From Washington to Tokyo: The Ripple Effects of the U.S. Presidential Election

Ziya (Helen) Guo

Abstract

This article examines the potential implications of the U.S. presidential election on Japan, focusing on how divergent foreign policies under Donald Trump and Kamala Harris could reshape U.S.-Japan relations and impact Asia-Pacific stability. A Trump administration may pressure Tokyo to bear greater defense responsibilities while injecting strategic unpredictability. Conversely, a Harris presidency promises policy continuity but raises concerns over her limited foreign policy experience. The analysis underscores Japan’s need for strategic flexibility and proactive measures, emphasizing multilateral cooperation to safeguard national interests in a rapidly evolving geopolitical environment.


Introduction

As the United States approaches the peak of its election season, the new president, to be elected on November 5, may significantly alter the trajectory of American foreign policy, hinging on the contrasting governance philosophies of Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. For Japan and the broader Asia-Pacific region, the outcome of this election is of paramount importance, as it could profoundly influence regional dynamics. The U.S.-Japan alliance, a cornerstone of regional security and stability, is poised to undergo strategic shifts based on the policies of the next administration, whether these policies fortify the alliance or introduce new strategic uncertainties. The stark differences between Trump and Harris in their foreign policy approaches are likely to impact this critical partnership in distinct ways. Which administration's policies would better align with Japan’s national interests? This article seeks to explore these pressing questions, analyzing the key features of both candidates' foreign policies and assessing their potential implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance and the broader stability of the Asia-Pacific region, while uncovering the ripple effects that may emanate from Washington to Tokyo.

Donald Trump

Considerable uncertainty remains regarding how a Trump administration 2.0 might approach diplomatic affairs in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in terms of U.S.-Japan relations. This uncertainty primarily stems from Trump's unpredictable policy style and frequent vacillation in decision-making (Grossman, 2024).

Donald Trump's foreign and security policies have often been characterized as manifestations of isolationism, with his core concept of "America First" being particularly pronounced during his presidency from 2017 to 2021. Scholars and commentators have frequently used this term to summarize his administration’s foreign policy orientation (Takahashi, 2024). A key feature of the Trump administration was its prioritization of national self-interest, often disregarding the long-term value of international cooperation. Upon taking office, Trump withdrew the United States from several critical international agreements, citing the "severe financial and economic burden" imposed on America as a justification for exiting the Paris Agreement, a vital accord aimed at combating global climate change (TRT WORLD, 2018). Furthermore, the United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and UNESCO, reflecting a rejection of multilateral frameworks and a tendency to recalibrate international relations through unilateral actions, ultimately destabilizing the structure of multilateral cooperation.

Additionally, Trump harbored overt skepticism toward America’s traditional allies (Takahashi, 2024). He openly criticized "unequal military alliances," with the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance being a prominent example, expressing his dissatisfaction with the alliance (Cohen, 2019); h. He claimed that if Japan were attacked, the United States would have to sacrifice "lives and wealth" to defend Japan, while if the United States were attacked, Japan would not be obligated to respond militarily and could "watch the conflict unfold on a Sony television" (Cohen, 2019). This critique of the asymmetry in defense obligations alarmed Tokyo, especially in 2019, when the Trump administration reportedly demanded that Japan increase its share of the cost of hosting U.S. troops by five times—a proposal that Tokyo resolutely rejected (Takahashi, 2024). Mori Satoru, a professor at Keio University, noted that "Trump's view was that America's security interests could be isolated from those of other countries and regions, suggesting that U.S. peace and prosperity could exist independently from the rest of the world" (Takahashi, 2024). This perspectivesituation strained America's relationships with its once-critical allies and partners, stalling previously close cooperative efforts. The U.S.-Japan alliance, in particular, experienced significant challenges in trust and coordination, failing to continue its historical "honeymoon period." This stagnation could affect collaboration in security, economic engagement, and regional affairs, ultimately diminishing the alliance's ability to maintain stability and deterrence in the Asia-Pacific region.

