Abstract

Waves of insurgent violence and a stop-start peace process marks our current understanding of tensions in South Thailand with the ethnic Malay Muslim communities, however in order to elaborate policies for peace a more comprehensive understanding is needed of the dynamic between the two groups. This issue brief provides a historical contextualisation of the area, and thus lays the foundation to understanding the claims of current actors and the potential flaws to ongoing negotiations.

The Songkran celebrations in Thailand, marking the start of the Thai New Year, led to an influx of news featuring the joyful water fights. However, amid the festivities, fears were also voiced with regard to a potential upsurge in ‘Muslim separatist violence’ that could accompany the Buddhist celebration (Crisis24, 2024). The zones of said conflict refer to the southernmost provinces in Thailand along the Malay border, where a hybrid of ethnic and religious tension has unfolded at varying intensities since Thai expansion and annexation of the kingdom of Pattani in 1902. This issue brief will contextualise this dynamic and outline the historical factors, current players, and potential solutions that characterise the fighting in the area. 

Reducing Thai-Malay relations to current animosity at the border fails to acknowledge the longstanding relations between the two. Notably, Thai-Malay relations began in the early 15th century and can be roughly divided into 3 distinct stages: tributary, colonial, and post-independence (Suwannathat-Pian, 2002).

Thai-Malay relations can first be understood through their tributary dynamics. Historically, the Malay Peninsular paid tribute to Siam through bunga mas, gifts of tree statues made of silver and gold sent from the states of the Malay Peninsular to the Siamese king as a sign of friendship, respect, and loyalty. Such a relationship was typical of the mandala power structure in Southeast Asia at the time, which was said to reflect the order of the universe in line with Hindu-Buddhist thought in a Mandala. In this Mandala system, the centre of the universe was embodied by the powerful Siamese capital, in which the authority was concentrated and then dispersed across the region in concentric circles with authority asserted less and less at a further distance from the centre (Koch, 1977). As such, the northern Kingdoms of the Malay Peninsular were vassal states, which allowed for strong Malay-Thai family ties through intermarriage as facilitated by free movement between the areas the two ethnicities dominated. Consequently, the distinction between the Siam territory and the Malay states was made purely on geographical considerations as opposed to the ethnicity of the people (Suwannathat-Pian, 2002). Today, this has translated to the unique relationship between Thailand and Malaysia where a considerable amount of each state’s ethnic people are found on the opposing side of the border.  

Whilst the degree to which the tributary system was implemented varied depending on the strength of each Siamese monarch, it remained a consistent characterisation of relations up until the British colonisation of the Malay Peninsular. In the late nineteenth century, despite growing British influence in the Malay territories, Siam still exercised authority over the Northernmost states and was passionate about securing this position after the loss of another territory to the French (Lamey, 2013). However, fearing the loss of control of the area under the tributary system and the rise of other rival Western influences, the British pressured Siam to reorganise its control over this area so as to better maintain this position (Koch, 1977). This resulted in the replacement of the loose system of provinces and vassal states into a central Thai administration which mirrored the methods used by the British in Western Malay states. Consequently, Siamese authorities began administering their own law in these states to adjudicate inheritance and divorce, increasing their direct contact with the local population. (Koch, 1977). This marked a huge deviation from the high degree of independence accorded to the Malay Peninsular as a vassal state, notably interfering in the practice of Islam. The discontentment of the Muslim Malays arose and local leaders pleaded with the British in Singapore to stop their oppression under the Siamese or they would look for a different foreign power to assist them in this way. This was deeply alarming to the British who called for the Siamese to prevent this and assert control more effectively to stop further insurgencies. The Siamese interpreted this as a removal of local structures and signalled for continued disregard to Islamic traditions. As such, in 1901, the Siamese abolished the tribute system and made the rajahs (the Malay rulers) relinquish administrative control to Siamese bureaucrats (Lamey, 2013).

The latest iteration of Siamese control was confirmed in the Anglo–Siamese treaty in 1909, which defined the borders of the modern state. The assimilation policies that followed this final establishment of direct control can be explained by a progressively centralised administration building upon the three pillars of the nation (initially under Siam and since 1938 under the name Thailand), the monarchy (Chakri Dynasty), and the religion (Theravada Buddhism) (Von Feigenblatt, 2010). These pillars opposed the cultural specificities of the newly annexed areas which had previously emphasised the importance of the Malay language and culture, Islam, and their alternative narrative of historical grievance (Lamey, 2013).

Contention between these two identities was particularly clear after Siam was renamed in favour of the Thai ethnic majority in 1939. This was further paired with the introduction of laws to aid the assimilation of Muslim Malays through the adoption of Thai names, dress, and language (Norton, 1971). These laws were repealed in 1946 with the new government, but alienation of the Malay people had already occurred. Subsequently, a variety of militant separatist movements arose, such as the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and the Patani United Liberation Organisation. Whilst violence levels and the prominence of such groups has fluctuated, notably dropping in the 1990s with short-lived signs of increasing central sensitivity to Southern provinces, violence has ultimately remained constant between 2004 and 2016, with more than 6,670 people killed and 12,231 wounded (Minority Rights Group, 2018). 

A pivotal moment to peace came in 2013 when the Yingluck government initiated the first official peace talks with the insurgents and acknowledged that the tension and violence in the South were not about poverty or criminality (Minority Rights Group, 2018). The BRN and the central government did not move past the confidence-building stages before the 2014 Thai coup d’état. The dynamic of Thai politics has continued to limit the consistency of discussions, most recently stopping for the 2023 Thai elections. This was paired with the hiatus for COVID-19, and has collectively meant that peace talks have been intermittent and so far unproductive, with the most recent wave starting in February of this year as hosted by Malaysia facilitating dialogue. A common theme throughout these talks is the impasse met as the central Thai government continues to try and preserve its regime, whilst the BRN pushes for decentralisation and autonomy (Frangia, 2023). 

Nevertheless, commentators find hope with the Pattani region in 2024 being the most stable it has been since the surge of violence in 2004 (Chambers, 2024), and with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who came to power in November 2022, approaching the discussions with increased energy. Even on the Thai side, civilians have been put in charge of the Deep South Policy, with an noticeably rising appetite to demilitarise the South, which is highlighted in the People’s Party’s policies to instead reorientate the military towards the Myanmar border. This optimism should not divert the reality of the evolving role of the military in Thai politics, which is significant because the new Thai civilian negotiators are no longer Pheu Thai royalists and therefore have peace policies that are vulnerable to interference from prime minister Prayut’s military forces. This dynamic has caused analysts, such as Paul Chambers from the Naresuan University in Thailand, to note that military moderation is necessary to create long-lasting progress and avoid back-tracking in the case of military disaccord (Chambers, 2024). With this moderation, however, there is a tangible expectation for ongoing stability.