Abstract
The South China Sea (SCS) crisis highlights the complexities of Southeast Asian foreign policy amid great power rivalries. This article analyzes the Philippines’ current foreign policy decisions through Carlos Escudé’s Peripheral Realism theory (1995). Peripheral Realism offers a framework for understanding how weaker states like the Philippines navigate relations with the US and China. The theory focuses on economic development, avoiding unnecessary confrontations, and strategic bandwagoning, which generally aligns with Philippine foreign policy but with certain contradictions. This concludes by calling for adaptation of Peripheral Realism to Southeast Asia’s unique geopolitical context; advocating for region-specific international relations models.

Geopolitical Paradigm of the South China Sea

The reignited crisis in the South China Sea is one of several escalating global hot spots due to the conflicting ambitions of states, great and small; but for those calling these regions home, it is an affair of survival. The current crisis is centered on a renewed standoff between the Philippines and the regional major power of China in Southeast Asia, the latter a great power rival of the Philippines’ best ally, the United States. The standoff, having begun as high seas maritime border incidents between belligerent Coast Guard vessels and their equivalent non-military naval assets, has culminated into near skirmishes, saber-rattling, and public relations martyrdom between a Washington-aligned Manila and a domineering Beijing at the Spratly Islands all the way to Philippine resupply missions as weapons brandished, personnel injured, and naval assets damaged (Center for Preventive Action, 2024; Kurlantzick & McGowan, 2024). For the most part, Manila has been on the back foot in the actual combat suffering unbalanced losses against their aggressive counterparts but is buffeted by positive general international opinion for the Philippines against China, which slowly fritters away its goodwill when it comes to its “core interests.” It appears that a combination of Philippine reactive deployment of its coast guard assets in April against assumed Chinese shoal occupation, renewed interference by hostile foreign powers on Chinese core interests, deployment of a US mid-ranged Typhon weapons system, and subsequent conflicts proceeding from late 2023 to early 2024 clashes are among the major causes of this year’s security tensions (Ibarra, 2024; Lariosa, 2024a). Yet one cannot rule out the recent Marcos administration’s realignment to the US after Duterte’s pivot to a pro-China, neutral Philippine, policy and the breakdown of de-escalation mechanisms and communication as easy kindling to a very volatile fire.

However, the Philippines is an outlier, Vietnam being another, in how the other South China Sea claimants engage with China whenever their exclusive economic zones or territorial waters are encroached upon. A majority of claimants often resolve disputes quietly as practice, even as the US and its allies openly engage in exercises in shows of force in the contested South China Sea (Kurlantzick & McGowan, 2024; Lariosa, 2024b). For instance, Brunei has remained silent on its claims despite occasional encroachment in favor of maintaining good relations with China as part of its hedging strategy (Dela Cruz, 2024; Putra, 2024). However, from 2021 onwards, claimants have been trending away from deference to varying levels of confrontation. One could argue that this less belligerent attitude toward Chinese aggressions is due to geographic position. So it is natural that China’s closest neighbors are the most belligerent as they share maritime borders. Another reason is China’s role as ASEAN’s largest trading partner and even the Philippines’. Though the extent of engagement with the major power tends to vary, the influence and reach remain constant. Regardless of the reasonings provided, a question continues to linger in the minds of everyday people who live at the heart of such conflicts. Why does the Philippines take such stances at its own detriment against a power that is not only deemed to one day supplant the old US unipolarity but a power that is right at the nation-state’s own doorstep? It is this article’s purpose to answer this question, what it means for Southeast Asian states and their people going forward, through the lens of South American I.R. theory—Peripheral Realism. 

Essentials of Peripheral Realism

Peripheral Realism, developed by Carlos Escudé in 1995, can be seen as a midway point between the ideas of balancing and bandwagoning featured in traditional I.R. theory to explain the state weaker powers fall into regarding how they engage with great or unipolar powers (Escude & Schneni, 2016). It stands as Latin America’s most comprehensive and exhaustive endeavor in recent history to answer the “autonomy” debate. Non-western I.R. scholars look to its foundation as a basis to build their own foreign policy theories and models, while the Anglo-American scholarship lauds it for making realism “realistic” as it covers the pitfalls of neorealism arguing that 1) There exists a state-society configuration with intervening variables that ultimately craft a foreign policy for the citizens’ benefit; 2) Security is not the ultimate national interest but economic development; 3) There exist hierarchies in the international system and its configurations help to explain why states act “irrationally” or against prior theoretical assumptions during the Cold War and early 90s. The theory sought to first establish the feasibility of a grand foreign policy dependent on both the capacity to mobilize resources and on democratic peace theory—where genuine democracies rarely war on others and almost never on each other. The formula that was formed to answer this was: 

