The Rise of Japan’s Defense Security in Light of Neighboring Threats
By Lalin Duangphatra
Introduction
Roughly one decade subsequent to the first publication of the National Security Strategy (NSS) by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2013, concerns over the country’s security environment escalated to the point that it became describable as ‘the most severe and complex as it has ever been since the end of World War II’ (National Security Strategy of Japan, 2022). Unforeseen results from government polls conducted over the last months of 2022 revealed 41.5 percent of the public sentiment being positive toward the prospective expansion of Self-Defense Forces, shortened as SDF, to ensure the security of Japan and its surrounding maritime areas (Kosuke, 2023).
The cornerstone of Japan’s defensive strategy redirection is the implementation of the newly amended NSS by current Prime Minister Kishida Fumio in 2022, complemented by two defense-related policy documents: the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program (Sasaki, 2023). Overburdened with a multiplicity of global and regional challenges, Japan attempted to adjust the status quo of heavy reliance of defensive capabilities on its allies into the possession of appropriate means to launch a counterattack on its opponents when necessary (Fukuda, 2023). As a strategic partner of NATO, Japan plans to double its expense in the category of defense to 2 percent of its GDP (Hawkins, 2023). This will enable the purchase of hypersonic weapons from the United States such as ammunition, fighter jets, and long-range tomahawks missiles that are capable of striking China and other adversaries in the region (Kosuke, 2023).
China’s Assertiveness in Maritime Spaces and Its Partnership with Russia
Labeled as ‘a matter of serious concern’ and ‘the greatest strategic challenge’ in the newest NSS (Fukuda, 2023), China has become Japan’s top priority in East Asian security concerns due to the constant rise of its annual defense budget. According to the SIPRI military expenditure database, China has a higher missile capability as compared to Japan (Yuki and Reynolds, 2022). Following the statement of former Japanese President Hu Jintao in 2012 demonstrating his strong interest to ‘build China into a maritime power’, Chinese President Xi Jinping began asserting China’s naval dominance over the Indo-Pacific region and against the United States’ increasing geopolitical and diplomatic interests in Asia (Duchâtel, Bräuner, and Seibel, 2015).
One of the most significant territorial disputes between China and Japan is the overlapping exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, leading to increasing tensions on possible aircraft crash incidents (Duchâtel, Bräuner, and Seibel, 2015). Chinese public vessels’ active circulation near the waters of the Senkaku Islands also sparked the public awareness of China as a possible military threat (Fukuda, 2023). Moreover, the military conflict over the Taiwan Strait in August 2022 resulted in heightened security concerns for Japan, as the deployment of Chinese ballistic missiles to the north of Taiwan landed in the Japanese EEZ, only shorter than 200 nautical miles to the baseline (Lee and Wu, 2022). Finally, as recently as in February 2023, the United States’ shootdown of unidentified flying objects imposed allegations towards China. This raised suspicions over similar cases in Japan; uproar broke out as to whether the balloons spotted over Japan’s Sendai airspace were for Chinese espionage purposes, as it would be considered as a ‘totally unacceptable’ territorial violation (Reynolds, 2023).
China has consistently fostered its relations with Russia since the 1990s, as the two nations both share distrust towards the Western countries and NATO in terms of geopolitics and diplomacy, while also mutually relying on each other for the supply of energy and weaponry. Although China has not openly supported Russia’s economy or the Ukraine conflict, ECFR’s Bachulska analyzed that China would still provide help in the worst-case scenario for the sake of its economic stability (Ellyatt, 2023). Following the evolution of Russia in North East Asian security as well as the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the perception of the Japanese public unveils fear towards Russia as a potential threat (Okuyama, 2023). The development of Chinese-Russian relations may become a probable threat to Japan and its alliance with the West.
The Two Koreas: The Dominance of North Korean Threats and The Obstacle to South Korean Relations
The adoption of the NSS last December caused protests in Seoul, as North Korea announced to take a ‘decisive military step’ in response to Japan’s possession of counterstrike capabilities (Kim, 2022), claiming that the ability that Japan could preemptively attack other countries threaten East Asian security. North Korea has been described as a ‘grave and imminent threat’ in Japan’s NSS since 2018 due to its frequent missile tests in which one triggered the Japanese missile alert system last October. The latest version of the NSS emphasized its goal to entirely denuclearize North Korea with the implementation of sanctions in collaboration with the United States and South Korea.
