Gendered Nation: How a Reimagined Confucian Legacy Fuels Digital Sex Crimes in South Korea
Kristyna Simonova
Abstract
This paper explores the deep-rooted gender inequality in South Korea, tracing how the post-colonial elite has manipulated Confucian values to legitimise the gendered hierarchy under the pretense of fostering national identity and economic stability. It underscores how current legal and political frameworks not only fail to combat gender-based crimes but often exacerbate them, especially amid the recent rise of deepfake pornography. The paper concludes by proposing measures to combat digital sex crimes, emphasising, however, that lasting change requires a fundamental shift in the power structures and narratives that uphold inequality, as South Korea contends with a broader societal crisis.
During the Miss Korea 2024 competition, one contestant was asked: “If a deepfake video version of me is more attractive, how can I bridge the gap between that and the real me?” (Lee, 2024a). This came in the wake of the discovery of Telegram chat rooms hosting deepfake pornography that targeted hundreds of women (Barr, 2024). While the prompt was not explicitly directed at the use of artificial intelligence in producing illegal sexual content, it underscored a disturbing reality of South Korea. This culture not only condones but perpetuates the reduction of women to objects, whether through technology or societal expectations.
This paper argues that South Korea's ongoing crisis of digital sexual crimes is a manifestation of structural sexism, which is deliberately upheld by the elite. Through a top-down process, Confucian values are manipulated to legitimise this gender inequality, framing it as essential for maintaining the nation's cultural identity and economic prosperity.
This analysis will examine the current state of structural gender inequality in South Korea, analysing the limitations of contemporary political and legal systems in addressing these issues. It will aim to explain the persistence of sexism in the country by exploring how the elite have upheld a hierarchical system based on Confucianism to serve their interests. Authorities developed an official historiography shaped by the colonial experience and disseminated this narrative through the education system. The paper will also consider other influential factors, including the chaebol system, mandatory military service, and rapid technological growth. Structural sexism has recently manifested in deepfake pornography scandals enabled by the social media platform Telegram. Following an outline of potential solutions, this paper concludes that South Korea's sexual scandals reflect a wider societal crisis that can only be addressed by confronting the root issues of gender inequality.
Deepfake images are a "synthesis of fake images using artificial intelligence." In this paper, the term will specifically refer to "sexually explicit images distributed without the consent of the women they are based on" (Lee, 2024a). However, no single universally accepted definition of deepfake images has been established.
The Worsening State of Gender Relations
In 2022, South Korea elected its most recent president Yoon Suk Yeol, who during his campaign controversially asserted that structural sexism no longer exists and that discrimination is solely a personal matter (Kim & Son, 2022). He also criticised the Ministry of Gender and Family (MOGEF), accusing it of treating all men as “potential sexual criminals” (McCurry, 2022). After the resignation of the previous minister of MOGEF, the position remained vacant, and Yoon vowed to abolish the ministry altogether. Its budget has been significantly reduced, with cuts to the funding of the institution of Advocacy for Online Sexual Abuse Victims (ACOSAV) implemented despite the number of digital sexual crimes on the rise (Kim & Son, 2022).
This stance reflects broader gender inequality in the country. The lack of sexual education is the starting point for embedding harmful gender norms (Barr, 2024). A survey of the Korean government from 2018 indicated that “48.7% of Koreans believe that sexual assault can be prevented if women act as more sexually reserved” (Jo, 2018, as cited in Lee, 2021). A 2017 study of 2,000 South Korean men revealed that nearly 80% had physically or psychologically abused their girlfriends (Smith, 2017). In the workplace, it is still common for female employees to be relegated to menial tasks, such as preparing coffee or washing dishes. Women are furthermore considered as “lost labour”, expected to leave the workforce after giving birth (Shao & Lee, 2023), contributing to a staggering 31% gender pay gap in 2022 (Gong, 2024a).
