Abstract

The 21st century has brought about a new era of Great Power Competition between the United States and China. Southeast Asia is at the forefront, where Indonesia is one of its regional and economic leaders. Indonesia has long maintained a non-aligned “free and active” foreign policy, maintaining its strategic autonomy. However, as tensions between the two great powers continue to increase, Indonesia is faced with balancing between these two rivals. Despite such challenges, it’s clear that Indonesia will continue to take its steady course through the two reefs for as long as possible. 

Introduction

In a new era of Great Power Competition between the United States (US) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Southeast Asia has found itself at the crossroads of these two powers’ efforts to triumph against the other. Within this geostrategic region’s role in both powers’ interests, Indonesia holds a special place as a regional leader within Southeast Asia. Indonesia is the largest nation in the region by population and landmass, with the highest GDP, and acts as the de facto leader of the region’s foremost international organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Heydarian, 2023). 

Bebas dan Aktif: The Foundation of Indonesian Foreign Policy

At the heart of Indonesia’s foreign policy is the concept of a Bebas dan Aktif (free and active) foreign policy. Coined by Indonesia’s first Vice-President, Mohammad Hatta, it follows a belief that Indonesia’s foreign policy should be independent of the affairs of other powers while remaining active in the international arena (Hatta, 1953). In what Hatta described as “sailing between two reefs,” Indonesia’s foreign policy has focused on navigating between two larger powers while maintaining neutrality (Emmerson, 2018).  This concept has guided Indonesia’s foreign policy since its founding and endures into the modern day. The modern-day usage of this principle is the adoption of the “hedging” approach to Great Power Competition. This approach posits that Indonesia seeks to maintain equidistant relations with both the PRC and the US, firmly rejecting alignment with both powers in hopes that Indonesia would not be entrapped into conflict with either power (Mubah, 2019). 

Relations between Indonesia, the US, and China

Under President Sukarno, Indonesia pursued closer ties with the PRC as an anti-imperialist ally, pursuing the establishment of the “Jakarta-Peking-Pyongyang-Hanoi-Phnom Penh Axis” in 1965 (Sulaiman, 2015). In 1965, anti-Communist President Suharto made a dramatic shift in Indonesian foreign relations, severing ties with the PRC (Purba, 2020). Suharto pivoted to the US by increasing military ties, providing the building blocks for the robust military ties the two nations share today. The fall of Suharto and the end of US military aid over human rights concerns damaged the relations in the 1990s, but ties were repaired in the 2000s (Laksmana, 2021). In the 2023 ISEAS-Yusuf State of Southeast Asia Survey, when asked “If ASEAN were forced to align itself with one of the strategic rivals, which should it choose?” 53.7% of Indonesians chose China while 46.3% chose the US. This highlights some dissatisfaction with the US among Indonesians, but largely the preference is evenly split. While the 2024 Survey found that 73.2% of Indonesians supported China with only 26.8% choosing the US, this can be attributed to US support for Israel in the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict alongside recency bias over the conflict rather than an analysis of great power presence in the region (Seah et al., 2024). Despite this, it shows that China has the upper hand in engagements with Indonesia, capitalizing on its popular economic support of Indonesia contrasting with America’s less popular defensive partnerships with the nation. 

The Jokowi Decade: Trade over Geopolitics

The recently concluded presidency of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) from 2014 to 2024 has left a remarkable legacy on not just Indonesia’s foreign policy, but its entire political establishment. While the incredibly popular Jokowi accomplished great feats in economic development during the “Jokowi decade,” his approach to foreign policy has been far less grounded. Jokowi’s foreign policy can be defined around one term, “transactional.” Jokowi’s domestic policy and popularity have resulted from his focus on transactional economic development for Indonesia. Thus, his foreign policy has focused on issues that are popular domestically, with development at the forefront (Laksmana, 2024). In Jokowi’s first year in office, he attracted $28.5b in foreign investment, which has risen to $37.8b in 2024 (Nada Shofa, 2024). Notably, Jokowi has capitalized on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), making Indonesia the single largest recipient of BRI aid worth $7.3 billion (Nedopil, 2024). Under Jokowi, China has become Indonesia’s largest economic partner, with Chinese money supporting Jokowi’s development initiatives (“Indonesia launches Jakarta-Bandung 'Whoosh'”, 2023). In contrast to the economic front, Jokowi has shown a disinterest in geopolitics. In 2014, Jokowi announced his plan to turn Indonesia into a “global maritime fulcrum” (GMF), utilizing Indonesia’s position at the center of the Indo-Pacific to become a middle power, entailing naval modernization and maritime development. Yet with the president giving little attention to the underfunded initiative, Indonesian scholar Evan Laksmana declared the GMF to have “died” (Laksmana, 2019). While Jokowi certainly hasn’t “chosen sides” between the US and China, it's clear that his policy goals were better aligned with Beijing’s economic foreign policy over Washington’s defense-focused relations with Indonesia. With the recent election of Prabowo Subianto to the presidency, a new door has opened for Indonesia’s approach to the Great Power Competition. 

A New Age of Relations: The Presidency of Prabowo Subianto

The recent election of Prabowo Subianto in February has opened the door for a new era of Indonesian foreign policy in the post-Jokowi era. Prabowo has committed to a more involved Indonesia on the global stage. Echoing his predecessors, he has committed to friendly but engaged relations, proclaiming that “one thousand friends is too few, one enemy is too many” (Anwar, 2024). Prabowo has vowed to continue Jokowi’s economic policies, which will certainly entail continued close ties with Beijing (Suoneto, 2024). After his election in February 2024, Prabowo’s first foreign visit was to China in April (Tanamal, 2024). In a later visit to China in November, Prabowo signed $10 billion worth of infrastructure deals alongside a controversial memorandum of understanding that appeared to have acknowledged China’s Nine-Dash Line that encompassed the disputed territory of the North Natuna Islands (Rakhmat & Purnama, 2024). While the Foreign Ministry later clarified the islands as Indonesian, this agreement shows Prabowo’s commitment to engage with China (Strangio, 2024). This has only been reinforced by Prabowo’s announcement of Indonesia’s intention to join BRICS. While this does not inherently present a case for further Chinese alignment, it is clear that Prabowo is more committed to engaging in geopolitics than Jokowi (Raditio, 2024). Alongside economic concerns, as a former General and Defense Minister under Jokowi, there will be a greater emphasis on national security under Prabowo. During his time as Minister of Defense, Prabowo worked on military modernization in line with the Minimum Essential Force doctrine started by former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, leading to high levels of military cooperation with Western nations alongside China and Russia (Anwar, 2024). A greater focus on national security plays to America’s advantage, however, the defense relationship is not enough to sway Indonesia. 

Conclusion

A nation at the heart of Southeast Asia, a region that many consider to be at the forefront of Great Power Competition in the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia remains a critical state for both powers. Despite the wishes of great powers, Indonesia remains committed to its non-alignment and will continue its hedging approach to ensure Indonesia is not entrapped in any conflict between the great powers. However, in the fight for influence in Indonesia, the United States is losing to China. Compared to the economic benefits of Chinese engagement, Washington struggles to garner support through the defense ties it shares with Indonesia. The pragmatic Prabowo has shown he is willing to make commitments to China for economic development; despite his history with the pro-America Suharto, he has shown to be less engaged with America. If Indonesia is forced to choose, the tides will push Indonesia towards the Chinese reef. Yet, Indonesia has “sailed between two reefs” since its foundation to avoid such a scenario, and it will continue to do so under President Prabowo.