Labour Struggle in South Korea

By Lalin Duangphatra

Abstract

As the second quarter of 2023 unfolded, streets in downtown Seoul were occupied with mass protests led by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) against President Yoon Seok-yeol’s administration, in the pursuit of improved working conditions and fundamental labour rights (Park, 2023). This article mainly addresses the backbone of South Korea’s blue-collar sectors, the foreign employees, who have not only been facing severe mistreatment but also the public’s nationalistic bias, despite being the solution to the country’s alarming demographic decline.

The Unionised Labour Protest Explained

The construction branch leader, Yang Hee-dong, passed away by self-immolation in front of a local courthouse on the previous May Day (Kim & Jang, 2023) during his arrest warrant hearing for force-recruiting his workers. Nonetheless, his last online messages expressed that he had ‘carried out union work justly and without wrongdoing’ (Jang, 2023). The death of this executive member of the KCTU, one of the largest umbrella unions of working people against authoritarian control, depoliticisation, and violent repression of labourers in South Korea (Ho, 1999), has invigorated the union’s large-scale rallies that have been organised since last year in opposition to Yoon Seok-yeol’s government (Bae et al., 1997).

Yoon Seok-yeol, the 13th and the current President of the Republic of Korea, with a solid conservative support base (McGrath, 2023), has been openly holding an anti-union stance since his election days. After his prosecutor-to-president transformation, he has been consistent in implementing anti-labour policies and giving police officers the green light to suppress ‘illegal’ union activities (Seol, 2023). Yoon’s ‘union-bashing’ efforts include accusing the unions of lacking transparency in accounting and of abusive behaviours towards labourers at construction sites (Kim, 2023), as well as multiple investigations and charges of unionists for alleged corruption and unlawful conduct.

For instance, in mid-January, the National Intelligence Agency (NIS) raided the union’s headquarters over suspicions of North Korean affiliation and National Security Act violations in order to seize electronic information. This event was followed by a trucker strike which was later defeated by the government’s successful crackdown, causing Yoon Seok-yeol’s approval rating to rise as well as new guidelines that authorised NIS’s expansion of warrantless surveillance (Seol, 2023). As recently as May 31st 2023, a memorial tent installed to commemorate the late Yang was demolished and 4 unionists were arrested for ‘physical assault and disturbance’ to the policemen (Cho, 2023). Moreover, the Seoul Metropolitan Police were deployed at scheduled rally locations with authorisation to spray capsaicin if required to disperse protestors (Park, 2023).

KCTU’s latest announcement of a two-week strike in July, despite sometimes being seen as a militant or an anti-capitalist effort, relies firmly on the slogans ‘Down with the Yoon Seok-yeol government’ and ‘Yoon Seok-yeol OUT’ (Shim & Ko, 2023). They aim to call for the President’s resignation, to put an end to pro-conglomerate policies and labour exploitation, as well as to reclaim their rights to freedom of speech. As consumption prices escalate amidst the stagnation of minimum wages, the KCTU general strike has gained an immense number of 400,000 supporters (Kim & Jang, 2023) in the political struggle which pressurised the government to respond to their demands (McGrath, 2023) –one of them being raising the minimum wage to reduce income disparities.

The protest however remained ineffective as it was labelled as ‘illegitimate’ by the Minister of Employment and Labor while their demands were ‘unfeasible’ according to South Korea’s leading business groups (Kim & Jang, 2023). The probable reason why the conglomerate-friendly government refused to increase welfare and the minimum wage of blue-collar workers is that the plan may edge down the number of working hours and new job positions, similar to the consequences of the income-led growth strategy implemented by former President Moon Jae-in in 2018 (Song, 2018).

Why Are Workers So Necessary?: The Harsh Reality of the Labour Market

Taking into consideration the current ageing population and falling birthrate of South Korea, the majority of South Korea’s income earners will soon be at the age of retirement while a smaller number of young employees will fill in those vacancies. Statistics Korea explains that while 70 per cent of the working-age population was employed, this was mainly due to the job additions in the eldest age groups, notably those aged 60 and above with 379,000 new positions. On the other hand, job creation for citizens aged 15 to 29 has shrunk for the seventh consecutive year, accompanied by sluggish exports and weak demand for goods (Yi, 2023). In addition, household income gaps rose by 30 per cent over the past 25 years among elders aged 60 and above while their income amount dwindles after retirement, according to a report from the Bank of Korea in August of 2022. This illustrates a high dependency ratio of income on the working-age population which is expected to be halved in the next 4 decades, meaning that roughly 17 million citizens will be permanently leaving their office (Lee, 2023). The situation is detrimental as labour competitiveness and productivity will be dramatically reduced, leading to a decline in government revenues from income tax, whereas the increasing burden on healthcare and retirement benefits will necessitate more government expenditures.