Total foreign policy autonomy = absolute domestic tyranny

The formula assists in predicting what the structure of incentives was under American unipolarity and why there was no grand coalition of lesser powers to balance against the superpower after the Cold War. Instead, these lesser powers often bandwagoned with the superpower to balance against major regional powers, which were forming an autonomous foreign policy separate from the dictates of American unipolarity. It is important to note that the formula applies to both superpowers, great and lesser powers though it is less obvious in the former’s case. Escudé argues that statesmen or elite-centered regimes are more likely to have autonomous foreign policy as, ignoring the three concerns of neorealism mentioned earlier, they shift the cost of acting against the hierarchical constraints from the international system’s power distribution onto common citizens, affecting their well-being thus making it a domestic tyranny. Well-known examples include US opponents of Iran, Cuba, Saddam’s Iraq and recently Putin’s Russia after its Ukraine invasion which saw their civilians bear the costs of their elite’s autonomous foreign policy. It is somewhat debatable as to how one measures the democraticness of a state, but it is clear that having an autonomous foreign policy is costly and not easily borne by even great powers as such, there must exist heightened control of the state society configuration to maintain it. 

There is also a hierarchy present composed of three classes: Rule Makers, Rule Takers, and Rebels. The first are those who get to dictate the rules everyone abides by; according to Escude, this is the UNSC, but they are often the greatest rule breakers and often have an autonomous foreign policy. The second is split into industrialized, developing, and those unable to develop, falling between the core and periphery of the international system and often accepting the rules dictated because it is costly to do otherwise or because the rules are generally to their benefit. The last are those who exercise autonomous foreign policy in conflict with the rule makers and whose people are the worse off because of it. There is one other feature to the theory’s proposition and that is the systemic mobility inherent in it, so states can rise and fall up or down the ladder as fortunes grow or wane.

Thus we find five normative ideas that form the heart of his theory. First, national interest is defined as economic development for the citizenry. Second, the periphery is nonconfrontational with the core so long as the former’s material interest remains unaffected by the core’s policies. Third, avoid unproductive confrontations with Great Powers. Fourth, avoid ‘idealist’ and costly foreign policies. Fifth, examine bandwagoning advantages with dominant powers. While these are comprehensive, there are some gaps the author mentions, mainly the definition of citizen-wellbeing and the departure from acknowledging the subordinate status of Latin American states and realistic interpretation of their perspectives in the near future and that weaker states are always at risk of losing any gains made.

Philippines Foreign Policy in the South China Sea

The Philippines has long maintained a strong alliance with the United States, aligning with the preeminent superpower to safeguard national security, given its precarious geopolitical situation. This alignment is reinforced by entrenched military and diplomatic institutions that uphold a resilient pro-US stance, which even President Duterte could not override (Quezon, 2023). China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea have further complicated its attempts at strategic influence over the Philippines. Despite President Duterte’s initial pivot towards Beijing, the termination of the US Visiting Forces Agreement was suspended multiple times before being canceled, demonstrating the limits of China’s approach (Taffer & Walsh, 2023).

Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines pursued a hedging strategy similar to Duterte’s initial attempts to diversify foreign relations. Early in his term, Marcos embarked on high-level state visits and was notably welcomed in Beijing, underscoring efforts to balance relations. He advocated for collective bargaining with other states to strengthen regional positions (Quezon, 2022). However, incidents such as the 2023 Second Thomas Shoal laser attack on the Philippine Coast Guard marked a turning point, prompting a decisive pivot back towards Washington (Poling, 2024). Subsequent confrontations, including the June 17 clash and standoffs at Escoda Shoal, reinforced Manila’s reliance on the US as Beijing continued to prioritize its core interests (Ibarra, 2024).