The legal system's handling of sexual crimes further exacerbates this disparity. In 2023, the MOGEF announced a revision of the legal definition of rape to include non-consensual sexual relations. However, just a few hours later it was rejected by the Ministry of Justice. Convictions for sexual abuse remain low, as few victims come forward due to the fear of shame and a lack of faith in the justice system (Bergsten, 2023). Courts in this setting tend to interpret the law narrowly. For rape to be recognised, not only must violence or intimidation be present, but the victim must also be physically unable to resist. Mitigating factors such as the perpetrator's lack of a prior criminal record or claims of mental “weakness” at the time of the crime often reduce sentences (Public Interest Law Clinic et al., 2020).
Online exploitation faces even more challenges in South Korea's legal system. Digital sex abuse is not fully recognised as a serious crime since no physical contact occurs (Gong, 2024b). As a result, only 28% of digital sex offenders caught in 2021 were indicted (Min-Sik, 2022).
Why is sexual crime so widespread in South Korea? Many point to the lasting influence of Confucianism, which is perceived as a conservative social system that treats women as inferior, emphasising sacrifice and submission to family values above all (Seo, 2024; Penda, 2023; Shao & Lee, 2023). This is evident in the writings of Confucian scholars, like Mencius who regarded a woman's failure to have children as one of the gravest unfilial acts (Shao & Lee, 2023). This perspective reduces women to mere vessels for reproduction. Korea's system of inequality is thus to be traced back to its Confucian roots. However, this explanation overlooks the power dynamics at play and the role of the elite in shaping the nation's philosophy.
Confucianism as a Civil Religion Created by the Elite
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify that while Confucian values are hierarchical, they do not inherently portray women as inferior, nor do traditional gender roles imply an intrinsic inferiority. Rather, gender-based hierarchy is embedded in a spousal relationship, where the role of the wife is to follow. Some Confucian scholars advocate for a feminist reinterpretation of the philosophy, proposing that the marital relationship may be replaced with friendship, thereby eliminating the hierarchical structure (Rosenlee, 2023).
Confucianism is often interpreted as an intrinsic feature of Korean culture and society, treating it as an inevitable bottom-up cultural phenomenon. However, this perspective disregards the active role of the elite and the state in shaping Confucianism into a civil religion—a set of beliefs promoted as sacred to strengthen national identity (Kim & Connolly, 2021).
The purpose behind this was to foster national unity and create a community bound by shared goals for the future. Confucian ideals of harmony, rooted in family structures and hierarchical distinctions, were emphasised as essential for South Korea's industrialisation when the country was one of the poorest in the world (Kim & Connolly, 2021). Citizens were urged to sacrifice for the greater good, with this sacrifice framed as a path to equality with colonial powers, framing Koreans' subordination as a temporary consequence of material shortcomings that could be overcome through hard work and dedication (Choi, 1998).
Confucianism also justified existing power structures. Its emphasis on the absolute obedience of subjects to the ruler legitimised the restriction of civic freedoms, with the ruling elite presenting political participation and decentralisation as threats to national stability and economic progress (Moon, 1998). Further, individuals must prioritise collective interests over personal needs. As a result, the burden of welfare was placed on families themselves rather than the state, reinforcing the family-centric model of society, with women assuming the role of caregivers (Kim & Connolly, 2021).
South Korea's Confucian civil religion has been constructed through selective portrayals of its history. Due to the country’s colonial experience, its historical narrative is fragmented, allowing the elite to curate its history and promote a proud image of Korea as a culturally distinct nation despite foreign incursions (Kim & Connolly, 2021).
Post-Colonial Historiography Reinforcing Gender Hierarchy
South Korean official historiography was influenced by its colonial legacy. During colonial times, the East was cast as the primitive Other to the West and was often equated with the feminine. This feminisation portrayed the East as naturally submissive to the masculine West, advancing the notion that these nations were incapable of self-rule. This colonial framing was translated into gender dynamics. Women were not only seen as lesser because of their gender but also because they represented an inferior nation (Choi, 1998).
