Abstract

This article discusses the implication of historical narratives in Japan’s past relations in East Asia through the perspective of constructivist and liberal internationalist theories of international relations. Through historical research and a normative perspective, it addresses this “historical problem” of Japanese imperial narratives with regard to Japan state-building through the figurehead of the Emperor and the binding of Japanese foreign policy through the rule of constitution and treaties under the aegis of the United States.

Introduction

Japan has always been a sandbox providing grounds for addressing the constructivist theory of international relations (Noguchi, 2000). The latter could be delineated as the manner in which the “material world” constructs and is constructed by human action and “interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretation of the material world” (Adler, 1997). As part of this “dynamic normative and epistemic interpretation,” the morality of the state has become central to a state’s policies and discourse, as it is part of a state’s agency in structuring international relations (Koyama, 2023). This perspective is relevant to decipher part of Japan’s relations in East Asia, since it bears a heavy legacy on its neighbors in the backdrop of its colonial past. Historical disputes can be obstacles for peaceful relations, such as the issue of “comfort women” in Korea, resolved financially on paper by the Agreement on Comfort Women in 2015—seventy years after the events. Nonetheless, it is still a moral dispute in Japan–Korea relations, since it is disdained by Japanese members of the National Diet (Hosaka, 2021). The Massacre of Nanjing in 1937 also remains a dispute in China–Japan relations; in fact, Japan uttered apologies in the 2005 Koizumi statement “as deep remorse and heartfelt regret,” yet still has not acknowledged it in proper terms as the “Massacre of Nanjing” (Koizumi, 2005). Such reticence to recognize historical disputes seems to contradict the rational purpose of Japanese relations in the region, like the promotion of institutions such as the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and freedom of trade. This article will first discuss the historical construction of narratives under Imperial Japan that later contributed to the “historical problem” of Japan (Koyama, 2023). Thereafter, it stresses the implication of US involvement in post-war Japanese state-building in a liberal internationalist perspective.

The “Historical Problem” of Japan in East Asia

In the first place, I argue that the ancient and imperial historical narratives that constitute the “historical problem” of Japan have been employed to assess the Japanese state’s continuity at the expense of undermining its foreign policy in East Asia. Through the paradigm of narratives, I encompass “a clear sequential order that connects events in a meaningful way for a definite audience and thus offers insights about the world and/or people’s experiences of it” (Hinchman, 2001). In international politics, antagonistic narratives can create a “history problem,” that is, in the case of Japan, the lack of willingness to acknowledge its imperial record (Koyama, 2023). I posit that at the core of this “history problem” lies the entanglement of Imperial Japan’s honor and the colonization of Korea and thereafter China. Imperial Japan’s honor derives from the tennosei ideology developed in the early Meiji Era by the genro—oligarchs—in order to foster national spirit (Powles, 1976); implicit in this ideology are two assumptions: the first being the elevation of the Emperor—since then unknown by the commoners—to the rank of semi-god, and the second being that all Japanese are related by blood to the Emperor (Suzuki, 1989). These narratives fostered the devotion of the Japanese to the Empire and structured the early Meiji Japanese State at a grassroots level. The centrality of the Emperor in Japan was notably foreseen by the US, which helped fuel these narratives to consolidate the state: in contradiction with the Nuremberg Charter of 1945, Emperor Hirohito was preempted from judgment given his position of semi-god in Japanese society at the time (Van Buuren, 2023), fostering this narrative of Imperial pride and continuity. Moreover, the US introduced a judgment gap—as the judgment of Japan for colonization crimes would bring about the judgment of Western countries for the same reason—during the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in 1945–1946 (Koyama, 2023). Both dynamics—heritage of the imperial pride and impunity—may be at the roots of homages to Yasukuni Shrine, where the souls of those who sacrificed themselves for the Emperor lie, including 14 Class A criminals from the Asia-Pacific War (Nakamura, 2025). Regarding this matter, Yasukuni Shrine remains a major issue in the region and more preeminently in Sino-Japanese relations (Yatid et al., 2017) from a constructivist perspective. Nonetheless, these practices did not emerge out of the blue, but rather through the involvement of Western powers, particularly the US.

