Introduction

If confidence-building policies are to be effective in the South of Thailand, and the legacy of the stop-start peace process broken, a more holistic understanding of the relationship between the ethnically Malay Muslim communities and the Thai state is vital. Current commentaries, simplifying tensions to arbitrary waves of insurgent violence, often neglect the historic context that defines the ongoing tension. This issue brief shines a light on the evolving relationship between the Malay communities in the South of Thailand and the central government, to facilitate a more in-depth understanding of the claims of current actors and the potential pitfalls of future negotiations.

With the start of the Thai New Year, recent news from Thailand is flooded with the joyful water fights that accompany Songkran celebrations; however lost amongst the reports on the festivities are the concerns of analysts regarding potential upsurges in violence in the South of Thailand. Notably Crisis24 fears that the Songkran Buddhist celebration could lead to an intensification of ‘Muslim separatist violence’ along the Southern Thai-Malaysia border (Crisis24, 2024), where a hybrid of ethnic and religious tension has unfolded at varying intensities since Thai expansion and annexation of the kingdom of Pattani in 1902. This issue brief will contextualise this dynamicto provide a holistic explanation of how tensions and violence in the region originated. 

Reducing Thai-Malay relations tocurrent animosity at the border fails to acknowledge the longstanding, varied relations between the Malay communities and the Thai state. Notably, Thai-Malay relations began in the early 15th century and can be roughly divided into 3 distinct stages: tributary, colonial, and post-independence (Suwannathat-Pian, 2002).

Tree Statutes and a Deep Rooted Tributary Relationship

Thai-Malay relations can first be understood through their tributary dynamics. Historically, the Malay Peninsular paid tribute to Siam through gifts of tree statuesmade of silver and gold, which were sent from the states of the Malay Peninsular to the Siamese king as a sign of friendship, respect, and loyalty. 

Such a relationship was typical of the mandala system in Southeast Asia, which provided an alternative to the western understanding of power being situated in sovereign states, and instead reflected Hindu-Buddhist thought. Notably in this Mandala system, the centre of the universe was embodied by the powerful Siamese capital, in which the authority was concentrated and then dispersed across the region in concentric circles with authority asserted less and less as distance from the centre increased (Koch, 1977). As such, the northern Kingdoms of the Malay Peninsular were vassal states, which allowed for free movement between the areas the two ethnicities dominated and strong Malay-Thai ties through intermarriage. Consequently, the distinction between the Siam territory and the Malay states was made purely on geographical considerations as opposed to the ethnicity of the people (Suwannathat-Pian, 2002). Today, this has translated to the unique relationship between Thailand and Malaysia where a considerable amount of each state’s ethnic people are found on the opposing side of the border.  

The Removal of Local Structures through Colonial Pressure

Whilst the degree to which the tributary system was implemented varied depending on the strength of each Siamese monarch, it remained a consistent characterisation of relations up until the British colonisation of the Malay Peninsular. 

In the late nineteenth century, despite growing British influence in the Malay territories, Siam still exercised authority over the Northernmost states and was keen to maintain this position after the loss of other territory to the French (Lamey, 2013). British interests aligned with Siam’s possession of the territory, as they sought to use the state as a buffer between French and British colonies. The British did however fear the collapse of the loose tributary power arrangement between Siam and the Northern Malay states, and pressured Siam to reorganise its control over the area so as to better maintain its position (Koch, 1977). This resulted in the replacement of the loose system of provinces and vassal states by a centralised Thai administration, which mirrored the methods used by the British in Western Malay states. 

Consequently, Siamese authorities began administering their own law in these states to adjudicate inheritance and divorce, increasing their direct contact with the local population. (Koch, 1977). This marked a huge deviation from the high degree of independence accorded to the Malay Peninsular as a vassal state, notably interfering in the practice of Islam. This shift was met with contestation from Malay local leaders who pleaded with the British to stop their oppression under the Siamese, and also threatened calling on other foreign powers for assistance. This was deeply alarming to the British, who instructed the Siamese to prevent Malaysian rebellion and assert control more effectively to stop insurgencies. The Siamese interpreted the furthering of control with the removal of local structures and continued their disregard to Islamic traditions. As such, in 1901, the Siamese abolished the tribute system and made the rajahs (the Malay rulers) relinquish administrative control to Siamese bureaucrats (Lamey, 2013).

Siamese control was confirmed in the Anglo–Siamese treaty in 1909, which defined the borders of the modern state. The assimilation policies that followed this final establishment of direct control can be explained by a progressively centralised administration building upon the three pillars of the nation (Siam/Thailand), the monarchy (Chakri Dynasty), and the religion (Theravada Buddhism) (Von Feigenblatt, 2010). These pillars opposed the cultural specificities of the newly annexed areas which had previously emphasised the importance of the Malay language and culture, Islam, and their alternative narrative of historical grievance (Lamey, 2013).

The renaming of Siam in favour of the Thai ethnic majority in 1939 and the introduction of laws to aid the assimilation of Muslim Malays through the adoption of Thai names, dress, and language highlights an intensified iteration of repression between the two groups (Norton, 1971). 

Intermittent Violence and Unproductive Peace Talks

These laws were repealed in 1946 with the new government, but not before considerable alienation of the Malay people. Subsequently, a variety of militant separatist movements arose, such as the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and the Patani United Liberation Organisation. Whilst violence levels and the prominence of such groups has fluctuated, notably dropping in the 1990s with short-lived signs of increasing central sensitivity to Southern provinces, violence has ultimately remained constant between 2004 and 2016, with more than 6,670 people killed and 12,231 wounded (Minority Rights Group, 2018). 

A pivotal moment to peace came in 2013 when the Thai Yingluck government initiated the first official peace talks with the insurgents and acknowledged that the tension and violence in the South were not about poverty or criminality (Minority Rights Group, 2018). The BRN and the central government however could not move past the confidence-building stages before the 2014 Thai coup d’état. Thai political happenings have continued to limit the consistency of discussions, most recently stopping for the 2023 Thai elections. Political impediments paired with the hiatus for COVID-19, have collectively meant that peace talks have been intermittent and unproductive, with the most recent wave starting in February of this year as hosted by Malaysia facilitating dialogue. A common theme throughout these talks is the impasse met as the central Thai government continues to try and preserve its regime, whilst the BRN pushes for decentralisation and autonomy (Frangia, 2023). 

Conclusion

Despite a historically contentious relationship between Thailand and its Southern Malay, Muslim communities, commentators find hope with the Pattani region in 2024 being the most stable it has been since the surge of violence in 2004 (Chambers, 2024). Furthermore, the Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who came to power in November 2022, has approached the discussions with increased energy. Even on the Thai side, civilians have been put in charge of the Deep South Policy, with an noticeably rising appetite to demilitarise the South, which is highlighted in the People’s Party’s desire to instead orientate the military towards the Myanmar border. This optimism should not divert the reality of the evolving role of the military in Thai politics, which is significant because the new Thai civilian negotiators are no longer Pheu Thai royalists and therefore have peace policies that are vulnerable to interference from prime minister Prayut’s military forces. This dynamic has caused analysts, such as Paul Chambers from the Naresuan University in Thailand, to note that military moderation is necessary to create long-lasting progress and avoid back-tracking in the case of military disaccord (Chambers, 2024). Nevertheless there is a tangible expectation for ongoing stability, if the two sides can approach discussions with a holistic understanding of their complicated past.