After independence, South Korea sought to overcome the stigma of being perceived as inferior by emulating the West and constructing a more “masculine” national identity. This shift was reflected in the official historiography, which promoted an androcentric tradition where men were credited with building the nation through involvement in war, while women's only contribution to the creation of the Korean nation was their reproductive function (Choi, 1998). Citizenship is then linked for men to military service, while for women to domestic duties (Moon, 1998). Gender hierarchy was framed as a fundamental part of the culture, demanded for South Korea's capitalist growth. It denied women the opportunity to challenge the position that was constructed for them during colonial oppression (Choi, 1998).
This narrative of Korean history was dispersed through the education system. In the 1970s, emphasis was placed on national identity in schools. Confucian virtues of filial piety and loyalty were emphasised as core values. Even today, subjects related to ethics—often titled “Good Citizenship” or “Citizen Ethics”—present to students Confucian values as the only acceptable standards of conduct, cementing them as social norms (Kim & Connolly, 2021).
However, while the framing of Confucianism by the elite plays a central role in shaping gender relations in South Korea, it is not the only factor. Other influences have contributed to the country’s unique gender dynamics, setting it apart from other nations impacted by Confucianism.
Additional Factors Shaping Gender Relations in South Korea
The South Korean chaebol system reinforces a specific form of elitism that seeks to maintain the status quo, including gender norms. The country’s economy is dominated by chaebols—family-run conglomerates. They have always been closely connected to those in positions of power, and although these ties have weakened, political leaders still rely on their support. Such connections have fostered a culture of corruption, where elites often escape accountability. This allows chaebols to perpetuate male-dominated leadership and traditional family structures limiting opportunities for women (Albert, 2018).
Mandatory military service plays a crucial role in shaping gender relations. Since no widely available studies specifically address the effects of Korean military service on attitudes toward gender, research from other countries becomes pertinent. Findings suggest that military experience can lead men to adopt more misogynistic views (Gibbons & Rossi, 2022). The military narrative frames war as a male domain, excluding women and portraying them—even if just implicitly—as vulnerable. Men are trained to be leaders reinforcing a gendered hierarchy (Robinson Kurpius & Lucart, 2000).
Lastly, South Korea's rapid technological growth must be considered, especially when it comes to the recent rise of digital sex crime. The country ranks first in the world for smartphone ownership and is known for the highest internet connectivity (Bae, 2024). This hyper-connected society has created new avenues for exploitation to whom everyone has access, and as such South Korea provides a unique environment where digital exploitation can proliferate. (Bae, 2024) This has become especially relevant in the recent surge of deepfake-related sexual crimes.
Persistent History of Digital Sexual Exploitation Scandals
South Korea has faced a troubling history of digital sexual crime scandals. Over the past decade, online harassment and spy cam pornography have become disturbingly common (Mackenzie & Choi, 2024). In 2020, the nation was shaken by the revelation of a sexual blackmail ring operating on Telegram. Hundreds of users paid for access to chat rooms where thousands of explicit photos and videos were shared, amounting to dozens of victims, many of whom were underage (Bae, 2024). The content, often violent and obtained through blackmail and cybersex trafficking, was distributed in two series of chat rooms—“the Nth” and “Doctor’s Room” (Lee, 2024b). In response, the government revised sex crime laws, making the possession, purchase, and viewing of illegal sexual content punishable, and raising the age of consent from 13 to 16 (Kim, 2020). However, despite deepfakes also being circulated in these groups, the government failed to address this growing threat. Investigators dismissed this aspect of the crime, arguing that since the images were “fake”, they did not warrant serious attention (Won, 2024).
In August 2024, South Korea was once again rocked by the emergence of a new series of chat rooms, dubbed the “New Nth Room” (Lee, 2024b). Hundreds of women were targeted as deepfake images of them were shared. ACOSAV reported a significant rise in the number of underage victims, with more than 500 educational institutions—from middle schools to universities—impacted. These chat rooms which hosted thousands of participants, included both perpetrators and victims under the age of consent. In the aftermath, many women began censoring their behaviour on social media out of fear of exploitation (Mackenzie & Choi, 2024). Researchers suggest that victims, as a result, lose trust not only in their communities but in society as a whole (Gong, 2024b).