US military support has extended beyond rhetoric, with significant deployments aimed at demonstrating solidarity and deterrence. The 2024 BALIKATAN exercise, featuring an unprecedented anti-ship missile launch and the participation of the French navy, signaled a shift towards more robust defense cooperation (Lariosa, 2024d). The MASA live-fire exercise involved F-35 jets, enhancing bilateral military interoperability. KAMANDAG exercises simulated joint responses to potential conflicts, such as a Taiwan crisis or a PLA invasion of Palawan, while the multi-lateral Exercise Sama-Sama expanded to include naval warfare drills (Lariosa, 2024b; Lariosa, 2024c). Additionally, the Philippine Armed Forces conducted joint service drills simulating island assaults, indicating a strategic shift towards external defense (Associated Press, 2024).

Behind the scenes, the Philippines has focused on enhancing its naval capabilities through updated strategic plans. The Philippine Navy’s “Re-Horizon 3” modernization plan has been revived, supplemented by a proposed Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (Lariosa, 2024e). Support from Japan and discussions on integrating national maritime organizations underscore this focus. The Cebu shipyards are poised to produce coastal defense vessels as part of this push. In July 2024, Marcos approved a major acquisition for new multi-role fighters, with contenders including the US F-16 and Sweden’s Gripen (Dangwal, 2024). The National Economic and Development Authority also sanctioned the purchase of 40 fast patrol craft for the Philippine Coast Guard, to be partially produced domestically with French assistance (Baird Maritime, 2024; Lariosa, 2024f).

Beyond defense, Philippine bandwagoning has influenced educational and legislative initiatives. The Department of Foreign Affairs first proposed in 2015 to educate Filipinos on maritime resources, including the West Philippine Sea (Macaraig, 2015). By 2023, the Department of Education aimed to integrate the West Philippine Sea issue into the Grade 10 curriculum (Galves, 2023). A legislative proposal sought to incorporate maritime issues and the UNCLOS ruling into the history curriculum (De Layola, 2024). Efforts are underway to embed this subject into both basic and tertiary education to bolster public awareness and counter misinformation (See, 2024). Recent legislation, including the Philippine Maritime Zones Act and the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act, aligned national laws with international maritime standards, drawing criticism from Beijing (Gita-Carlos, 2024).

President Marcos reiterates Philippine non-belligerence in the South China Sea continuing to hedge his bets on winning the court of public opinion on the “parliament of the high seas.” Yet he is not wholly committed to morally one-upping China as he has ordered his own officials to refrain from provocative statements or stances and continues to hold back deployment of his own navy vessels while the People’s Liberation Army Navy has been deployed for the first time on a similar capacity as its coast guard and naval militias (Bajo & Casucian, 2024; Tupas, 2024). There are also official statements, such as the one given regarding the US Task Force Ayungin in November, that seek to quell continued gossip of Philippine subordination to the US even as it continues to intervene in Chinese core interests with officials reiterating that there was no connection between the American Task Force and the ongoing Philippine operations in November (Nepomuceno, 2024). This shows a desire to de-escalate and repair relations even as Marcos’ house is in domestic turmoil, and he may be looking for a sure political victory to rally his odds. Alternatively, he may not be able to afford a continued standoff of the same scale as in June–September. Independent but linked to these affairs is the ongoing Philippine bid for a seat at the United Nations Security Council, citing its longstanding role as a founding member and riding on its calls for reform to expand the UNSC membership and bring greater transparency to the general UN membership (Cabuenas, 2024). It is no secret that much of the power is monopolized by the UNSC and even more so by its permanent members, the US and China among them. In this angle, what the Philippines is focusing on is an attempt to gain support for a spot on the seat. It is clear that gaining this seat would bolster the Philippine position in the South China Sea against China with its ongoing negotiations for a more equitable outcome.

Despite these strategic shifts, the Philippines maintains a nuanced approach regarding economic relations. While reportedly withdrawing from the Belt and Road Initiative, the economic impact was minimal as the Philippines has not been a major recipient of Chinese FDI. In terms of trade, China is the Philippines’ largest trading partner, with Japan and the US following in third and fourth, and there is expected to be a continuation of growing linkages between the two states irrespective of any geopolitical snafu. Experts note that while tensions may strain government-level cooperation, private-sector operations remain largely unaffected (Walker, 2023). President Marcos has sustained some of Duterte’s “Build, Build, Build” agreements and acknowledges China’s role as a key economic partner (China Briefing, 2024). Though China has engaged in economic coercion, current maritime tensions have not yet escalated to a level impacting economic ties, and Manila is unlikely to initiate such measures itself (Ordoñez, 2024).

