The presence of China in Central Asia

Gauthier Gaul-Quiniou

Abstract

The starting of the New Silk Road Initiative was made by the President of China, Xi Jinping, in 2013 at Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan. These new roads go mainly through Central Asia, which has become a new angle of new and former power, as is evidenced by the recent diplomatic visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to Uzbekistan. However, despite the recent opening up of these countries, it is often said to be jointly managed by both Russia and, more recently, China. 

Analysing China’s relationship with the Central Asian countries, this paper attempts to understand the different levels of cooperation with China in the region. It explores security and cooperation ties, the recent economic boom, and the opening up of the Central Asian countries to determine why their relationships with China vary. However, despite these increasingly significant economic, energetic, security, and diplomatic ties with China, there are still other powers that are more integrated in the region. The presence of China should therefore be nuanced. 

Keywords: China, Central Asia, economy, security, One Belt One Road Initiative, 

In 1919, Halford Mackinder, in his book Democratic Ideals and Reality, described one of the most important geopolitical notions: the concept of a heartland. Based on historical and contemporary events, he concludes that the country or nation controlling the heartland, which he describes as the pivotal land on the map, would be able to control the world. This famous concept has been used by journalists to describe a certain geopolitical aspect of the Chinese One Belt One Road initiative. Indeed, no more than 3 Silk Road corridors go through Central Asia, the place of the heartland. The notion of Central Asia first emerged from the Prussian geographer Alexander von Humboldt in 1843 about the historical region of nomadic people participating in the Silk Road trade. However, the modern definition of central Asian countries refers to the independent states previously included within the USSR. China has developed a strong interest in the region both by being the first to recognise the independence of the countries and by launching the project One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR), also known as the New Silk Road, in Astana, Kazakhstan, on September 7th, 2013. The increasing presence of China in Central Asia in recent years across different fields has raised questions about China’s goals in this region. Understanding China’s presence in Central Asia requires a nuanced look at different actors and factors. 

The creation of a significant nexus and integration of China in the region

One of the first main issues with the newly independent countries was the recognition of the People’s Republic of China, and not the Republic of China (Taiwan). Through proximity between the countries and diplomatic policy, the exclusive recognition of the People’s Republic of China was easily and quickly done. The second main issue that concerned China was the security of the region. Three countries in this region have borders with Afghanistan, making them unstable and problematic for China for many reasons. First, China does not have a good relationship with the Taliban. During the Cold War, China began financing the Mujahidin to fight against the USSR in 1976. This created conflict with the Taliban and led to the protection and support of the different Islamic groups of the region. Some of these groups were the independentist movement from Xinjiang, the western part of China. Xinjiang was integrated into China in 1949 and was more or less stable until the 1990s, when conflict and independence movements started to rise. One particular uprising in 1990, the Barin uprising, was a turning point for the communist party, which considered such independence movements to be organised riots. Since that time, China has engaged in the repression and suppression of the different extremist groups in Xinjiang. As a result, most of them went to Afghanistan, including the Turkistan Islamic Party as well as other Islamic groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which wanted to overthrow the Uzbek president of that time, Islam Karimov. 

In order to help these countries secure their border with Afghanistan and share information, China implemented the “Shanghai Five'' in April 1996, gathering China, Tajikistan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan to collaborate on these issues. This cooperation led to the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (上海合作组织) in 2001, focusing on the 3 Evils Fight (三股势力), meaning the fight against terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. This treaty remains a security treaty, not a military one, currently existing as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) under the direction of Russia. As a result, aside from some common exercises, the cooperation focused exclusively on the securitization of the border. China mainly cooperates with Tajikistan since Tajikistan has the longest border with Afghanistan, and Afghanistan hosts a large community of Tajik people. Due to its weak economy and slow development, as well as traumatic experiences with radical Islamist groups, Tajikistan seeks economic and security help from China. Reciprocally, China seeks the stability of the border as two corridors of the OBOR initiative go through the region; therefore, China seeks the transfer of weapons for public security, such as anti-aircraft defences sent to Uzbekistan in 2015. Despite these efforts, for China, the most important method to stabilise the area remains economic development .

Before the OBOR initiative, the Chinese government had already implemented policies, such as the Great Western Development Strategy 西部大开发, to develop and boost the economy of the western part of its territory. Through the One Belt One Road initiative, these policies were integrated into a more multilateral and global project. The port and SEZ (Special Economic Zone) of Korgos have become a sort of symbol of Chinese investment and the rise of trade in the region, representing a significant increase in trade between China and the other Central Asian countries. Except for Kazakhstan, most Central Asian countries have a negative trade balance with China, exporting more natural and raw resources and importing more manufactured goods. Coordination and trade between the different actors in the region were one of the core subjects discussed at the Xi'an summit in 2023. The summit gathered all the Central Asian countries in China and insisted on the need for common development in the region. The plan for a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Highway was enacted during this summit after approximately 10 years of planning. This should cost $4.5 billion and boost trade between China and Uzbekistan. Despite its scale, Kyrgyzstan would like to make it longer, expanding it through various important cities and opening up some of its underdeveloped regions. Finally, in addition to trade, China is also present in Central Asia through its investments. According to the Kazakhstan Bank, $18.5 billion was invested by China in Kazakhstan between 1993 and 2008. However, in addition to the different projects, this increased Kazakhstan’s debt to China, creating fear among the population.

