Abstract

This paper explores Ho Chi Minh's enduring legacy, examining the evolution of his cult of personality from a political strategy to a figure of traditional religion in Vietnam. It argues that while Ho Chi Minh initiated the creation of his myth, the Communist Party manipulated it to legitimise its authority, utilising his legacy in varying ways depending on the context and goal. The population has adapted his legacy for religious purposes, highlighting the blurred lines between political and traditional religion.

“Take Ho Chi Minh out of Vietnam, and what is its driving force? For many Vietnamese, whatever their views of the late leader, there is no other figurehead” (Marsch, 2012). This statement by BBC journalist Viv Marsh encapsulates the significance of the late president in present-day Vietnam. Even half a century following his demise, his presence is ubiquitous—his image adorning banknotes and classroom walls, his teachings and name recurring in public addresses (Marouda, 2013). Even though we could interpret this purely from a symbolic angle, the legacy of Ho Chi Minh goes much deeper. Born at the end of the 19th century under the name Nguyen Sinh Cung, Ho Chi Minh at a young age departed to France to pursue his studies. However, facing rejection, he embarked on travels around the world before returning to France where he petitioned for Vietnam's self-determination at the Versailles peace talks, albeit unsuccessfully. Later, he co-founded the French Communist Party before leaving for Moscow where he was employed by Comintern. Subsequently, he relocated to China as an agent of Comintern, engaged in further travels, and then returned to China. Finally, in 1941, he returned to Vietnam and established Viet Minh. In 1945, he became the president of the newly founded Democratic Republic of Vietnam and stayed as the leader of North Vietnam until his death in 1969 (Duiker, 2000). His life story contains many gaps, creating uncertainty regarding his whereabouts and activities. His personality is however inextricably linked to the Communist Party of Vietnam which has been the ruling party of North Vietnam since 1954 and then of unified Vietnam since 1975. 

 This essay will focus on the figure of Ho Chi Minh with a primary emphasis on his enduring legacy in Vietnam from his passing to the present day. It asks the following research questions: (1) How has the legacy of Ho Chi Minh been shaped by the Communist Party in Vietnam? and (2) How did state officials utilise it for their own legitimacy, while the population adapted it for religious purposes? These questions allow us to exemplify the concepts of Vietnamese communism and religion through Ho Chi Minh by drawing on secondary sources of renowned academics such as Hue-Tam Ho Tai, William Duiker, Olga Dror, and Chung Van Hoang. It seeks to integrate prior research on the engineered construction of the myth of Ho Chi Minh from above with the bottom-up phenomena of his deification. The paper argues that the creation of the cult of personality was constructed by Ho Chi Minh himself but was later taken over and maintained by the party aiming to create a coherent justifying master narrative. However, the party has been utilising his legacy in varying ways across different contexts, emphasising either his communist identity tied to the international perspective or his patriotic identity linked with domestic affairs. Lastly, the paper will present how the legacy of the late president has been appropriated by the population within a religious context filling in the absence of religion stemming from atheist communist principles, finally blurring the boundary between political and traditional religion. 

Construction of the Myth of Ho Chi Minh for Party's Legitimacy

Political religions are rarely created for the personal glorification of the leader, but rather they are demanded by structural features of certain political systems (Dror, 2016). Communist regimes throughout history have required a figurehead for political legitimacy, as exemplified by Lenin, Stalin, or Mao. Vietnamese communism was no exception.

Forging The Glorious Myth of Ho Chi Minh for the Establishment of Independent Vietnam 

Establishing the myth of Ho Chi Minh was imperative for the newly independent Vietnam to gain both domestic and international support in times of dire need, while also providing a blueprint for the functioning of the state. The Communist Party in Vietnam, in order to succeed, had to unite around a singular figure for several reasons. Firstly, there was a profound lack of awareness regarding Marxist doctrine or events unfolding in Russia after the 1917 October Revolution due to restrictions of the French colonial regime out of apprehension of sparking nationalist sentiments (Duiker, 1995). Hence, it was easier to focus on a personality invoking communist ideals rather than a complex political program. Secondly, as the war with France was unavoidable due to unsuccessful peace negotiations, the Vietnamese communists needed international support. They hoped to make their cause known by popularising the struggle of Vietnam illustrated by the figure of Ho Chi Minh abroad (Dror, 2016).