Telegram serves as an ideal platform in South Korea for such crimes as it enables the creation of anonymous encrypted chats that can only be accessed through invitation (Gong, 2024b). Exploitation through deepfakes is alarmingly easy, as these videos can be produced through social media quickly—often in under 30 minutes—and at no cost (“2023 State of Deepfakes”, 2023). The anonymity and lack of immediate consequences lead many users to view their actions not as crimes, but as harmless pranks (Bae, 2024). As a result, nearly one-third of the perpetrators are teenagers, many motivated by the thrill of deviant behaviour (Won, 2024). Offenders mock their victims and encourage each other, creating a culture of exploitation (Gong, 2024b).
Deepfake crimes represent a distinct and growing threat, yet numerous challenges complicate their prosecution. The damage caused by deepfake crimes extends beyond other forms of sexual abuse, as anyone—not just someone known to the perpetrator—can be targeted. Law enforcement has had limited success in tracking down offenders, relying mainly on the use of cryptocurrencies (Redfern & Lee, 2021). Compounding these challenges is the lack of a universally agreed-upon definition of deepfakes, which has presented further obstacles to their legal classification and persecution (Birrer & Just, 2024). By 2023, South Korean celebrities accounted for 53% of global victims of deepfake pornography, highlighting the urgent need for stronger protections and enforcement measures (“2023 State of Deepfakes”, 2023).
Addressing South Korea’s Digital Exploitation
This paper will finalise its analysis by proposing solutions to address the hyper-discriminatory nature of South Korean society. While punishments surrounding the scandals have been raised, they have proven largely ineffective. Stronger measures are needed, including the regulation or even banning of Telegram (Mackenzie & Choi, 2024). Although regulation is feared as there is a lack of research into impacts of policies and concerns about encroaching on freedom of expression (Birrer & Just, 2024), the dangers posed by unregulated platforms are clear. Telegram publicly claims to ban harmful content (Mackenzie & Choi, 2024), yet in practice, it is frequently used for illegal activities, including terrorism and the spread of explicit materials (Mozur et al., 2024). Despite requests from South Korean police for assistance in the investigation, Telegram has repeatedly ignored these demands (Mackenzie & Choi, 2024).
Furthermore, more support should be given to initiatives that utilise AI for beneficial purposes. The Digital Sex Crime Support Centre run by the government of Seoul created a tool for monitoring and removing deep fake images. This initiative, which won a UN Public Administration Award, demonstrated how technology can be used to combat digital sex crimes (Bae, 2024).
The Struggle for Social Reform
South Korea’s structural gender inequality has most recently manifested in the rise of deepfake pornography. The exploitation of women in the digital age reflects broader, systemic gender discrimination. Traditional power structures manipulate Confucian values to legitimise and perpetuate a gendered hierarchical system, framing it as a fundamental aspect of maintaining cultural identity and economic prosperity.
South Korea is facing a much larger societal crisis. Young Koreans face immense pressures in hypercompetitive education, labor, and marriage markets, leading to widespread disillusionment and contributing to the nation's high suicide rate (Kim & Connolly, 2021). With one of the lowest fertility rates in the world and an ageing population, South Korea faces severe labour shortages. Despite this, the government has overlooked the root causes, instead relying on foreign workers as a solution (Seo, 2024).
Ultimately, South Korea's demographic and societal crises uncover the faults of top-down constructions of national identity. Korean society must confront and dismantle its entrenched gender discrimination and reimagine the power structures that sustain inequality. Women must be recognized as equal citizens, with opportunities and rights equal to men, rather than being treated solely as caregivers or economic tools. Only by addressing issues at their roots, rather than deflecting to other factors, can South Korea begin to resolve the broader societal crisis intertwined with systemic sexism.
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