Abstract

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s first meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump marked a pivotal moment for U.S.–Japan relations, reaffirming the alliance’s stability despite leadership transitions. The subsequent joint statement emphasized strengthened defense cooperation, regional security, and economic partnership, reinforcing Japan’s commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. However, China’s strong reaction to the statement highlighted escalating tensions in trilateral relations. As U.S.–China strategic competition intensifies, Japan faces the delicate challenge of maintaining alliance commitments while fostering diplomatic engagement with Beijing to safeguard its long-term regional interests.

On February 7, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba held his first meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House. This meeting not only marked Ishiba as the first senior Asian leader to engage in direct discussions with Trump but also underscored the significance of the U.S.–Japan alliance in the early days of the Trump administration (Tatsumi, 2025). Since Trump’s inauguration on January 20, his foreign policy trajectory has been the subject of intense scrutiny. Ishiba’s visit was widely regarded as a crucial step in testing the future direction of U.S.–Japan relations (Tatsumi, 2025). Following the meeting, Washington and Tokyo issued a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to advancing U.S.–Japan relations into a “new golden era,” expressing hope that this partnership would contribute to peace and prosperity in an increasingly volatile and uncertain world.

The joint statement focused on three core areas of U.S.–Japan cooperation: “Cooperation for Peace,” “Cooperation for Growth and Prosperity,” and “Coordination in the Indo-Pacific” (The White House, 2025). These three pillars encompass key domains such as security, defense, and economic growth while highlighting the strategic coordination between the U.S. and Japan in the Indo-Pacific region to address evolving regional dynamics and challenges.

Amid an increasingly severe and complex security environment, the United States is encouraging Japan to fundamentally enhance its self-defense capabilities while also working to strengthen the alliance’s deterrence and response mechanisms through deeper defense and security cooperation (The White House, 2025). The joint statement explicitly outlines a series of measures aimed at reinforcing the bilateral security partnership, including reaffirming that Article 5 of the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security applies to the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands), thereby underscoring Washington’s commitment to Tokyo’s territorial security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2025; The White House, 2025). Additionally, both nations plan to upgrade their respective command and control systems to improve joint operational capabilities and expand their military presence in Japan’s southwestern islands to better address potential regional contingencies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2025; The White House, 2025). Furthermore, the two allies will enhance combat readiness through more realistic joint training and exercises to ensure a swift and effective response to various security challenges (The White House, 2025).

The joint statement also reaffirmed both countries’ commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, as well as their engagement in other key cooperative frameworks, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), U.S.–Japan–Australia cooperation, U.S.–Japan–ROK trilateral coordination, and U.S.–Japan–Philippines collaboration (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2025; The White House, 2025). It strongly opposed any attempt by China to alter the status quo in the East China Sea through force or coercion, as well as China’s “illegal” claims and other provocative activities in the South China Sea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2025; The White House, 2025).

The specific measures outlined in the U.S.–Japan joint statement to enhance Japan’s defense capabilities closely align with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) that Japan released in 2022. The 2022 NDS lays out three core approaches to achieving Japan’s defense objectives:

1. Strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense – enhancing self-defense capabilities and bolstering defense infrastructure to respond more independently to external threats.

2. Reinforcing joint deterrence and response within the alliance – improving military coordination, optimizing command and control systems, and expanding joint exercises to enhance operational synergy between the two countries.

3. Collaborating with like-minded countries and other partners – deepening security engagement with regional and global allies to foster broader defense cooperation.

This alignment underscores the continuity in Tokyo’s security policy while also demonstrating the stability of the alliance’s strategic direction despite leadership transitions in both countries. Although the first meeting between Trump and Ishiba took place shortly after the change of government in both nations, the joint statement sent a clear message—the core strategy of the U.S.–Japan alliance remains unwavering, and the consensus on security and defense cooperation remains firm. This not only reinforces domestic confidence in the continuity of foreign policy in both countries but also signals to the international community that, regardless of leadership changes, the fundamental ideology and security framework underpinning their partnership will remain intact.

However, the U.S.–Japan leadership meeting also underscored the underlying tensions and uncertainties in trilateral relations among China, Japan, and the United States. In particular, China reacted strongly to the joint statement issued by Washington and Tokyo, viewing it as an attempt to undermine its interests in the region. In a swift diplomatic response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry publicly denounced the statement, calling it an infringement on China’s sovereignty and a destabilizing move in the Asia-Pacific.

At a regular press conference on February 10, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun condemned the statement, calling it “blatant interference in China’s internal affairs,” an "attack and defamation against China,” and an attempt to “create panic in the region.” He emphasized that “China strongly condemns and firmly opposes this” and confirmed that China had “lodged a formal protest with both the U.S. and Japan” (Kawashima, 2025). In further demonstrating its discontent, Beijing summoned Akira Yokochi, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Japanese Embassy in China, to formally convey its strong opposition (Kawashima, 2025). This diplomatic rebuke reflects Beijing’s growing unease with what it perceives as deepening U.S.–Japan coordination aimed at countering China’s influence in the region.

This diplomatic friction highlights the complexity of China–Japan–U.S. relations. While the U.S.–Japan alliance continues to deepen, Japan is also striving to navigate a delicate balance amid intensifying U.S.–China competition. Although the Ishiba administration has firmly advanced defense cooperation with Washington, it has not abandoned engagement with Beijing, seeking to maintain open channels of communication (The Japan Times, 2025).

In October 2024, Shigeru Ishiba met with Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Laos, where both sides reaffirmed that China and Japan should regard each other as “opportunities rather than challenges” and emphasized the importance of maintaining regional stability. The following month, in November, Ishiba held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Peru, expressing Tokyo’s desire to keep channels of dialogue with Beijing open while deepening the U.S.–Japan alliance. Meanwhile, in December, Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya visited China—the first visit by a Japanese foreign minister to Beijing in approximately one year and nine months—highlighting the Japanese government’s intent to maintain a certain level of communication with China to manage differences and prevent further deterioration in bilateral relations.

Ishiba himself has repeatedly emphasized his hope to visit China at an appropriate time to deepen mutual trust with Chinese leaders (The Japan Times, 2025). Within the Ishiba administration, some officials are actively assessing a plan to arrange a prime ministerial visit to Beijing as early as early May, coinciding with Japan’s Constitution Memorial Day, in an effort to advance high-level diplomacy through this opportunity (The Japan Times, 2025).

Amid intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, Japan faces the critical challenge of balancing its alliance commitments with the imperative of regional stability. The Ishiba administration must carefully navigate between strengthening the U.S.–Japan alliance and maintaining stable relations with China—enhancing security cooperation to address regional security challenges while avoiding excessive tensions with Beijing to safeguard Japan’s long-term strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region.