Two biographies were created in 1949, one titled Vignettes of President Ho's Life and Activities by Tran Dan Tien and the other titled Biography of President Ho by Tran Ngoc Dang. According to Olga Dror, they are the same book (Dror, 2016). Both were probably, in reality, written by Ho Chi Minh himself or his close associates. They introduce the persona of Ho Chi Minh through different stories from his life before he came back to Vietnam in 1941. They position him as the leader of the nation but also as Uncle Ho to all of the Vietnamese. Ho Chi Minh supposedly wrote in 1947: “I do not have a family, and do not have children either. Vietnam is the great family of mine” (Dror, 2016, p. 454). The biographies carefully crafted an image of a leader without a personal life who was too focused on the liberation of his country. The need for international support is noted in the Chinese version of Vignettes, where an expression of loyalty to China is asserted, noting a plea for assistance (Dror, 2016).

Through his figure, the population was introduced to the new order and informed of their loyalty to the new state. The biographies taught the people that what is published and asserted by the state is to be taken as the truth despite chronological confusions or authorship controversies. The narrative created by the Party was not to be questioned, it was to be believed unconditionally (Dror, 2016). Speculations around how much the cult was created by Ho Chi Minh himself ensued. Dror (2016) asserts that he was involved as the information shared is too personal to be known by anyone else. However, as he became a background figure in the regime, the cult was taken over by the party. As Hue-Tam Ho Tai explains: “Ho is trapped in a myth largely of his own making, while the meaning of his life is buried under the weight of clashing, equally unyielding, master-narratives” (Tai, 1995, p. 287).

Reproduction of the Myth by the Party Cementing Communist Rule

The party leaders utilised the figure of Ho Chi Minh to produce a coherent narrative justifying their regime. After his death, he could be elevated to a semi-mythical status further emphasising the necessity of a communist regime in Vietnam. The unwavering obedience to Uncle Ho was to be transposed onto one of the states, Ho Chi Minh and Vietnam became one. The concept of a Marxist linear history could foster the universal acceptance of the notion that there is no alternative to communist rule (Tai, 1995). Many anti-communist Vietnamese exiles assert that “the myth of Ho Chi Minh is linked with the legitimacy of the Communist Party” (Marsh, 2012). If the myth is removed, other possibilities for the arrangement of the state are easier to imagine hence the myth becomes vital for the survival of the party. We can see several examples of the ruling power being aware of their precarious position. They were conscious of it from the beginning, which is demonstrated by the mummification of Ho Chi Minh which went against his wishes as expressed in his testament but allowed for the myth to be maintained and possess a tangible reminder. Ho Chi Minh’s Mausoleum has not only become a tourist destination for students to visit but also, more significantly, plates a role in instilling the ideology in youth. Furthermore, the party rejects any dissenting opinion of Uncle Ho. Specifically, his conjugal relations and natal family became the point of contention. The party tried to push forward the narrative of the late president living a celibate life (Dror, 2016). This was however disproven by William Duiker in his biography of Ho Chi Minh which revealed his past marriages and affairs. For the publication of the book in Vietnam, the party demanded certain parts to be removed (“Great ‘Uncle Ho’ May Have Been a Mere Mortal,” 2002). If the celibate image of Ho Chi Minh was to be discarded, the myth of him choosing the country over his family would be disproven and his glorious aura would be diminished. 

The construction and perpetuation of the legacy and myth of Ho Chi Minh or Uncle Ho have been instrumental in shaping Vietnam's political landscape. Most probably initiated by Ho Chi Minh himself but later taken over by the party leaders, the myth served to construct a unified nation, garner initial support, and justify the regime's authority. Lately, challenges to the idealised image have arisen, but they are strictly rejected by the Party.

Diverse State Efforts in Shaping Ho Chi Minh's Legacy

The enormous power and endurance of the myth of Ho Chi Minh allow for it to be pertinent long after his death. The inherent enigmatic qualities of a myth facilitate its interpretation and manipulation for various purposes. As the historian Sophia Quinn-Judge explains, anyone can “rebrand” Ho Chi Minh (Marsch, 2012).