Theory and Praxis

One may find I.R. theory as a predictive model to be either too restrictive or broad when examining the behavior of states within the international system. Theories can be reiterated, improved, or discarded as practice evolves and new explanations emerge to explain why nations act as they do, logically or illogically. Rarely do states follow established theories directly; instead, practice leads, and theory follows, often struggling to address contradictions. Such is the limitation of studying international relations; though state-centric in focus, it evolves through contributions from heads of state crafting strategies to policymakers assessing feasibility and to the boots on the ground enacting a nation-state’s will. Yet, there is a need to assess Philippine praxis with theory, even if developed under entirely different circumstances, as this offers a method to gauge whether Philippine foreign policy is wise or risky in today’s context. The same applies to Escudé’s Peripheral Realism, questioning its relevance outside Latin America and the era of its origin.

The Philippine national interest in the South China Sea (SCS)—defending its territorial waters against Chinese actions—is framed as a national security matter but also carries an economic dimension. The contested region is an economic treasure trove with untapped resources crucial for boosting geopolitical standing domestically and internationally. The national interest, though framed in security terms, is deeply tied to the region’s economic potential if its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) could be developed. Additionally, the western side of the Philippines, being less prone to typhoons than the Pacific coast, offers a logical focus for development, especially for a state with limited resources.

Philippine policy against Chinese aggression in what Manila regards as its lawful waters appears confrontational but does not necessarily conflict with the second tenet of Peripheral Realism for several reasons. First, China may not fully qualify as a core power, often considered semi-periphery by scholars, although this is debated in light of 21st-century developments. Second, the concept of “core” remains Eurocentric, reflecting the West’s dominance as rule-makers and industrial leaders over the past century. Third, despite political tensions, trade and economic ties between Manila and Beijing remain largely unaffected, with no significant economic retaliations linked to the SCS dispute. Philippine material interests tied to the global economy, in which China is a major player, remain intact. However, the inability to develop its EEZ due to Chinese actions arguably harms the Philippines’ material interests, making the issue a partial contradiction of Peripheral Realism.

It is natural for states to defend their sovereignty, especially when territorial disputes involve rich resources, but a recurring question arises: is it worth it? Is the Philippines’ approach pragmatic and aligned with its capabilities, or too idealistic? By most measures, the Philippines is outmatched by China—a rising state viewed as a successor to a declining US, even as unipolarity shifts toward bipolarity or multipolarity. Manila’s victories in the SCS are symbolic rather than material. Even the term “West Philippine Sea” lacks global recognition compared to Beijing’s preferred terminology. The Philippines has relied on a “public parliament,” emphasizing its rule-abiding stance and China’s violations. However, words alone cannot secure borders, and Manila’s limited capabilities necessitate expanding partnerships, particularly by returning to the US orbit.

The Philippines seeks to leverage great power rivalries, hoping to achieve its goals indirectly. By aligning with the US and anti-China bloc, it aims to secure its interests, especially if China weakens and the US-led order prevails. This strategy is both pragmatic, acknowledging its reliance on external support, and idealistic, assuming such alignments will lead to favorable outcomes. However, this dependence on the US is not without risks. Washington prioritizes its interests, maintaining the status quo between Manila and Beijing while promising support. Meanwhile, domestic governance challenges and scandals could erode public trust and weaken Manila’s position.

Ultimately, the Philippines’ geography ensures that China will always remain a neighbor and competitor, while the US remains a distant but influential partner. In realist terms, Beijing will prioritize its interests regardless of norms or regime change, making it more tolerable for Manila to engage with Washington as any agreement with Beijing on the South China Sea is anything but enduring.

Conclusion

It is fair to say that Peripheral Realism has proven valuable in understanding and assessing Philippine foreign policy in regard to its South China Sea claims. The theory explains why the Philippines continues to bandwagon with the US in spite of China’s growing power and status and is so bullish in its posturing regarding its claims. However, we must acknowledge that the theory has limitations in regard to the classification of China from the theory’s Cold War origins. Not all the tenets can be so clearly fitted in the context and situation of the Philippines. Finally, the theory’s historical development is premised on America’s presence in Latin America both by geography and the Monroe Doctrine neither being present in Southeast Asia. So it seems the theory may need adjusting to fit other regional contexts but it is also good that it inspires others to develop native theories that fit regional configurations to assist in explaining the phenomena of the international system.