In response to lowering employment and workforce participation in South Korea, Yoon’s government proposed raising the maximum weekly limit from 52 to 69 working hours. However, the plan ended up with strong criticism from both young jobbers and millennials, as it would guarantee neither a boost in productivity nor flexibility in an already stress-ridden South Korean office culture. Instead, the plan may narrow down the time for familial and caregiving commitments, thus potentially resulting in an even lower fertility rate (McCurry, 2023) and a smaller number of next-generation workforce. The younger generation is giving greater attention to the idea of a shorter workweek—following the trend seen in the US and Europe— such as implementing every other Friday off for Kakao Games staff (Lee, 2023).

Migrant Workers: Solution and Problem

According to Foreign Policy, 70 per cent of South Koreans aged 25 to 34 held a college degree, as of 2017, meaning they are unwilling to fill in the ‘3D’ (Dirty, Dangerous, and Demeaning) job positions, and instead only applying to the biggest firms, leading to the problem of skill mismatch: white-collar positions are in demand while blue-collar workers are in shortage (Stokes, 2021). Therefore, a method that could effectively resolve the demographic crisis is recruiting employees from overseas who became the major labour supply of South Korea’s blue-collar workforce (Lee, 2023).

The Employment Permit System (EPS), a government-established project launched in 2004, permits Korean firms to legally hire foreign workers, principally from developing countries of South East Asia, to fill in labour shortages, notably in low-skilled sectors including agriculture, stockbreeding, fisheries, construction, and manufacturing industries (Ministry of Employment and Labor, 2015). A record-breaking quota of 110,000 non-professional employment or E-9 visas (Jeon, 2018) was granted in 2023 alone (Lee, 2023), marking a significant rise after the pandemic era disallowed migrant inflows (Kuhn, 2021). Obtaining permanent resident status is now facilitated due to governmental aid programs such as language education offers or budget allocations for interracial marriage (Minegishi, 2023).

Even though this system aimed to ensure transparency and labour protection policies (Argueta, 2022), legally hired migrants are still facing mistreatment: many are overworked, underpaid, socially excluded, and stuck in substandard living conditions without safety or sanitation (Lee, 2023). Additionally, their fundamental labour rights are uncertain as they are unable to switch jobs without their employers’ legal consent (Argueta, 2022). This prevents them from parting ways with firms to avoid being labelled as ‘illegal’ wage-earners and getting expelled from the country, trapping them in a vicious cycle of abuses and vulnerabilities. Some female workers had to tolerate sexual violence from their employers while others have reportedly had their privacy invaded with an inappropriate amount of surveillance (Lee, 2023). In spite of diplomatic and international trade concerns, non-Korean workers still had to bear the reduced minimum wage (Park, 2023) to secure their employment status.

One dominant reason is that the idea of multiculturalism and the permanent integration of migrants disrupt the historically homogeneous Korean society (Stokes, 2021). A majority of South Koreans have remained hesitant to welcome foreign labourers due to the misperception that they will displace the jobs of nationals (Argueta, 2022). However, in reality, the labour input of young migrants has eased labour shortage in low-skilled sectors that are less favoured by domestic workers and decelerated the ageing population issue by increasing the number of working-age population (Jeon, 2018).

Conclusion

South Korea’s existing labour policies controlled from a top-down approach are far from undergoing adjustments. Yoon Seok-yeol’s aggressive ‘union-bashing’ efforts, combined with the implementation of disproportionate pay and unreasonable working hours, have intensified the battle of the KCTU against the pro-conglomerate government. The rapid decline of the working-age population has presently become the leading cause for the need for an increase in labour productivity. Notably for blue-collar job vacancies that are difficult to be filled by the educated young nationals, welcoming migrant labourers now appears as the most effective method to replace the disappearing labour supply of soon-to-be-retired domestic employees. Labour policy changes such as a rise in national minimum wage and an end to workers’ mistreatment may therefore be seen as a necessary step towards revitalising South Korea’s economy and demographic crisis.

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