Ho Chi Minh as a Communist Leader Commanding International Esteem

One current aims to assert the view of Ho Chi Minh as an international communist, emphasising his past as a Comintern agent and founding member of the French Communist Party. This allows for the focus to be on the communist legacy and the need for its continuation. It can be best exemplified by the aforementioned mummification and deposition of Ho Chi Minh's body in a mausoleum. The embalming was inspired by the same procedure being done to other communist leaders, aiming to elevate Ho Chi Minh to their level and adhere to the international communist tradition (Tai, 1995). As Tai asserts, the isolated location of the mausoleum results in the feeling that “the person entombed in the mausoleum is Ho the world leader, not Uncle Ho of popular memory. His body may lie on Vietnamese soil, but his soul no longer belongs to the people of Viet Nam; it has migrated to an international pantheon of Communist figures” (Tai, 1995, p. 281). Furthermore, as the building was designed at the time North Vietnam was planning its final blow to its Southern enemy, it serves as a reminder of the victory over the United States, projecting outward and emphasising Vietnam's global standing (Tai, 1995). Another example can be found in the celebration of Ho Chi Minh's birthday as explained by Dror in her work. In the Vietnamese culture of his time, celebrations of birthdays were not common. The date of Uncle Ho's birth was to be celebrated hence not necessarily for the domestic audience, but more for the international one where similar commemorations are common resulting in the creation of international legitimacy of the leader (Dror, 2016).

This utilisation of Ho Chi Minh's legacy has been harshly criticised as for many it goes against his direct wishes. Many emphasise his nationalist ideas over his communist identity. The historian William Duiker questions the late-president's allegiance and belief in communism and rather sees it as a convenient framework for mobilisation towards liberation and as a prerequisite for the practical support of the USSR (Duiker, 2000, p. 673-689). Quinn-Judge agrees and presents him as “a believer in social justice but not in scorched-earth communism” (Marsch, 2012).

Ho Chi Minh as a Patriot Enabled by the Invention of Tradition

The other dominant current presents Ho Chi Minh mainly as a patriot hence narrowing the lens to domestic affairs and fuelling nationalist sentiments often based on a construction of the past. Patriotic feelings had been firstly hard to evoke as Vietnam was seen as weak and unable to catch up with its rapidly developing neighbours which was amplified by the registered corruption in the state. There was simply not that much to be proud of and the past image of Vietnam as a David to America's Goliath was too distant. The state however cleverly adapted its stance and instead created a cult of frugality. Ho Chi Minh and his ascetic lifestyle made it almost too easy. Here our focus can shift to another commemoration place of Ho Chi Minh. The house where Uncle Ho lived was simple, as he refused to reside in the old colonial palace. Books of Woodrow Wilson's have been kept in the house drawing back to Ho Chi Minh's quest for self-determination, emphasising the main goal of his political career, one of independence from the colonial oppressor. Overall, Tai notes an absence of ideological rigidity which could symbolise the willingness to shift from communist doctrine. The house has been proposed as a site of almost religious significance, with state dignitaries routinely taken there for official visits (Tai, 1995).

However, the positioning of the house as a symbol of local tradition invokes the concept of the invention of tradition by historian Eric Hobsbawm, defined as “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawm, 2012, p. 1), in this case, Ho Chi Minh’s house is a model example. Proposed as quintessentially traditionally Vietnamese, the house was built on stilts a unique feature not found in other lowland houses and that is due to it being constructed by the French colonialists (Tai, 1995).

We must question the notion of tradition at its core. It is constructed and aims to create a singular correct form and purpose (Asad, 2009). Tai explains that in Vietnam, history is mainly based on an oral tradition due to either the absence of a writing system or its limited use. However, at present, it has been rigidified and serves as a justification for Uncle Ho's patriotic identity (Tai, 1995). The shaping of Ho Chi Minh's myth serves various goals, reflecting the disputes over the future path of the party. One strand emphasises Vietnam's place in the global communist movement while the other focuses on his nationalist ideals drawing back on a tradition that has been largely constructed. Altogether, the state manipulation of the legacy highlights the interplay between history, memory, and ideology. 

Popular Religious Adaptation of Ho Chi Minh's Legacy

Even though the myth of Ho Chi Minh was singularly constructed and shaped by the state, the population has adapted it for its own means, particularly to fill the void of a religious figure. This allowed for the political religion based on the cult of personality of the late president to be transformed into a more traditionally shaped worship.

Absence of Religion Allowing the Transformation of Political to Traditional Worship

The state has been unable to craft a master narrative that enjoys universal acceptance. This task has been made difficult due to the widespread popularity of Ho Chi Minh, particularly in the North. It is unrealistic to expect a unanimous interpretation of any symbol, particularly with the inherent mysteriousness of a myth (Tai, 1995). Hence, the population was able to create their own interpretation resulting in the deification of Ho Chi Minh. The enigmatic aura around his figure allows for a transition from an emphasis on his individual traits to him embodying an archetypal local deity or fitting “the familiar mould of the local gods” as explained by Tai (1995, p. 278).

