Abstract

The March 2024 attack on the Moscow Crocus served as a catalyst for the growing hostility toward Tajik migrants in Russia. The output examines how public perceptions of crime and security have changed, as well as how nationalist operations have affected Tajik and Central Asian populations. This study seeks to shed light on the rising gap between locals and migrants by examining the socio-political background of the attack and its aftermath, highlighting the socioeconomic and cultural elements that fuel these escalating conflicts. 

Following migration from Latin America to the United States, Central Asians in Russia are an essential part of the world's greatest migrant network. Economic prospects are the primary drivers of such outmigration. Migrants have to work in the service industry, construction, or agriculture to support their households. They establish entire communities, supporting one another and preserving ethnic customs, to make their lives less challenging.  But they often are paid little and are always at risk of having their wages disrupted. As a result, the integration of Central Asians into Russian society is hampered through various major obstacles.

The poorest country in Central Asia, Tajikistan, is largely dependent on labor migration to help it overcome its economic difficulties. A significant number of Tajik nationals migrate to Russia in pursuit of better economic possibilities. According to the World Bank (2024), Remittances from migrants who work abroad—primarily in Russia—generate more than 25% of Tajikistan's GDP. The demand for labor migrants from Russia is predicted to sustain Tajikistan's economy, which is projected to develop at a rate of 6.5% in 2024 thanks to private spending.

However, the tragic event in Moscow has brought to the attention the presence of Tajik migrants in Russia. The deadliest terrorist attack to occur in Moscow in the last 20 years took place on March 22 and claimed 144 lives. A few individuals dressed in camouflage opened fire with machine guns in the "Crocus City Hall" music venue prior to the "Picnic" band's performance (Meduza, 2024). Since all of the tickets for the "Picnic" concert had been sold out, the worldwide Russian-language newspaper Meduza estimates that there were 6,000 people in the venue at the time of the shooting. 

The results of the investigations showed that the four main suspects in the attack were citizens of Tajikistan. Since then, Russia has experienced a sharp rise in xenophobia, as evidenced by the rise in nationalist discourse and the number of hate crimes recorded by independent monitoring organizations, such as the SOVA Research Center. Media reports indicate a noticeable rise in anti-immigrant attitudes, regardless of the lack of official Russian government data on the subject of xenophobia. "Meduza" reports that Russian authorities have reportedly tightened immigration restrictions, imposing harsher employment limits and visa requirements with a specific focus on laborers from Central Asia. While it is unclear if the Russian Ministry of Defense has authorized these activities, there are instances when border troops have increased migrant labor inspections. 

In dealing with migrants, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made an effort to minimize nationalist discourses. He stressed that "the measures taken are not directed against a specific nation or religion." However, Sirojiddin Muhriddin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan, questioned Lavrov's claim, stating that Tajikistani citizens were the ones targeted deliberately (Jamestown Foundation, 2024). 

The Russian government tightened control over immigration flows by implementing a number of security sector measures after the attack. These steps included tightening documentation requirements, stepping up border crossing security, and police inspections in locations known to have high migrant labor concentrations, such as marketplaces and residential neighborhoods. The SOVA Research Center has shown that even five months after the attack, nationalist groups are still conducting raids on immigrant communities. "In July 2024, we learned that 13 people had fallen victim to hate-motivated attacks. We learned of most of the incidents from far-right Telegram channels, which posted videos of brutal attacks on people of Central Asian, Caucasian and of 'non-Slavic' appearance, unhoused people, or other people considered by the far-right to 'disgrace the white race.' In total, we have recorded 155 victims of hate attacks in 2024" (SOVA Research Center, 2024). 

In early August, the head of Tajikistan's Ministry of Labor and Employment provided data that shows the following trends: in the first half of the year, the number of Tajiks who went seeking employment in Russia fell by 15%. The total number of 17,000 Tajik nationals were expelled from Russia throughout this time (RFE/RL’s Tajik Service, 2004). It turns out that out of the 40,000 people repatriated home from Russia in the first six months, nearly half were Tajiks.

Even if the majority of Tajiks still have low-paying occupations and abstain from crime, they are now more frequently linked in the public discourse to extremism and dangers to society. On social media, where efforts to limit migrant rights have increased, this change is most noticeable. Together with other nationalist groups, Samara-based nationalists from the "Severnyi Chelovek" organization made a video message in early April that was aimed at Vladimir Putin, the State Duma, the executive branch, and law enforcement organizations (SOVA Research Center, 2024). They argued for stricter rules and more stringent border control in the video and called for a thorough review of Russia's immigration laws. They suggested making work permits essential and granting citizenship only to people with "special merits."

Prohibitions on the right to work in particular occupations are the most troubling actions against migrants. For example, Roman Basargin, the governor of the Saratov region, signed an order on May 1st, imposing a prohibition on hiring migrant laborers for jobs in catering, taxis, and public transportation. The regional government's press office stated that the limitations will remain in place until the end of the current year (Vedomosti, 2024). The leaders of Yakutia, Kamchatka, Novosibirsk, Nizhny Novgorod, and Voronezh all passed similar prohibitions in 2024. All of this is set against the backdrop of Russia's ongoing labor shortage discussions.  At the end of the last year, the Institute of Economics estimated that the country lacked almost 5 million workers and analysts concur that the deficit grew in 2024 (RFE/RL’s Tajik Service, 2024). Migrant workers from Central Asia, particularly Tajikistan, play a critical role in addressing these shortages. Approximately 10% of all migrant workers in Russia were Tajiks as of 2023, and the majority of them worked in "migrant-intensive" industries such as construction, agriculture, and customer service. With a 300,000 delivery worker shortage by year's end, these industries are most affected by the labor shortage (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024). Businesses that provide taxi services have already warned of the approaching driver shortage brought on by restrictions on the labor of migrant workers. This has sparked worries about additional financial pressure on industries that rely heavily on migrant labor.

The aftermath of the attack in Crocus exposes nationalism and misconceptions about public safety, demonstrating how Tajiks and other Central Asian migrants have become hostages to a larger issue. The increasing nationalist sentiments and associated raids suggest that Russia's migration policies will stay on the radar.  Future decisions should consider measures to integrate migrants that can assist lower tensions in addition to public sentiment. To achieve this, it is vital to reconsider current immigration policy strategies, with a focus on communication and understanding between parties.