However, another possibility is that Trump’s new administration might simply resume the Indo-Pacific framework strategy in place in 2019 (Grossman, 2024). This strategy aligns with the overarching policy direction of the Biden administration in terms of great power competition and strengthening alliances and partnerships while continuing to view countering China as one of its core objectives. It is worth noting that Trump had successfully established a close personal relationship with former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (Johnstone & Szechenyi, 2024). Despite criticisms of Trump’s administration for accusing Japan of “free-riding” on U.S. security guarantees, his diplomatic moves provided Tokyo with a strategic buffer, helping Japan avoid direct security challenges (Johnstone & Szechenyi, 2024). Under Trump's leadership, the U.S. explicitly recognized Japan as its foremost strategic partner in Asia and further supported Abe’s regional strategic vision, promoting the concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” This vision aimed to maintain peace and prosperity in one of the world’s most dynamic regions by strengthening regional cooperation and economic connectivity to ensure the stability and fairness of the international order (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013).

The close relationship between the U.S. and Japan has been reinforced and deepened under President Biden and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Under Kishida’s leadership, Tokyo initiated historic defense developments in 2022, planning to nearly double defense spending by 2027 (Tsuneo, 2023). The National Defense Strategy explicitly outlines Japan's goal to enhance joint deterrence and response capabilities within the U.S.-Japan alliance to achieve its defense objectives (Ministry of Defense, 2022). These military modernization efforts reflect Japan’s deep concerns about the future regional security environment and showcase its forward-looking strategies to address potential changes in U.S.-Japan relations. Japan currently faces a complex and severe security situation, surrounded by three nuclear-armed states—China, North Korea, and Russia—making the security challenges even more pressing. Given this uncertainty, Tokyo must prepare comprehensively for possible crises on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. In this increasingly perilous security environment, Japan’s dependence on Washington’s support has grown significantly, underscoring the urgent need for the U.S. to remain a stable and reliable ally to counter multifaceted threats.

If Trump were to return to office, his tough stance on burden-sharing among allies could compel Tokyo to shoulder more defense responsibilities. However, Japan’s recent investments in defense and enhancements in military capabilities may lay a stronger foundation for bilateral cooperation, granting Japan greater strategic leverage in addressing future pressures within the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Despite the uncertainties surrounding the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance if Trump were to win, some voices remain optimistic, suggesting that new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba could establish a solid relationship with Trump (Takahashi, 2024). Certain analysts argue that Ishiba and Trump share similar thinking patterns, potentially facilitating communication between the two leaders. As Masaharu Sato, a former chief intelligence analyst at Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasized in a speech in Tokyo on October 2: “Ishiba and Trump operate on the same (psychological) operating system. I believe their perspectives on numerous issues align surprisingly well due to their similar thought processes” (Takahashi, 2024). This potential common ground could provide a stabilizing factor for U.S.-Japan relations amid complex international dynamics, though much will depend on whether the two sides can reach concrete policy agreements.

Kamala Harris

In an article published in The Diplomat, Takahashi Kosuke (2024) points out that many officials within the Japanese government may be more inclined to support a Harris administration over a second Trump term. If Harris is elected president, she is expected to broadly continue the existing foreign, security, and economic policies of the Biden administration, which is crucial for the current smooth and stable U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship. The Japanese government hopes to maintain this policy continuity under Harris’s leadership to solidify the cooperative achievements made in recent years. The U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders' Statement in April 2024 highlighted that, through the joint efforts of President Biden and former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, the U.S.-Japan alliance has “reached unprecedented heights” and has evolved into a genuine global partnership (The Government of Japan, 2024). This strategic partnership extends beyond traditional security cooperation to deep collaboration on global issues such as climate change, supply chain security, and emerging technologies (The Government of Japan, 2024).

If Kamala Harris assumes office, the U.S.-Japan relationship is expected to continue its “honeymoon period” under the leadership of her administration, providing continuity for America’s Asia foreign policy, particularly in supporting Japan against China. The Biden administration has dedicated itself to deepening bilateral cooperation with Japan and strengthening multilateral ties with other regional allies in response to China’s growing influence. With the U.S.-Japan alliance as a cornerstone, the United States has advanced strategic collaborations with Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea across the Indo-Pacific. This has further solidified the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) framework, comprising the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India. Such regional cooperation aims not only to counter China’s rise but also to promote long-term security and stability in the Indo-Pacific, offering regional allies a more reliable collective defense system while bolstering America’s leadership role in Asia-Pacific affairs.