In spite of Japan recognizing South Korea as its like-minded security partner, the strengthening of this bilateral relationship remained unsettled due to the past grievances between the two populations (Sakata, 2023). According to the public opinion surveys that measured South Korean citizens’ sentiments towards Japan, albeit showing an unprecedentedly rising trend in 2022, 52.8% of the respondents still held a ‘bad impression’. 6 out of 10 answers are optimistic about the future, but without government’s concrete efforts in taking steps to improve ties, expectations are yet to be met (The Genron NPO, 2022). South Koreans’ misery during Japan’s annexation of the Korean peninsula in the first half of the twentieth century explained the lack of consensus towards the upgrade of SDF. The NSS of 2022 include such details concerning the long-lasting territorial dispute between the Dokdo Island of South Korea and the Takeshima Island of Japan, which unsurprisingly drove a wedge of frustration and unwelcome sentiments into successful policy implementation. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed displeasure towards the ‘unreasonable and greedy ambition’ of Japan (Shin, 2022).
A Potential Trilateral Cooperation
As North Korea’s constant launches of underwater drones, satellite programs, and intercontinental ballistic missiles have made headlines (Herskovitz and Lee, 2023), Japan’s NSS illustrates its bold interest to reinitiate and enhance the trilateral US-Japan-ROK relationship along with an aim to boost real-time info-sharing on Pyongyang's missile testing. Japan’s past ineffective attempts in predicting missile launches evoked the need to upgrade its defensive technology. The General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) has allowed both Tokyo and Seoul to directly exchange details of intelligence from and to Washington, but a system between the two East Asian countries is yet to be established (The Japan Times, 2023).
With the perception of South Korea as a ‘highly important neighboring country’ in Japan’s geopolitical strategy, as stated in the newly published NSS of 2022, Japan affirmed the necessity to amend its friendship with South Korea through the opportunity of establishing a trilateral partnership with the United States (Sakata, 2023) in order to collectively defend their security interests against negative shifts (The Japan Times, 2023). The East Asian Summit in November 2022 resulted in the ‘Phnom Penh Statement’ on this partnership between the three countries regarding the Indo-Pacific security, economic prosperity, technology, climate crisis, as well as collaboration with ASEAN (The White House, 2022).
In a mild surprise, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin eventually announced the country’s favorable response at a news conference in March 2023, towards the vision of developing a ‘healthy Japan-South Korea relations’ with an aim in expanding political, economic, and cultural exchanges as well as its security-related cooperation. This plan was achieved thanks to the resolution of wartime labor disputes, where Japan’s main private sector companies gave a nod to fundraise for compensation and collectively build a ‘future youth fund’ for academic scholarships. Newly elected South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and his administration also confirmed the ‘future-oriented’ stance to repair ties with Tokyo, in which the United States President Joe Biden looks forward to the improved bilateral relations between its two major allies (Ninivaggi and Johnson, 2023).
Conclusion
The implementation of the 2022 National Security Strategy, aiming to potentially equip Japan with counterattack capabilities, has resulted in distinct responses from Indo-Pacific countries. China has climbed up to the ‘top priority’ in security concerns, due to its possible collaboration with Russia and its intelligence threats. North Korea delivered a strong opposition towards the policy and has remained assertive in missile-testing. Following the launch of the ‘new type’ of longer-range ballistic weapon near Hokkaido (Bae, 2023), the choice of militarism of North Korea is more certain than diplomatic engagement, and the aggression is likely to escalate exponentially upon the strengthened trilateral alliance between Japan, South Korea, and the United States. The reconciliation between Japan and South Korea is not all roses, as lingering pains from the colonized era instilled in South Koreans’ memories, but the two leaders have expressed agreement through a summit completed in Tokyo and a security talks scheduled on April 17 (Komiya, 2023). China-North Korea-Russia coordination is therefore an unlikely but expectable scenario for Pyongyang to counter its regional adversaries in Asia’s 21st-century arms race (Green, 2023) (Lendon, 2023).
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