ጽድቅና ኵነኔ ቢኖርም ባይኖርም ከክፋት ደግነት ሳይሻል አይቀርም

(Ethiopian proverb: “Whether righteousness and  torment  do  exist  or  not, generosity is better than iniquity”) (Ermias, 2020)

Abstract

For several reasons, 2024 saw an escalation in relations between Egypt and Ethiopia. The first is the issue of using Ethiopia’s Hidāsē dam. The second is Ethiopia's recognition of Somaliland to gain sea access. The disagreement between the two regional leaders appears to be temporary and situational, the reasons for the confrontation between these states go back a long way. The goal of this study is to identify the key factors influencing the Ethiopian-Egyptian conflict. The author concludes that Egypt and Ethiopia are facing each other as geopolitical adversaries but stand with their backs to each other as economic partners.

1. Historical context

Since antiquity, the valley of the great African river Nile has been not only the scene of fierce geopolitical rivalry between the Egyptians and the ‘Ethiopians’ (from the Greek Αἰθίοψ, ‘tanned, burnt face’) but also a place of active inter-civilisational interaction. The Egyptians moved steadily up the Nile through the rapids to expand their state’s borders and try to control the trade route from the Horn of Africa, which carried the flow of goods from Arabia and sub-Saharan Africa. Dynasties and millennia changed, but the geopolitical struggle for the Nile between the ‘mouth’ (North) and the ‘source’ (South) did not stop. Egypt often won, but sometimes, taking advantage of the weakening of a formidable rival, the South took revenge and even imposed its ‘Ethiopian’ dynasty on Egypt. However, it should be borne in mind that Ethiopia (aka ‘the kingdom of Kush’) in those times primarily understood the territory of modern Sudan. Ethiopia proper (Damaat, created by aliens from the Arabian Peninsula, then the kingdom of Axum as its successor) became one of the main geopolitical opponents of Egypt only at the turn of the millennium. The Roman Empire (and later Byzantium), having made Egypt its province, regarded Axum as the most important geopolitical actor in the region and had to reckon with its interests.

At the same time, the civilisational and cultural interaction between the North and South of the Nile Valley was mutually beneficial for a long period. For example, around 330 A.D., Axum became the third Christianised state in the world (after Armenia and the Roman Empire). Christianity and the Greek language came to Axum through Egypt. However, this fact became a factor in the serious civilisational situation after the conquest of Egypt by Muslim Arabs in the 7th century A.D. (Ethiopia remained independent and Christian).  Speaking of the religious factor in Ethiopian–Egyptian relations, one cannot fail to mention that today, about 35 million Muslims live in Ethiopia, or about 31 percent of the country’s total population (World Population Review, 2024a). Conversely, Egypt is home to about 10 percent of the Christian population (World Population Review, 2024b). Such statistics result from cultural exchange and interaction over the course of historical development, but some researchers look at religious differences from another angle. For example, S. Huntington, in his famous work ‘The Clash of Civilisations,’ argues as follows: “Some Westerners, including President Bill Clinton, have argued that the West does not have problems with Islam but only with violent Islamist extremists. Fourteen hundred years of history demonstrate otherwise. The relations between Islam and Christianity, both Orthodox and Western, have often been stormy” (Huntington, 1996). From his point of view, Ethiopian-Egyptian contradictions can be explained by civilisational differences. On the other hand, it would be naive to assume that all the contradictions between the countries are merely cultural. One of the episodes of this rift was the Egyptian–Ethiopian war of the nineteenth century.

In the early 1870s, Egypt wanted to expand its territories in East Africa. At that time, Egypt was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. In the 1860s, Egypt received some Ottoman territories that became legally assigned to it. “In 1868 Turkey gave him the port of Massawa, and in the early 70's under Egyptian control was already the entire coast from Zeila to Guardafui. The plans of the khedive also included the expansion of Egyptian possessions at the expense of the north-eastern regions of Ethiopia” (Tsypkin & Yagua, 1989). In Ethiopia during that period, there was feudal fragmentation, as local rulers had more regional power than the emperor. The Egyptians saw this as an opportunity to seize new territories and expand their zone of influence.

The military campaign was unsuccessful for the Egyptian army, primarily because of the enemy’s numerical superiority. It is worth noting that the Ethiopian emperor tried to mobilise the population using religious factors. It is well known that Egypt is a Muslim country, and the majority of the Ethiopian population are Christians. That is why Emperor Yohannis spoke about the ‘expulsion of Muslims’ from the ancestral territory of the state. As a result, the war ended with the complete defeat of Egypt and the strengthening of the central power in Ethiopia. However, the peace treaty itself, mediated by the British Empire, was signed in 1884, giving great preference to Ethiopia (Ram, 2009). 

