South Korea and Japan’s Relations Through the Lens of Constructivism
By Federica Cidale
Introduction
The relationship between South Korea and Japan has always been very complicated due to historical unresolved issues. Despite historical divides, the two countries are fairly similar in terms of economy, political system and security concerns (Cooney and Scarbrough 2008). According to the International Relations Theory of Classical Realism, the international system is in a perpetual state of anarchy as states pursue self-interest in order to protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity (Mastanduno 2014). For this reason, realists expect states to balance power, either by establishing an army or forming alliances (Mastanduno 2014).
Contrary to what is observed, Korea and Japan should be cooperating more closely, given the rising and looming threat of North Korea and China. The historical and social changes that states go through are not taken into account by Classical Realism. State behaviour cannot just be understood in rational and instrumental terms; states are not monolithic, they change throughout history, and are shaped by social processes.
Constructivism claims that the world is shaped by social interactions among the various actors that inhabit it. Unlike Realism and Liberalism, where the main assumption is that the states are the only or main actors pursuing self-help strategies and economic gains, the Constructivist approach draws attention to the possibilities created by norms and identities, which can be missed if only material interests are considered (Leheny 2014). It is in this context that I would like to explore the relationship of South Korea vis-à-vis Japan to see how history contributed to shaping norms and identities in South Korean society.
Overview of Classical Realism
According to realists, despite changes in ideologies, institutions, etc., the fundamentals of international relations are centred on the struggle for power (Mastanduno 2014; Kirshner 2012). Realists do not believe that war happens all the time but they assume that “the states must be alert to the possibility that war could occur and are sensitive to the potentially catastrophic consequences of defeat” (Kirshner 2012, 55). They do not exclude the fact that states can cooperate and have a peaceful relation, but they tend to be pessimistic and “emphasize the fallibility rather than perfectibility of human beings” (Mastanduno 2014, 25).
The main actors for realists are territorially defined entities, the states, whose behaviour is best understood in rational and instrumental terms. The absence of an international authority makes the international system anarchic and, thus, inherently competitive. This drives states to compete with one another for material goods like territory, resources and markets. States are the guarantor of their own security, they have to protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity. To avoid being dominated by stronger states, states have to build military capabilities or form alliances (Mastanduno 2014). Classical Realism puts emphasis on material factors and non-material factors, like honour and prestige, to explain the behaviour of states: “interest (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men” (Morgenthau and Thompson 1997, 11). For realists, with the focus on power dynamics, Asia is an extremely appealing region to examine; it is indeed a crossroads and a theatre of great powers including the United States (US), China, and Japan.
Seen from this angle, Japan and South Korea have similar security threats: both countries have to face North Korea, a nuclear power often threatening their territorial integrity, and a rising China that politically and economically challenges South Korea and Japan. Additionally, because of their common goals in preserving an Asian balance of power, both nations are important regional allies of the US. Despite having so many material factors to bind them together, South Korea and Japan’s relationship seems to be unstable (Cooney and Scarbrough 2008).
Constructivism
As previously mentioned, Realism would dictate that given their similar political and economic structures as well as their alliance with the US, these two countries would be a perfect fit for partnership or any other form of alliance. The mistake here lies in the fact that Classical Realism views the behaviour of states in rational terms and considers material factors the most important in motivating states’ trajectories. In contrast to realism, constructivism analyses certain concepts like states, history, identities, their origins and how they evolve. In a region like Asia, many of the key tensions are related to ideas and identities, rather than just material factors (Leheny 2014). This is not to say that Constructivism is more relevant than other theories but, in this case, it is a helpful tool in uncovering the reasons behind their rocky relationship. Note, Constructivism is a very broad discipline and to explain it in detail is not within the scope of this article, for this reason, I only briefly introduce Constructivism’s fundamentals and relate them to why the cooperation between South Korea and Japan is unstable.