Finally, China is working on the creation of a significant energy nexus. For China, the diversification of its supply of natural resources is important for its economy. On the other hand, since their independence, most of the countries in Central Asia have tried to diversify through their trading partners. In the case of Kazakhstan, the country tries to balance the influence of Russia in its economy. Therefore, Kazakhstan’s national oil company, KazMunayGas, developed, in conjunction with China’s National Petroleum Corporation, the China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline. Through this pipeline, 14 billion tons of oil are provided per year to China. Turkmenistan is also an important supplier of gas to China. For Turkmenistan, supplying gas to China represents approximately 80% of its exports since both Russia and Iran stopped trading with them. Since 2009, China has built increasing numbers of pipelines to access Turkmenistan’s oil. Line D, China’s fourth pipeline, is currently under construction and, when completed, will transport an additional 30 billion cubic metres of oil per year from Turkmenistan. This project was pushed forward by President Xi Jinping during the Xi’an Summit, almost a decade after the beginning of the project. Nonetheless, contrary to the security program developed by China, Russia seems to look at Line D as a potential rival to the Power of Siberia 2, linking Russia to China.

A presence to be nuanced by various factors and actors.

In almost all Central Asian countries, the strengthening of China’s  relationship with their neighbors is not without worries. The Central Asia Barometer surveys the different opinions and feelings of the populations towards China in Central Asia. Collected every two years, it shows a clear and sharp decrease in the appreciation of China between 2017 and 2021. This can largely be explained by the events that each country has faced. The case of Kazakhstan is particularly interesting because of its common history with Russia. They consider their annexation by the Russian Empire and then by the USSR as the result of colonialism, a claim that Russia denies from time to time. In contrast, China does not have any history of colonial administration on Kazakhstan’s territory. However, increasing common projects have made the population more suspicious of China. The fear of losing the sovereignty of the country is strong in both Kazakhstan’s elites and in its general population. China has explicitly attempted to avoid being viewed as a coloniser by avoiding specific conditions in its contracts. Despite the absence of these conditions, the population, especially the Kazakh nationalists, is active in the public movement against Chinese influence. This was the case in 2016 when protests against the joint creation of 55 Chinese farms in Kazakhstan occurred. According to nationalists, this project is reminiscent of the Virgin Lands campaign, where the USSR imposed the rise of crops in the region in 1953. Similar protests happened in 2016 when civil societies protested a land reform policy that would allow foreigners to rent land for the next 25 years. The population is still concerned about the previous power’s influence. In Kazakhstan, the population fears the Russian nationalists' denial of the current territory. These fears and suspicions are shared in other countries, in addition to the traditional worries about Russia.

Indeed, despite the increasing presence of China, Russia also plays a critical role in the region. The ties between Central Asian countries and Russia are still strong, and many people from these countries cross the border to work in Russia. The migration of these workers plays an important role in their state GDP. For instance, these workers produce approximately 11% of Uzbekistan’s GDP and around 33% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP. Relations with Russia mostly coincide with the Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance created between Russia and its former republics in 2002. Although they conduct frequent military exercises, the usefulness of the organisation was often criticized until January 2022. Rising gas prices, corruption, and other factors caused sudden uprisings, forcing Kazakhstan to ask for Russia’s help through the CSTO. The quickness of the repression confirmed the presence and stranglehold of Russia, even in countries that contest, to some extent, its authority. Indeed, in the case of Kazakhstan, the Cyrillic alphabet will be changed to the Latin alphabet in 2025, expressing both the decline of Russian influence and the will of Kazakhstan to avoid the predominance of Russia.

Finally, the presence of both Russia and China in Central Asia is also influenced by the sporadic presence of other actors in the region. Although not present in military or political agreements, the member states of the European Union are the most important partners of some countries in Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. For instance, in 2019, in Kazakhstan, European states were the first investors in the country, with the Netherlands being the first investor and contributing $7.9 billion. As a result, 95% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports are destined for the European Union. In exchange, Europe provides Kazakhstan with cosmetics, medicines, and medical equipment, as well as various other goods. Similarly, Uzbekistan has started to open and diversify its trade partners, as expressed by the recent diplomatic visit of Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to France. Uzbekistan collaborated with France to organise three exhibitions in Le Louvre, Musée Guimet, and l’Institut du Monde Arabe. France also has plans for more cooperation in terms of improving water management and investment in Kazakhstan, with a total cost of 5 billion euros. Additionally,  French companies like Total, Orano, and Airbus are expected to be more present in Kazakhstan in the future. 

Conclusion

China’s presence in the Central Asian region was initially for security purposes but has expanded economically to increase stability, energetic supply, and support for its One Belt One Road initiative. To achieve these goals, China has invested heavily in the region. While the previously dominant power in Central Asia, Russia sees the security programs and other investments as unproblematic, the diversification of Chinese gas suppliers and pipelines in the region is more contested. Finally, the Central Asian countries have implemented a policy of diversification in their economies and decreased their ties with Russia, which remains important in the region. However, opposition to Chinese projects and China in the region exists, stemming from a fear of colonisation and losing national sovereignty.

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