However, international politics and Japan Sstudies expert Chris Hughes highlights that compared to Biden, Harris's relative lack of experience in foreign affairs may concern the Japanese government (Benoza & Johnson, 2024). Harris’s career began as a district attorney before she became California's Attorney General and later, in 2017, a U.S. Senator (The White House, 2021). Despite her strong domestic record, her background in international relations remains limited, and she has yet to present a coherent foreign policy framework or strategy. By contrast, current President Biden brings extensive experience and a well-established reputation in foreign affairs (Bremmer, 2024). As a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he has actively shaped national security debates for decades (Bremmer, 2024). During his tenure as Vice President under President Obama, he led significant diplomatic initiatives, including promoting nuclear nonproliferation and strengthening transatlantic alliances (Bremmer, 2024).

Harris's foreign policy experience has expanded during her tenure as Vice President, yet it still pales in comparison to Biden's extensive track record. This contrast has sparked concerns within the Japanese government, particularly against the backdrop of an increasingly complex international security environment. Japan’s leadership cannot help but question whether Harris possesses the necessary competence and political acumen to effectively address the challenges facing the Asia-Pacific region, such as the nuclear threat from the Korean Peninsula and China’s increasingly assertive geopolitical posture. For a nation that relies on stable diplomacy to maintain regional equilibrium, these doubts are especially significant, further shaping Japan’s expectations for the future of U.S.-Japan relations.

Another noteworthy point is that in early September 2024, Kamala Harris explicitly opposed the acquisition of Pittsburgh-based U.S. Steel by Japan's largest steelmaker, Nippon Steel, during a speech in Pittsburgh (Rogin, 2024). Following her remarks, The Washington Post reported that President Joe Biden planned to officially block the $14.9 billion deal on national security grounds, emphasizing that this iconic American company should remain under domestic ownership (Lynch, 2024; Rogin, 2024). From a short-term political perspective, this move is intended to help the Democratic Party garner more voter support, particularly in crucial industrial states. However, from a long-term economic standpoint, this decision has sparked serious concerns, especially from Japan. The intervention not only directly threatens the sustainability of Japanese investments in the United States but also risks undermining the strategic trust built over the years within the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The erosion of this trust could further constrain the depth and breadth of bilateral cooperation in key areas such as economic and security initiatives, compelling Japan to reassess its confidence in the United States as a global partner. Furthermore, these adverse effects may prompt Tokyo to adopt a more cautious approach in its future diplomatic and economic strategies, even considering broader multilateral cooperation mechanisms to mitigate risk. Additionally, this uncertainty has heightened Japan's doubts about whether the United States can consistently uphold its global cooperation commitments amid an increasingly complex international landscape. In the face of growing geopolitical challenges, maintaining a stable and mutually beneficial long-term relationship between the two nations becomes even more difficult, potentially impacting the overall strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region.


Conclusion 

The impact of the U.S. presidential election on Japan is highly complex, encompassing both uncertainties and potential opportunities. A potential Trump administration could bring policy shifts that would redefine U.S.-Japan relations and place greater pressure on Tokyo to shoulder more defense responsibilities. However, Japan’s recent investments in military capabilities and defense preparedness have provided a foundation for addressing these possible challenges. At the same time, Trump’s unpredictable decision-making style and foreign policy uncertainties may compel Japan to explore more flexible strategic options to safeguard its security interests.

Conversely, a Harris administration’s policy continuity could solidify the current bilateral relationship and offer Japan a more stable framework for cooperation, particularly in countering China’s growing influence. Nonetheless, Harris’s relatively limited foreign policy experience raises concerns in Tokyo about her ability to effectively navigate the complex international landscape. This apprehension underscores the U.S.-Japan alliance’s need for stable and predictable foreign policies to maintain strategic equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific region.

Therefore, Japanese policymakers and stakeholders must prepare proactively for possible political shifts. They should maintain strategic flexibility, actively pursue multilateral cooperation to mitigate the risks of overreliance on a single partner, and seek to uphold national interests amid a dynamic international environment. Japan’s future diplomatic and security policies will hinge on its ability to adapt to changes in U.S. leadership while striving for stability and long-term development in an era of uncertainty.

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