meaningfully closer to the US’ main strategic rival. Trump’s isolationist views could somewhat weaken the US–ROK–Japan alliance over the next four years, carving out an opportunity for China to strengthen ties with the two countries. While Trump will likely add pressure on Japan and Korea to contribute more to the alliance, this will not mean abandoning these two key allies in Asia, considering Trump’s fundamental views on China and the presence of China hawks such as Marco Rubio and Michael Waltz in his incoming administration (Eves, 2024).

Meanwhile, Japanese public support for the country’s alliance with the US has remained strong (Kafura et al., 2022), while the country’s incumbent Prime Minister, Shigeru Ishiba, has floated the idea of an Asian NATO (Ishiba, 2024). He has also argued for a more equal alliance between his country and the US, one where Japan could also contribute to the defense of the US, seemingly addressing President Trump’s earlier concerns (Ishiba, 2024). While Ishiba’s weak domestic position could cause tensions within the US–Japan alliance (Suzuki, 2024), I argue that it is highly unlikely that Ishiba’s minority government, or any Japanese government in the coming years, would significantly depart from the status quo concerning the US. Given Japan’s enormous economic dependence on Washington—nearly a fifth of Japanese exports go to the US (“Japanese Foreign Trade in Figures,” 2024)—it is unlikely that Japan will significantly test the boundaries of its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the US in the near future.

Conclusion

With the return of Trump’s transactional foreign policy, China and Japan may again seek to temporarily bury the hatchet and seek to improve short- to medium-term economic relations, which understandably also requires some dialogue on security issues. However, any further rapprochement between the two nations appears unlikely due to unresolved fundamental issues, Japan’s commitment to its US alliance, and Washington’s low likelihood of allowing its most important partner in Asia to draw significantly closer to the US’ main strategic rival. However, with talks of high-level official visits between China and Japan in 2025, the world can at least hope for some easing of tensions in East Asia against the backdrop of a worryingly tumultuous world.