Constructivism emerged as a framework in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War which brought about significant changes to the international order (Leheny 2014). The shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world order begs the question as to how to analyse this new reality via newer angles. According to Finnemore & Sikkink, Constructivism offers “a framework for thinking about the nature of social life and social interaction, but makes no claims about their specific content (2001, 393)”. Constructivists focus on the role of ideas, norms and culture in politics emphasizing that these social facts (money, sovereignty, rights) have no material reality but exist only because people collectively believe they do. These shared beliefs construct society, the interests and identities. Constructivists’ main aim is to uncover how these identities originated; they do not take them for granted but analyse the processes in which they were created and came to be (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). Understanding how norms and identities affect politics allows us to see that a wider range of political outcomes can happen, which would be overlooked if only material interests are considered.
Historical Memory
So how does this fit into the discourse of South Korea and Japan’s relations? The Korean perception of Japan is mostly shaped by historical events. According to the 2015 Asan Report (Kim, Lee, and Kang 2015), the dispute between South Korea and Japan originated from their divergent interpretations of history and was further exacerbated by Japan's recent conservative leadership. When Koreans were asked what were the biggest obstacles to a better relationship with Japan, many answered the dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima island, the history textbooks controversy, comfort women and the demand for sincerer and more consistent apologies. Constructivism shows that the scars of the past can still haunt the present and shape relationships accordingly. Gustafsson (2020) states that divergent collective memories can indeed worsen traditional conflicts over territory and resources, like the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute. Furthermore, Japanese colonization is viewed as degradation and exploitation by the Koreans, as many Korean women were forced into prostitution and Korean men condemned to forced labour (Cooney and Scarbrough 2008).
After the war, Japan rejected demands from South Korea to apologize and, instead, glorified its colonial past. In 1995 PM Tomiichi Murayama apologized to the comfort women and issued compensation. However, the first written apology was in 1998, and in 2001 PM Koizumi Junichiro issued another apology following his visit to a former Japanese prison. The conservatives in Japan rejected these apologies, with some arguing that Japan had done positive things for Korea (Lind 2009). There was then the controversy about Japanese textbooks, whose historical content watered down WWII Japanese’s crimes (Sneider 2013). Still nowadays, Japan displays an unapologetic stance towards its historical crimes in South Korea and China (Lind 2009). For instance, Japanese war memorials mostly emphasize Japanese victimhood (Kal 2011) and Japanese officials keep visiting the Yasukuni shrine1 (McCurry 2022). Moreover, Japan opposes every time South Korea builds monuments to commemorate colonial crimes, for instance the statue of An Jung-Geun in Harbin (Rausch 2013) and comfort woman statues in Philadelphia (Hauser 2018) and Berlin (Ryall 2020).
Discourses created by policymakers’ speeches and museums, too, shape South Korean national identity vis-à-vis Japan (Lee 2014). These discourses construct the collective Korean identity, centred around its relationship with Japan. The collective identity the Koreans created originates from their collective memory connected to the history of colonialism, exploitation, and abuse by the Japanese (Lee 2014). The fact that Japan has often been inconsistent with their representation of the past, their apologies and lack of proper historical education created an ambiguous perception of Japan. Norms and identities were then created based on these perceptions and made South Koreans perceive Japan as a threat, rather than an ally.
Conclusion
Through the lens of Classical Realism, the behaviour of states is viewed in rational terms and material factors are perceived to be what set states’ trajectories. Realism takes certain concepts like states, history, identities for granted and does not analyse how they have changed. Thus, if we observe the relationship between South Korea and Japan through these lenses, we do not entirely understand how these two countries with shared economic, security, and political interests are having a hard time cooperating.
Constructivism can, though, shed more light on these reasons, as its main aim is to analyse social facts, the non-material reality, to uncover how interests and identities originated. This perspective helps to explain why South Korea is reluctant to cooperate with Japan. The collective memory of the past is still influencing the identity of Koreans and their views vis-à-vis Japan. The inconsistent apologies, lack of historical education towards Japan’s past, and the fact that Korean national identity was constructed in relation to Japanese colonialism still shape South Korean perceptions and contribute to grievances and a reluctance to work together.
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Endnotes
1. A Shinto Shrine located in Tokyo where many Japanese war criminals are enshrined