The US’s Involvement in Binding Japan’s Foreign Policy

In the second place, I posit that the present stance of Japan’s international relations is the result of interventionist policy by the US through the instillation of historical narratives that supported constitutional binding and fostered treaty dependence. The history of Japan–US relations can be traced to the arrival of Commodore Perry in Yokohama in 1853, imposing gunboat diplomacy in order to obtain the US–Japan Treaty of 1854 (Aruga, 1994). This imposing intervention of Perry’s “Black ships,” contrasted by this treaty under the sakoku, initiated the US–Japan relations and Japan’s position: a victim mentality—in a psychological perspective, Shu Kishida mentioned the American rape of Japan—contrasted with an incentive for Western modernization (Aruga, 1994). In a constructivist perspective, this created a dominant standing for the US in US–Japan relations: the US being a threat and one of the most reliant partners in the framework of gaiatsu—the fact that for Japan to undertake actions, it needs to be strong handed (Nadeau, 2018). Thus, these narratives better decipher the US–Japan interactions in the post-war era and their present implications in Japanese international relations.

In the aftermath of the Asia-Pacific War in 1945, the US made its dominant discourse of heroism and triumph prevail over the situation of Japan, which was not only a victim but a perpetrator tormented by guilt (Dower, 1995). This reassessed the core of the Japanese State and the Meiji Constitution of 1889—the Constitution of Japan of 1946 was written under the aegis of the US. It introduced Article 9C enshrining Japan’s renunciation of its “right of belligerency” (Art. 9C, Constitution of Japan, 1946). This does not deny the country the right to collective self-defense according to Article 51 of the UN Charter (Art. 51, Charter of the United Nations, 1945); still, the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960 remains a restriction. The latter stresses that the US “is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.” (Nasu, 2004). This prevalence of the “US protectorate” is also to be seen in other articles: Article 98C introduces a “treaty supremacy clause”—contrary to the legal concept of Kompetenz-Kompetenz—and states that international law and international treaties that Japan has consented to are part of domestic law (Art. 98C, Constitution of Japan, 1946).  As the Constitution of Japan is rigid, and there is no such constitutional custom to amend it, it assures the US of its long-term ability to maintain the treaties negotiated with Japan. This means the US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security—de facto enabling the US to expand its military power projection in East Asia—and the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed in 1951. The latter, beyond legally ending the state of war between the two countries, places Japan as the only East Asian past belligerent to participate, while South Korea, North Korea, the Republic of China, and the People’s Republic of China are not entrusted to join the treaty (Koyama, 2023). Japan passively benefited from—or dare I say actively complied with—the liberal internationalist order created by the US based upon cooperation and development. In a nutshell, the US restrained Japan’s foreign policy through the instillation of gaiatsu relationship, constitutional binding, and treaties. Nevertheless, Japan made the most of it, as its anti-militarist narrative integrated it perfectly into the US ideational international order, while the support from the US secured its place in the regional order of East Asia.

Conclusion

On November 30, 2024, the Republic of Korea declined Japan’s proposal to attend a commemoration of the atrocities of the Sado Gold Mines in the Niigata prefecture, due to divergent regards on the event—during the Second World War, the latter brought about forced labor for deported Koreans (Tong-Hyung, 2024). This is a present-day result of the “history problem” of Japan (Koyama, 2023), enshrined in the remnants of imperial devotion and the lack of international impunity. The continuity of both dynamics is due to the implication of the US as it envisions in Japan a reliable ally in East Asia within gaiatsu, binding it through constitution and treaties, while still supporting its beneficial anti-militarist and peaceful narrative on the international stage, in light of a liberal internationalist order. Recently, as the US under the Trump administration strains US–Japan relations through a paternalistic attitude towards Japan’s defense budget (Reuters, 2025), this order is at present being called into question, as it increasingly gears toward realist turnouts. Therefore, one can anticipate a paradigm shift in Japan’s military strategy and relations in East Asia.