Thus, although the disagreement between the two contemporary regional leaders, Egypt and Ethiopia, appears at first glance to be temporary and situational, the author suggests that, in reality, the reasons for the confrontation between these states go back a long way. In this struggle for influence, the author examines various aspects, such as economic, geopolitical, and military. The goal of this study is to identify the key factors influencing the contemporary Ethiopian–Egyptian conflict.

The methodology of this study relies primarily on the historical method (which examines any phenomenon and fact in its historical development) and comparative analysis.

The literature devoted to this topic includes a large number of scientific books and articles. Among them is the research of Erlich and Haggai ("Haile Sellassie and the Arabs, 1935-1936". 1994. Northeast African Studies, 1(1), 47–61; "Identity and Church: Ethiopian—Egyptian Dialogue, 1924-59". 2000. International Journal of Middle East Studies. 32(1): 23–46), Yihun, Belete Belachew ("Battle over the Nile: The Diplomatic Engagement between Ethiopia and Egypt, 1956-1991". 2024. International Journal of Ethiopian Studies. 8(1 & 2): 73–100), Ali, Faisal (Egypt backs Somalia in dispute over Ethiopia-Somaliland deal". 2024), and G. Markus, Harold (2002). A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley, California: University of California, etc.

Official sources also were used (for instance, (1) Brief History of Egyptian-Ethiopian relations - Ministry of Foreign Affairs". Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Egypt), (2) "Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan Should Negotiate Mutually Beneficial Agreement over Management of Nile Waters, Top Official Tells Security Council//UN Press," and (3) "Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Agreement within Reach, Under-Secretary-General Tells Security Council, as Trilateral Talks Proceed to Settle Remaining Differences//UN Press"), with additions of mass media articles (for instance, (1) Egypt and Ethiopia vow to defuse Blue Nile dam row. BBC News; (2) Nile Basin countries experts negotiation in Khartoum marked with disputes//Egypt Independent; (3) Ethiopia determined to construct Renaissance Dam: ambassador//Egypt Independent; (4) Ethiopian dam project to include Egypt and Sudan//Egypt Independent; and (5) Minister: Diversion of Blue Nile no indication that Egypt approves of dam//Egypt Independent etc.).

2. Current geopolitical context and the strengths of the parties

Egypt and Ethiopia are now contenders for the role of regional leadership in North East Africa. From the perspective of political realist theory, large states, in pursuit of their national interests and using instruments of force, inevitably seek to expand their dominance at the expense of their neighbours. The next section examines what are the forces of the parties.

2.1 The forces of the parties

Modern Egypt and Ethiopia are the strongest actors in the North-East Africa region. Ethiopia's population (about 120 million) is the largest in Africa (after Nigeria). Egypt's population is slightly smaller than Ethiopia's (about 110 million). However, Egypt’s GDP is significantly larger than Ethiopia’s. Ethiopia is also far behind Egypt on the Human Development Index (ranked 173rd versus Egypt's 116th). In addition, Ethiopia has much greater ethnic, linguistic (over 100 languages), and religious diversity (fraught with internal conflict) than Egypt. Arabs (Arabised Egyptians) comprise about 85% of Egypt's population (Coptic Christians 10–15%). In comparison, in Ethiopia, the largest peoples are Oromo (35% of the total population) and Amhara (25%), and Christians of all denominations make up only about 60% of the faithful. It is no coincidence that Ethiopia has been the scene of fierce inter-ethnic warfare for many years. However,  Ethiopia's greatest geopolitical vulnerability is its lack of access to the sea, which was lost in 1993 after the Ethiopian province of Eritrea seceded following its bitter, long-running war of independence. A problem for Egypt is Islamic radicals actively fighting the country's government (especially in the Sinai Peninsula). So, it is not surprising that both Ethiopia and Egypt spend quite a lot of money on their armed forces. 

Many rankings in the world compare the armed forces of different countries. The Army Strength Index takes into account more than 50 criteria, so it can be taken as one of the most detailed ones. According to the latest Army Strength Index, Egypt is ranked 15th with a score of 0.2283, while Ethiopia is ranked 49th at 0.7938 (Global Firepower, 2024). Of course, it can be noted that this index is not the only or completely objective index. However, it can help us analyse and compare the forces in the region.

Comparing the capabilities of Ethiopia and Egypt is necessary for several reasons. First, it assesses the prospect of open confrontation in the future. Second, it enables us to understand which side can use economic and military superiority as an instrument of political pressure.