The persona of Ho Chi Minh has been largely incorporated into Buddhist traditions, as can be seen with altars and shrines dedicated to him. He has been further integrated into already existing places of worship (Chung, 2017). A void in religious space must be acknowledged in Vietnam, where religion under communist rule came to be perceived as an obstacle to the nation's liberation and development. In the beginning, the party aimed to create a secular state, one where private and religious spheres are separated, meaning the State should be neutral when it comes to religious matters. However, instead of the secular sphere being devoid of any religious aspect it enabled the creation of a political religion which is defined by Emilio Gentile (2006, as cited in Dror, 2016) as "the sacralization of a political system founded on an unchallengeable monopoly of power, ideological monism, and the obligatory and unconditional subordination of the individual and the collectivity to its code of commandments.” After the emergence of a political religion centred around Ho Chi Minh, it did not take long before he was elevated to the status of a fully-fledged religious figure in traditional terms (Chung, 2017).

A consequence of the deification of Ho Chi Minh is the creation of an ideal for state leaders highlighting a sharp contrast between him and current politicians, therefore inviting criticism. Additionally, worshippers can criticise the party leaders for failing to meet their obligations to the deity of Ho Chi Minh who becomes an eternal authority for all (Chung, 2017).

Doi Moi Facilitating the Emergence of Religion in the Traditionally Secular Scene

Since 1986, the state of Vietnam has adopted the policy of Doi Moi, meaning renovation and breaking away from a centrally-planned economic model to a market economy. This allowed for a partial liberalisation and religious professionals to engage with the secular sector, hence participating in economic, cultural, or social activities. The government issued an article stating: “Belief and religion are spiritual needs of a part of the population. These needs exist today and will co-exist with the nation during the building to socialism” (Resolution No. 25-NQ/TW, as cited in Chung, 2017). Religion has hence shifted from being seen as purely a private matter to one of public interest. The secularity of the state has been disturbed and the ruling party has started interfering in the religious landscape of the country. It sets precise guidelines for ritual practice, local authorities directly shape the form of performance of religion, and national leaders have increased their presence in spiritual ceremonies on behalf of the state. This results in religion becoming a tool for the state to mobilise people and reinforce its central authority (Chung, 2017).

 An interesting example can be found in the Peace Society of Heavenly Mediums, where Ho Chi Minh is worshipped as a deity, specifically the Jade Buddha. The religion emerged in the 1990s as a reaction to the Doi Moi resulting in the integration into the world economy as well as a response to the tensions over territory with China. It dreams of a drastic social transformation reacting to these challenges and emphasises nationalist thinking around the figure of Ho Chi Minh. Previously, it was taboo to turn the late president into a religious object but Doi Moi lifted this unwritten ban. The state's reaction to new religions is still unclear. On one hand, there seems to be a clear distinction between tolerance for private worship of Ho Chi Minh and official refusal to recognize such communities. The state is taking its time to evaluate the validity of these churches, and may we say their threat. In the history of Vietnam, religious followings should not be underestimated, exemplified by the impact of Cao Dai or Hoa Hao. On the other hand, inconsistency in policing between local authorities enables groups such as the Peace Society of Heavenly Mediums to strengthen. Specifically, we observe less repression of groups worshipping Ho Chi Minh as it in a sense follows the party policy (Chung, 2017).

 The popular adaptation of Ho Chi Minh's legacy unveils an interplay between traditional and political religion. This leads to increased deification and hence idealisation of Ho Chi Minh, creating an unattainable ideal for politicians. The Doi Moi resulted in the secular character of the state fading away and enabled the authorities to interfere in religious affairs. The state has not set a clear policy on the administration of these religious groupings, possibly assessing their threat.

The legacy of Ho Chi Minh, shaped by both the man himself and his party, initially aimed to unify the nation and later legitimise the regime. However, the inherent ambiguity of a myth led to internal disputes over ideological direction, either emphasising his communist identity to bolster the regime or prioritising his patriotic goals invoking nationalist sentiments by inventing tradition. Both essentially led to the creation of political religion despite communist atheist doctrine. The population adapted this political religion to fit traditional contexts and worship practices to serve their own goals. The declining secularism now facilitates both the flourishing of intensified worship as well as increasing state control over religion.

Throughout this essay, we have focused on the idolisation and mythification of the late President Ho Chi Minh. These processes have primarily unfolded among older generations who were directly impacted by the struggles of liberation and unification. We must contemplate, how will younger generations who have grown up in a free and now economically prospering Vietnam interpret the myth of Uncle Ho. Will they utilise it in different ways or will it diminish in prominence, leaving a void for symbols hence justifications of the communist regime in Vietnam?